Jowei Chen
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3628262 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jowei Chen |
| NOMBRES | Jowei |
| APELLIDO | Chen |
| FIRMA | CHEN J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Michigan |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 280 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2007 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2016 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Article II Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives both the Senate and the President a role in the appointment of public bureaucrats. Yet, since the drafting of that constitutional passage, changes within the Senate and Executive have created new ways for officials to influence who gets appointed to the public bureaucracy. The Senate has developed intricate vetting procedures within its committees, while the Executive Branch has created new meth…
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
We present a formal model explaining that US presidents strategically unionize federal employees to reduce bureaucratic turnover and ‘anchor’ the ideological composition of like-minded agency workforces. To test our model’s predictions, we advance a method of estimating bureaucratic ideology via the campaign contributions of federal employees; we then use these bureaucratic ideal point estimates in a comprehensive empirical test of our model. Con…
Unintentional Gerrymandering
While conventional wisdom holds that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections results from intentional partisan and racial gerrymandering, we demonstrate that substantial bias can also emerge from patterns of human geography. We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes. To m…
Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political Participation
Do distributive benefits increase voter participation? This article argues that the government delivery of distributive aid increases the incumbent party's turnout but decreases opposition‐party turnout. The theoretical intuition here is that an incumbent who delivers distributive benefits to the opposing party's voters partially mitigates these voters’ ideological opposition to the incumbent, hence weakening their motivation to turn out and oust…
The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures
How does the electoral geography of legislative districts affect pork barreling? This article presents a formal model extending Mayhew's classic credit‐claiming theory to account for the electoral geography of bicameralism. Under bicameralism, upper chamber (Senate) and lower chamber (Assembly) legislators who share overlapping constituencies must collaborate to bring home pork projects. Collaboration is easier between a Senator and an Assembly M…
The Law of k/n
Recent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending, which Weingast et al. (1981) formalized as the law of 1/n. However, empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings. The positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures but not for lower chambers. We b…
Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political Participation
Do distributive benefits increase voter participation? This article argues that the government delivery of distributive aid increases the incumbent party's turnout but decreases opposition‐party turnout. The theoretical intuition here is that an incumbent who delivers distributive benefits to the opposing party's voters partially mitigates these voters’ ideological opposition to the incumbent, hence weakening their motivation to turn out and oust…
Unintentional Gerrymandering
While conventional wisdom holds that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections results from intentional partisan and racial gerrymandering, we demonstrate that substantial bias can also emerge from patterns of human geography. We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes. To m…
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
We present a formal model explaining that US presidents strategically unionize federal employees to reduce bureaucratic turnover and ‘anchor’ the ideological composition of like-minded agency workforces. To test our model’s predictions, we advance a method of estimating bureaucratic ideology via the campaign contributions of federal employees; we then use these bureaucratic ideal point estimates in a comprehensive empirical test of our model. Con…
The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures
How does the electoral geography of legislative districts affect pork barreling? This article presents a formal model extending Mayhew's classic credit‐claiming theory to account for the electoral geography of bicameralism. Under bicameralism, upper chamber (Senate) and lower chamber (Assembly) legislators who share overlapping constituencies must collaborate to bring home pork projects. Collaboration is easier between a Senator and an Assembly M…
The Law of k/n
Recent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending, which Weingast et al. (1981) formalized as the law of 1/n. However, empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings. The positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures but not for lower chambers. We b…
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Article II Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives both the Senate and the President a role in the appointment of public bureaucrats. Yet, since the drafting of that constitutional passage, changes within the Senate and Executive have created new ways for officials to influence who gets appointed to the public bureaucracy. The Senate has developed intricate vetting procedures within its committees, while the Executive Branch has created new meth…
Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering
The Law of k/n
Recent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending, which Weingast et al. (1981) formalized as the law of 1/n. However, empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings. The positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures but not for lower chambers. We b…
The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures
How does the electoral geography of legislative districts affect pork barreling? This article presents a formal model extending Mayhew's classic credit‐claiming theory to account for the electoral geography of bicameralism. Under bicameralism, upper chamber (Senate) and lower chamber (Assembly) legislators who share overlapping constituencies must collaborate to bring home pork projects. Collaboration is easier between a Senator and an Assembly M…
Unintentional Gerrymandering
While conventional wisdom holds that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections results from intentional partisan and racial gerrymandering, we demonstrate that substantial bias can also emerge from patterns of human geography. We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes. To m…
Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political Participation
Do distributive benefits increase voter participation? This article argues that the government delivery of distributive aid increases the incumbent party's turnout but decreases opposition‐party turnout. The theoretical intuition here is that an incumbent who delivers distributive benefits to the opposing party's voters partially mitigates these voters’ ideological opposition to the incumbent, hence weakening their motivation to turn out and oust…
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Article II Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives both the Senate and the President a role in the appointment of public bureaucrats. Yet, since the drafting of that constitutional passage, changes within the Senate and Executive have created new ways for officials to influence who gets appointed to the public bureaucracy. The Senate has developed intricate vetting procedures within its committees, while the Executive Branch has created new meth…
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
We present a formal model explaining that US presidents strategically unionize federal employees to reduce bureaucratic turnover and ‘anchor’ the ideological composition of like-minded agency workforces. To test our model’s predictions, we advance a method of estimating bureaucratic ideology via the campaign contributions of federal employees; we then use these bureaucratic ideal point estimates in a comprehensive empirical test of our model. Con…
Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering
Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Political science (7 obras) · Economics (6 obras) · Politics (5 obras) · Legislature (4 obras) · Political economy (4 obras) · Public Administration (4 obras) · Public Administration (4 obras)