Canice Prendergast
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3596100 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Canice Prendergast |
| NOMBRES | Canice |
| APELLIDO | Prendergast |
| FIRMA | PRENDERGAST C |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Chicago |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 102 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1996 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
The Allocation of Food to Food Banks
Feeding America allocates donated food to over 200 food banks. In 2005, it transitioned from a queueing mechanism to one where food banks use a specialized currency to bid for food. Food banks chose very different food than they received before. Small food banks acquired 72% more pounds per client than large food banks at little nutritional cost. This reallocation of food is estimated to have increased its value by 21%, or $115 million per annum.…
How Food Banks Use Markets to Feed the Poor
A difficult issue for organizations is how to assign valuable resources across competing opportunities. This work describes how Feeding America allocates about 300 million pounds of food a year to over two hundred food banks across the United States. It does so in an unusual way: in 2005, it switched from a centralized queuing system, where food banks would wait their turn, to a market based mechanism where they bid daily on truckloads of food us…
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. The intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper, and three primary results are shown. First, bureaucrats should be biased. Second, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal, while in other cases, they are more hostile to …
Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls
This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, whereas many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of othe…
Favoritism Under Social Pressure
This paper is concerned with the effect of nonmonetary incentives on behavior, in particular with the study of social pressure as a determinant of corruption. We offer empirical evidence that shows how professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We find that ref…
The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this incentive is important, bureaucracies (efficiently) respond by (i) ignoring legitimate consumer complaints, (ii) monitoring more in situations in which it…
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Empirical work testing for a negative trade-off between risk and incentives has not had much success: the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade-off. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, firms are co…
Consumers and Agency Problems
Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agents have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by agents. I distinguish cases where consumers have similar preferences to the principal, from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocations, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers dis…
Investigating Corruption
Agency theory has had little to say \n about the control of bureaucratic corruption, perhaps the \n greatest agency problem that exists. The author considers \n the role of incentive contracting in reducing corruption \n through the use of independent investigations-a common way \n to monitor corruption. In simple settings, bureaucratic \n corruption can be suppressed by rewarding and penalizing \n bureaucrats, depending on the independent \n inv…
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
This paper provides an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical work on the provision of incentives. It reviews the costs and benefits of many types of pay-for-performance, such as piece rates, promotions, and long-term incentives. The main conclusions are (i) while there is considerable evidence that individuals respond to pay-for-performance, there is less evidence that contracts are designed as predicted by the theory, (ii) there has…
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers
This paper examines individual decision making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn. The authors address this problem in the context of a manager making investment decisions on a project over time. They show that, in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information but ultimately he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information. The authors'…
Favoritism in Organizations
Objective measures of employee performance are rarely available. Instead, firms rely on subjective judgments by supervisors. Subjectivity opens the door to favoritism, where evaluators act on personal preferences toward subordinates to favor some employees over others. Firms must balance the costs of favoritism--arbitrary rewards and less productive job assignments--against supervisors' demands for authority over subordinates. The authors analyze…
Agency Issues
Favoritism in Organizations
Objective measures of employee performance are rarely available. Instead, firms rely on subjective judgments by supervisors. Subjectivity opens the door to favoritism, where evaluators act on personal preferences toward subordinates to favor some employees over others. Firms must balance the costs of favoritism--arbitrary rewards and less productive job assignments--against supervisors' demands for authority over subordinates. The authors analyze…
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Empirical work testing for a negative trade-off between risk and incentives has not had much success: the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade-off. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, firms are co…
The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this incentive is important, bureaucracies (efficiently) respond by (i) ignoring legitimate consumer complaints, (ii) monitoring more in situations in which it…
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers
This paper examines individual decision making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn. The authors address this problem in the context of a manager making investment decisions on a project over time. They show that, in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information but ultimately he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information. The authors'…
The Allocation of Food to Food Banks
Feeding America allocates donated food to over 200 food banks. In 2005, it transitioned from a queueing mechanism to one where food banks use a specialized currency to bid for food. Food banks chose very different food than they received before. Small food banks acquired 72% more pounds per client than large food banks at little nutritional cost. This reallocation of food is estimated to have increased its value by 21%, or $115 million per annum.…
How Food Banks Use Markets to Feed the Poor
A difficult issue for organizations is how to assign valuable resources across competing opportunities. This work describes how Feeding America allocates about 300 million pounds of food a year to over two hundred food banks across the United States. It does so in an unusual way: in 2005, it switched from a centralized queuing system, where food banks would wait their turn, to a market based mechanism where they bid daily on truckloads of food us…
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers
This paper examines individual decision making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn. The authors address this problem in the context of a manager making investment decisions on a project over time. They show that, in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information but ultimately he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information. The authors'…
Favoritism in Organizations
Objective measures of employee performance are rarely available. Instead, firms rely on subjective judgments by supervisors. Subjectivity opens the door to favoritism, where evaluators act on personal preferences toward subordinates to favor some employees over others. Firms must balance the costs of favoritism--arbitrary rewards and less productive job assignments--against supervisors' demands for authority over subordinates. The authors analyze…
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
This paper provides an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical work on the provision of incentives. It reviews the costs and benefits of many types of pay-for-performance, such as piece rates, promotions, and long-term incentives. The main conclusions are (i) while there is considerable evidence that individuals respond to pay-for-performance, there is less evidence that contracts are designed as predicted by the theory, (ii) there has…
Investigating Corruption
Agency theory has had little to say \n about the control of bureaucratic corruption, perhaps the \n greatest agency problem that exists. The author considers \n the role of incentive contracting in reducing corruption \n through the use of independent investigations-a common way \n to monitor corruption. In simple settings, bureaucratic \n corruption can be suppressed by rewarding and penalizing \n bureaucrats, depending on the independent \n inv…
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Empirical work testing for a negative trade-off between risk and incentives has not had much success: the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade-off. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, firms are co…
Consumers and Agency Problems
Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agents have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by agents. I distinguish cases where consumers have similar preferences to the principal, from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocations, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers dis…
The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this incentive is important, bureaucracies (efficiently) respond by (i) ignoring legitimate consumer complaints, (ii) monitoring more in situations in which it…
Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls
This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, whereas many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of othe…
Favoritism Under Social Pressure
This paper is concerned with the effect of nonmonetary incentives on behavior, in particular with the study of social pressure as a determinant of corruption. We offer empirical evidence that shows how professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We find that ref…
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. The intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper, and three primary results are shown. First, bureaucrats should be biased. Second, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal, while in other cases, they are more hostile to …
How Food Banks Use Markets to Feed the Poor
A difficult issue for organizations is how to assign valuable resources across competing opportunities. This work describes how Feeding America allocates about 300 million pounds of food a year to over two hundred food banks across the United States. It does so in an unusual way: in 2005, it switched from a centralized queuing system, where food banks would wait their turn, to a market based mechanism where they bid daily on truckloads of food us…
The Allocation of Food to Food Banks
Feeding America allocates donated food to over 200 food banks. In 2005, it transitioned from a queueing mechanism to one where food banks use a specialized currency to bid for food. Food banks chose very different food than they received before. Small food banks acquired 72% more pounds per client than large food banks at little nutritional cost. This reallocation of food is estimated to have increased its value by 21%, or $115 million per annum.…
Agency Issues
Economics (12 obras) · Business (10 obras) · Microeconomics (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · Incentive (5 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 obras)