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Carl Shapiro

Datos Biográficos

ID3706921
NOMBRECarl Shapiro
NOMBRESCarl
APELLIDOShapiro
FIRMASHAPIRO C
AFILIACIONESPrinceton University
ORCID0000-0003-4430-3655
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS12
TOTAL DE CITAS168
OBRAS COMO AUTOR12
OBRAS COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1982
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2025
ÍNDICE H5
  • Acquisitions to Enter New Markets

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2025

    How should antitrust enforcers treat acquisitions by successful firms to enter new markets? Should a major pharmaceutical company with an extensive sales and distribution network be permitted to acquire a popular drug that does not compete against any of the drugs it already owns? Throughout American economic history, expansion by successful firms into new markets has played a vital role in promoting competition and spurring economic growth. Howe…

  • Protecting Competition in the American Economy

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2019•Referencias: 16

    Accumulating evidence points to the need for more vigorous antitrust enforcement in the United States in three areas. First, stricter merger control is warranted in an economy where large, highly efficient and profitable "superstar" firms account for an increasing share of economic activity. Evidence from merger retrospectives further supports the conclusion that stricter merger control is needed. Second, greater vigilance is needed to prevent do…

  • Ecosystem services science, practice, and policy

    Open Access•Carl D Shapiro, Carl Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Ecological Economics•2015

  • Probabilistic Patents

    Open Access•Mark A Lemley, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2005•Citada por: 9•Referencias: 20

    Economists often assume that a patent gives its owner a well-defined legal right to exclude others from practicing the invention described in the patent. In practice, however, the rights afforded to patent holders are highly uncertain. Under patent law, a patent is no guarantee of exclusion but more precisely a legal right to try to exclude. Since only 0.1% of all patents are litigated to trial, and since nearly half of fully litigated patents ar…

  • Antitrust Policy

    Open Access•William E Kovacic, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2000•Citada por: 8•Referencias: 10

    Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and monopolization and treated violations as crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary po…

  • Systems Competition and Network Effects

    Open Access•Michael L Katz, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Citada por: 49•Referencias: 18

    This paper discusses firm behavior, market performance, and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets, i.e., markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits. In such markets, which include communications networks and 'hardware/software' networks, popular products are inherently more valuable. These 'network effects' can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation …

  • Symposium on the Economics of Liability

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1991

    Has the U.S. liability system run amok? Many commentators feel it has, as do many executives who feel that the liability “tax” discourages innovation and ultimately fails to promote safety. On the other hand, economists have ceaselessly pointed out that when one party is made liable for injury caused to another, an externality has been internalized. This symposium is intended to clarify just what economists know about the U.S. liability system: i…

  • On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro, Robert D Willig•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1990•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 5

    The U.S. Congress is currently considering several bills to alter the antitrust treatment of collaborative production activities among rival firms. This paper sketches the tradeoffs involved in altering U.S. antitrust treatment of joint venture production activities among rival firms. This requires understanding the nature, benefits, difficulties and dangers to competition of production joint ventures; identifying their degrees of prevalence in t…

  • Dynamic R & D Competition

    Gene M Grossman, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1987•Citada por: 7

    Journal Article Dynamic R & D Competition Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Shapiro Carl Shapiro Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 372–387, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232884 Published: 01 June 1987

  • Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities

    Michael L Katz, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1986•Citada por: 85

    We analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant. The pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored. A sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it. Key findings include the following: (1) compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market, but excessive standardization can occur; (2) in the absence of sponsors,…

  • Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations

    Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1983

    This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating seller…

  • A Theory of Factor Mobility

    Gene M Grossman, Carl D Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 2

    In this paper we study the determinants of intersectoral factor mobility. Mobility is the outgrowth of a prior investment decision. In particular, we focus on the human capital (i.e., training) decisions of workers. Uncertainty isa critical feature in such training decisions. The acquisition of general (vs. specific) skills allows a worker to select the more favorable sector after uncertainty is resolved. Thus general training has option value, w…

  • Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities

    Michael L Katz, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1986•Citada por: 85

    We analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant. The pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored. A sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it. Key findings include the following: (1) compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market, but excessive standardization can occur; (2) in the absence of sponsors,…

  • Systems Competition and Network Effects

    Open Access•Michael L Katz, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Citada por: 49•Referencias: 18

    This paper discusses firm behavior, market performance, and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets, i.e., markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits. In such markets, which include communications networks and 'hardware/software' networks, popular products are inherently more valuable. These 'network effects' can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation …

  • Probabilistic Patents

    Open Access•Mark A Lemley, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2005•Citada por: 9•Referencias: 20

