Craig French
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3597462 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Craig French |
| NOMBRES | Craig |
| APELLIDO | French |
| FIRMA | FRENCH C |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Nottingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8843-5225 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Experiences of derealization A naive realist account
A major symptom of “Derealization/Depersonalization Disorder” is derealization. People who experience derealization report a sense of unreality when it comes to their surroundings, yet they still perceive those surroundings. How can this possibly be accommodated by a naive realist theory of experience – a theory on which the real external world is central to explaining the phenomenology of perception? I develop this question into a new problem fo…
On the Myth of Psychotherapy
Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz's claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been paid to his claim that psychotherapy is a myth. In the first part of this essay, I critically examine Szasz's discussion of psychotherapy to uncover the strongest version of his case for thinking th…
Mental health pluralism
In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon—mental health—denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all and only instances of mental health, and which illuminates what it is to be mentally healthy. In contrast, mental health pluralism is the idea that there are multiple mental health phenomena denoted b…
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
What is the nature of conscious sensory experience? In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience David Papineau sets out to answer this question. He argues for the qualitative view: conscious sensory experiences are "intrinsic qualitative properties of people that are only contingently representational" (6).This book is instructive, engaging, original, full of argument, straight-talking, and it defends an interesting view! I enthusiastically recommen…
How NaÏve Realism can Explain Both the Particularityandthe Generality of Experience
Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it-that particular object -looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been …
Idiosyncratic Perception
Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem
The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism
I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p . Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a sta…
Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge
In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p , then S knows that p . Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p . In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts “see” …
Nietzsche, Genealogy and Political Authority
Tamsin Shaw has suggested that Nietzsche's concerns included the ideological capacity of the state. I show that some support for this interpretation can be drawn from Nietzsche's own views about the threat to moral and intellectual independence posed by modern forms of political authority. If taken seriously, his insights allow us to appreciate how independent political judgment, and hence individual autonomy, can be systematically imperiled by t…
The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism
I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p . Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a sta…
How NaÏve Realism can Explain Both the Particularityandthe Generality of Experience
Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it-that particular object -looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been …
Mental health pluralism
In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon—mental health—denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all and only instances of mental health, and which illuminates what it is to be mentally healthy. In contrast, mental health pluralism is the idea that there are multiple mental health phenomena denoted b…
Nietzsche, Genealogy and Political Authority
Tamsin Shaw has suggested that Nietzsche's concerns included the ideological capacity of the state. I show that some support for this interpretation can be drawn from Nietzsche's own views about the threat to moral and intellectual independence posed by modern forms of political authority. If taken seriously, his insights allow us to appreciate how independent political judgment, and hence individual autonomy, can be systematically imperiled by t…
Nietzsche, Genealogy and Political Authority
Tamsin Shaw has suggested that Nietzsche's concerns included the ideological capacity of the state. I show that some support for this interpretation can be drawn from Nietzsche's own views about the threat to moral and intellectual independence posed by modern forms of political authority. If taken seriously, his insights allow us to appreciate how independent political judgment, and hence individual autonomy, can be systematically imperiled by t…
Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge
In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p , then S knows that p . Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p . In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts “see” …
The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism
I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p . Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a sta…
Idiosyncratic Perception
Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem
How NaÏve Realism can Explain Both the Particularityandthe Generality of Experience
Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it-that particular object -looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been …
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
What is the nature of conscious sensory experience? In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience David Papineau sets out to answer this question. He argues for the qualitative view: conscious sensory experiences are "intrinsic qualitative properties of people that are only contingently representational" (6).This book is instructive, engaging, original, full of argument, straight-talking, and it defends an interesting view! I enthusiastically recommen…
Mental health pluralism
In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon—mental health—denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all and only instances of mental health, and which illuminates what it is to be mentally healthy. In contrast, mental health pluralism is the idea that there are multiple mental health phenomena denoted b…
Experiences of derealization A naive realist account
A major symptom of “Derealization/Depersonalization Disorder” is derealization. People who experience derealization report a sense of unreality when it comes to their surroundings, yet they still perceive those surroundings. How can this possibly be accommodated by a naive realist theory of experience – a theory on which the real external world is central to explaining the phenomenology of perception? I develop this question into a new problem fo…
On the Myth of Psychotherapy
Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz's claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been paid to his claim that psychotherapy is a myth. In the first part of this essay, I critically examine Szasz's discussion of psychotherapy to uncover the strongest version of his case for thinking th…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Linguistics (2 obras) · Medicine (2 obras)