Adam Leite
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3597485 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Adam Leite |
| NOMBRES | Adam |
| APELLIDO | Leite |
| FIRMA | LEITE A |
| AFILIACIONES | Indiana University Bloomington |
| ORCID | 0009-0003-1802-2654 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 45 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1991 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Difficulties with Saying What One Thinks
Saying What One Thinks, by Léa Salje. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025, 160 pp. ISBN: 9780198914181. How do we know our minds – our thoughts, attitudes, and the like? Familiar sorts of accounts focus on, among other things, introspection understood as a quasi-perceptual faculty or process, reliable second-order ascriptive mechanisms, our ability to express our mental states by self-ascribing them, and various versions of the idea that we can…
Some challenges raised by unconscious belief
Eric Marcus's Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind urges that beliefs of the sort possessed by normal adult humans are "essentially self-conscious" (Marcus 2021, 6, 39). Marcus also grants that there are unconscious beliefs of the sort relevant in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy (34). He acknowledges a tension here, and his solution is clever: he holds that unconscious beliefs, too, essentially involve self-consciousness.…
Love, Value, and Reasons
It is a familiar thought that in friendship and romance, people’s good qualities are reasons for loving them. This chapter clarifies the kinds of reasons—and the forms of reasons-responsiveness and evaluation—at issue. It offers a new model for understanding love as a form of valuing. On this model, love is both a response to reasons and a source of reasons, and the two sets of reasons are complementary parts of a single coherent, interlocking pa…
Changing One's Mind
Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view . What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committe…
Experiential self‐understanding
The notion of insight is at one and the same time central to psychoanalysis and to the self-understanding that is part of everyday life. Through clinical material and critical engagement with contemporary philosophical work on self-knowledge, this paper clarifies one crucial aspect of this key notion. Self-understanding of the sort we have in mind, while of course involving cognitive elements, is not sufficiently accounted for by cognition about …
Why Don't I Know That I'm Not a BIV
But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True
Journal Article 'But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True!' Get access Adam Leite Adam Leite Indiana University, Bloomington Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 250, January 2013, Pages 81–104, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00107.x Published: 17 December 2012
Love as a Reactive Emotion
One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. 'Reactive love' is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill a…
Believing one’s reasons are good
Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief
Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist accounts of epistemic rationality fail because what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the content of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe . Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist can avoid Kelly’s objections. The paper concludes by sketching what I take to be the …
Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology
Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the trut…
Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming
Journal Article Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Get access Adam Leite Adam Leite Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 215, April 2004, Pages 232–251, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00349.x Published: 17 May 2004
Socrates' Critique of Cognitivism
Ethics and lexicography would seem, prima facie , to have little to do with each other. Yet Aristotle testifies that Socrates pursued both: Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to…
Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief
Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist accounts of epistemic rationality fail because what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the content of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe . Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist can avoid Kelly’s objections. The paper concludes by sketching what I take to be the …
Believing one’s reasons are good
Love as a Reactive Emotion
One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. 'Reactive love' is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill a…
Experiential self‐understanding
The notion of insight is at one and the same time central to psychoanalysis and to the self-understanding that is part of everyday life. Through clinical material and critical engagement with contemporary philosophical work on self-knowledge, this paper clarifies one crucial aspect of this key notion. Self-understanding of the sort we have in mind, while of course involving cognitive elements, is not sufficiently accounted for by cognition about …
Changing One's Mind
Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view . What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committe…
Socrates' Critique of Cognitivism
Ethics and lexicography would seem, prima facie , to have little to do with each other. Yet Aristotle testifies that Socrates pursued both: Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to…
Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming
Journal Article Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Get access Adam Leite Adam Leite Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 215, April 2004, Pages 232–251, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00349.x Published: 17 May 2004
Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology
Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the trut…
Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief
Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist accounts of epistemic rationality fail because what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the content of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe . Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist can avoid Kelly’s objections. The paper concludes by sketching what I take to be the …
Believing one’s reasons are good
Love as a Reactive Emotion
One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. 'Reactive love' is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill a…
But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True
Journal Article 'But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True!' Get access Adam Leite Adam Leite Indiana University, Bloomington Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 250, January 2013, Pages 81–104, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00107.x Published: 17 December 2012
Why Don't I Know That I'm Not a BIV
Changing One's Mind
Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view . What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committe…
Experiential self‐understanding
The notion of insight is at one and the same time central to psychoanalysis and to the self-understanding that is part of everyday life. Through clinical material and critical engagement with contemporary philosophical work on self-knowledge, this paper clarifies one crucial aspect of this key notion. Self-understanding of the sort we have in mind, while of course involving cognitive elements, is not sufficiently accounted for by cognition about …
Love, Value, and Reasons
It is a familiar thought that in friendship and romance, people’s good qualities are reasons for loving them. This chapter clarifies the kinds of reasons—and the forms of reasons-responsiveness and evaluation—at issue. It offers a new model for understanding love as a form of valuing. On this model, love is both a response to reasons and a source of reasons, and the two sets of reasons are complementary parts of a single coherent, interlocking pa…
Some challenges raised by unconscious belief
Eric Marcus's Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind urges that beliefs of the sort possessed by normal adult humans are "essentially self-conscious" (Marcus 2021, 6, 39). Marcus also grants that there are unconscious beliefs of the sort relevant in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy (34). He acknowledges a tension here, and his solution is clever: he holds that unconscious beliefs, too, essentially involve self-consciousness.…
Difficulties with Saying What One Thinks
Saying What One Thinks, by Léa Salje. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025, 160 pp. ISBN: 9780198914181. How do we know our minds – our thoughts, attitudes, and the like? Familiar sorts of accounts focus on, among other things, introspection understood as a quasi-perceptual faculty or process, reliable second-order ascriptive mechanisms, our ability to express our mental states by self-ascribing them, and various versions of the idea that we can…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 obras) · Psychoanalysis (3 obras) · Social Psychology (3 obras)