Ruth Weintraub
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3608305 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Ruth Weintraub |
| NOMBRES | Ruth |
| APELLIDO | Weintraub |
| FIRMA | WEINTRAUB R |
| AFILIACIONES | Tel Aviv University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9702-6263 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 21 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1959 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement
This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement.Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): selfundermining.I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show…
A Neglected Aspect of Hume’s Nominalism
In this paper, I point to two problems engendered by two assumptions that Hume makes. The first is his nominalism: the view that all ideas are fully determinate with respect to all the aspects that are represented in them. The second, perhaps hitherto unnoticed, is that names denote ideas. I propose some solutions, aiming to find one that is Humean
The Dis-Unity of Humean Space
My aim in this paper is to explore some metaphysical and psychological implications of the (contentious) idealist interpretation of the belief in external objects ("bodies") Hume ascribes to us in the Treatise. More specifically, I will argue that the interpretation commits Hume to the claim that space is spatially fragmented, both synchronically and (even more so) diachronically, and renders Hume incapable of allowing for all the spatial thought…
A New Humean Criticism of Our Inductive Practice
Hume’s familiar sceptical argument against induction brands as irrational our practice of generalising from observed regularities because of its reliance on the assumption that nature is uniform, an assumption which is unjustifiable. The argument which I wish to consider focuses instead on the observed regularities that are required if we are legitimately to extrapolate from experience. According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning …
Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational
Journal Article Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational? Get access Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Ruth Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 253, October 2013, Pages 740–759, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12065 Published: 13 September 2013
Locke vs. Hume
According to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he …
What Descartes' Demon Can Do and his Dream Cannot
The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes' scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducin…
On Sharp Boundaries for Vague Terms
The Lottery
A Bayesian Paradox
A seemingly plausible application of Bayesian decision-theoretic reasoning to determine one's rational degrees of belief yields a paradoxical conclusion: one ought to jettison one's intermediate credences in favour of more extreme (opinionated) ones. I discuss various attempts to solve the paradox, those involving the acceptance of the paradoxical conclusion, and those which attempt to block its derivation.
Naturalism, Explanation, and Akrasia
Si on la définit comme une action contraire au bon jugement de l'agent, l'action acrasique se trouve exclue par le principe selon lequel une personne a forcément l'intention de faire ce qu'elle juge devoir faire. Une fois ce principe rejeté, comme je le propose ici, le problème traditionnel de l'acrasie, qui est celui de sa possibilité même, s'évanouit. Je soutiens, cependant, qu'un problème plus limité semble se poser si nous admettons que les a…
The Spatiality of the Mental and the Mind-Body Problem
The sceptical challenge
What do we know? Are any of our beliefs reasonable? Scepticism gives a pessimistic reply to these important epistemological questions: we don't know anything, it replies; none of our beliefs are reasonable. Can these seemingly paradoxical claims be more than an intellectual curiosity? And if so, can they be refuted? Ruth Weintraub answers yes to both these questions. The sceptical challenge is a formidable one, and should be confronted, not dismi…
What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction
Journal Article What Was Hume’s Contribution to the Problem of Induction? Get access Ruth Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 460–470, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220309 Published: 01 October 1995
Fallibilism and Rational Belief
Objectivism without objective probabilities
Decision-theoretic epistemology
Unconscious Mental States
Journal Article Unconscious Mental States Get access Ruth Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 149, October 1987, Pages 423–432, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219572 Published: 01 October 1987
The Sea Ice Topography of M'Clure Strait in Winter and Summer of 1960 from Submarine Profiles
Submarine profiles of the ice underside in M'Clure Strait were obtained by USS Sargo in February 1960 and by USS Seadragon in August 1960. They gave the first quantitative measurements of the ice draft distribution in the strait and in the nearby Beaufort Sea shelf zone, as well as providing a seasonal comparison of ice conditions within a single year. Analysis of the profiles reveals a region of very high mean ice draft (7.8 m) and heavy ridging…
Establishing an Administrative Internship Program
TWENTY-FIVE young men and women from colleges in New York and New Jersey are the central participants in the second-year phase of a five-year experimental project: the Federal-College Internship Program.1 This group is being exposed to an experience that differs from that of the original twenty-five interns of last year. These differences reflect modifications of the initial design and administration prompted by a review of the operations of the …
Notice to Association Members
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
The Lottery
Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational
Journal Article Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational? Get access Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Ruth Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 253, October 2013, Pages 740–759, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12065 Published: 13 September 2013
Decision-theoretic epistemology
Establishing an Administrative Internship Program
TWENTY-FIVE young men and women from colleges in New York and New Jersey are the central participants in the second-year phase of a five-year experimental project: the Federal-College Internship Program.1 This group is being exposed to an experience that differs from that of the original twenty-five interns of last year. These differences reflect modifications of the initial design and administration prompted by a review of the operations of the …
Notice to Association Members
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Establishing an Administrative Internship Program
TWENTY-FIVE young men and women from colleges in New York and New Jersey are the central participants in the second-year phase of a five-year experimental project: the Federal-College Internship Program.1 This group is being exposed to an experience that differs from that of the original twenty-five interns of last year. These differences reflect modifications of the initial design and administration prompted by a review of the operations of the …
The Sea Ice Topography of M'Clure Strait in Winter and Summer of 1960 from Submarine Profiles
Submarine profiles of the ice underside in M'Clure Strait were obtained by USS Sargo in February 1960 and by USS Seadragon in August 1960. They gave the first quantitative measurements of the ice draft distribution in the strait and in the nearby Beaufort Sea shelf zone, as well as providing a seasonal comparison of ice conditions within a single year. Analysis of the profiles reveals a region of very high mean ice draft (7.8 m) and heavy ridging…
Unconscious Mental States
Journal Article Unconscious Mental States Get access Ruth Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 149, October 1987, Pages 423–432, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219572 Published: 01 October 1987
Objectivism without objective probabilities
Decision-theoretic epistemology
Fallibilism and Rational Belief
What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction
Journal Article What Was Hume’s Contribution to the Problem of Induction? Get access Ruth Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 460–470, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220309 Published: 01 October 1995
The sceptical challenge
What do we know? Are any of our beliefs reasonable? Scepticism gives a pessimistic reply to these important epistemological questions: we don't know anything, it replies; none of our beliefs are reasonable. Can these seemingly paradoxical claims be more than an intellectual curiosity? And if so, can they be refuted? Ruth Weintraub answers yes to both these questions. The sceptical challenge is a formidable one, and should be confronted, not dismi…
The Spatiality of the Mental and the Mind-Body Problem
Naturalism, Explanation, and Akrasia
Si on la définit comme une action contraire au bon jugement de l'agent, l'action acrasique se trouve exclue par le principe selon lequel une personne a forcément l'intention de faire ce qu'elle juge devoir faire. Une fois ce principe rejeté, comme je le propose ici, le problème traditionnel de l'acrasie, qui est celui de sa possibilité même, s'évanouit. Je soutiens, cependant, qu'un problème plus limité semble se poser si nous admettons que les a…
The Lottery
A Bayesian Paradox
A seemingly plausible application of Bayesian decision-theoretic reasoning to determine one's rational degrees of belief yields a paradoxical conclusion: one ought to jettison one's intermediate credences in favour of more extreme (opinionated) ones. I discuss various attempts to solve the paradox, those involving the acceptance of the paradoxical conclusion, and those which attempt to block its derivation.
On Sharp Boundaries for Vague Terms
What Descartes' Demon Can Do and his Dream Cannot
The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes' scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducin…
Locke vs. Hume
According to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he …
A New Humean Criticism of Our Inductive Practice
Hume’s familiar sceptical argument against induction brands as irrational our practice of generalising from observed regularities because of its reliance on the assumption that nature is uniform, an assumption which is unjustifiable. The argument which I wish to consider focuses instead on the observed regularities that are required if we are legitimately to extrapolate from experience. According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning …
Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational
Journal Article Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational? Get access Weintraub Ruth Weintraub Ruth Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 253, October 2013, Pages 740–759, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12065 Published: 13 September 2013
The Dis-Unity of Humean Space
My aim in this paper is to explore some metaphysical and psychological implications of the (contentious) idealist interpretation of the belief in external objects ("bodies") Hume ascribes to us in the Treatise. More specifically, I will argue that the interpretation commits Hume to the claim that space is spatially fragmented, both synchronically and (even more so) diachronically, and renders Hume incapable of allowing for all the spatial thought…
A Neglected Aspect of Hume’s Nominalism
In this paper, I point to two problems engendered by two assumptions that Hume makes. The first is his nominalism: the view that all ideas are fully determinate with respect to all the aspects that are represented in them. The second, perhaps hitherto unnoticed, is that names denote ideas. I propose some solutions, aiming to find one that is Humean
Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement
This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement.Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): selfundermining.I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show…
Philosophy (17 obras) · Epistemology (15 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Philosophy of science (5 obras) · Philosophy of language (4 obras)