    Economists often assume that a patent gives its owner a well-defined legal right to exclude others from practicing the invention described in the patent. In practice, however, the rights afforded to patent holders are highly uncertain. Under patent law, a patent is no guarantee of exclusion but more precisely a legal right to try to exclude. Since only 0.1% of all patents are litigated to trial, and since nearly half of fully litigated patents ar…

  • Antitrust Policy

    Open Access•William E Kovacic, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2000•Citada por: 8•Referencias: 10

    Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and monopolization and treated violations as crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary po…

  • Dynamic R & D Competition

    Gene M Grossman, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1987•Citada por: 7

    Journal Article Dynamic R & D Competition Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Shapiro Carl Shapiro Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 372–387, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232884 Published: 01 June 1987

  • On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro, Robert D Willig•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1990•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 5

    The U.S. Congress is currently considering several bills to alter the antitrust treatment of collaborative production activities among rival firms. This paper sketches the tradeoffs involved in altering U.S. antitrust treatment of joint venture production activities among rival firms. This requires understanding the nature, benefits, difficulties and dangers to competition of production joint ventures; identifying their degrees of prevalence in t…

  • A Theory of Factor Mobility

    Gene M Grossman, Carl D Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 2

    In this paper we study the determinants of intersectoral factor mobility. Mobility is the outgrowth of a prior investment decision. In particular, we focus on the human capital (i.e., training) decisions of workers. Uncertainty isa critical feature in such training decisions. The acquisition of general (vs. specific) skills allows a worker to select the more favorable sector after uncertainty is resolved. Thus general training has option value, w…

  • A Theory of Factor Mobility

    Gene M Grossman, Carl D Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 2

    In this paper we study the determinants of intersectoral factor mobility. Mobility is the outgrowth of a prior investment decision. In particular, we focus on the human capital (i.e., training) decisions of workers. Uncertainty isa critical feature in such training decisions. The acquisition of general (vs. specific) skills allows a worker to select the more favorable sector after uncertainty is resolved. Thus general training has option value, w…

  • Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations

    Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1983

    This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating seller…

  • Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities

    Michael L Katz, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1986•Citada por: 85

    We analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant. The pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored. A sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it. Key findings include the following: (1) compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market, but excessive standardization can occur; (2) in the absence of sponsors,…

  • Dynamic R & D Competition

    Gene M Grossman, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1987•Citada por: 7

    Journal Article Dynamic R & D Competition Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Shapiro Carl Shapiro Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 372–387, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232884 Published: 01 June 1987

  • On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro, Robert D Willig•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1990•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 5

    The U.S. Congress is currently considering several bills to alter the antitrust treatment of collaborative production activities among rival firms. This paper sketches the tradeoffs involved in altering U.S. antitrust treatment of joint venture production activities among rival firms. This requires understanding the nature, benefits, difficulties and dangers to competition of production joint ventures; identifying their degrees of prevalence in t…

  • Symposium on the Economics of Liability

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1991

    Has the U.S. liability system run amok? Many commentators feel it has, as do many executives who feel that the liability “tax” discourages innovation and ultimately fails to promote safety. On the other hand, economists have ceaselessly pointed out that when one party is made liable for injury caused to another, an externality has been internalized. This symposium is intended to clarify just what economists know about the U.S. liability system: i…

  • Systems Competition and Network Effects

    Open Access•Michael L Katz, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Citada por: 49•Referencias: 18

    This paper discusses firm behavior, market performance, and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets, i.e., markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits. In such markets, which include communications networks and 'hardware/software' networks, popular products are inherently more valuable. These 'network effects' can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation …

  • Antitrust Policy

    Open Access•William E Kovacic, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2000•Citada por: 8•Referencias: 10

    Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and monopolization and treated violations as crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary po…

  • Probabilistic Patents

    Open Access•Mark A Lemley, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2005•Citada por: 9•Referencias: 20

    Economists often assume that a patent gives its owner a well-defined legal right to exclude others from practicing the invention described in the patent. In practice, however, the rights afforded to patent holders are highly uncertain. Under patent law, a patent is no guarantee of exclusion but more precisely a legal right to try to exclude. Since only 0.1% of all patents are litigated to trial, and since nearly half of fully litigated patents ar…

  • Ecosystem services science, practice, and policy

    Open Access•Carl D Shapiro, Carl Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Ecological Economics•2015

  • Protecting Competition in the American Economy

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2019•Referencias: 16

    Accumulating evidence points to the need for more vigorous antitrust enforcement in the United States in three areas. First, stricter merger control is warranted in an economy where large, highly efficient and profitable "superstar" firms account for an increasing share of economic activity. Evidence from merger retrospectives further supports the conclusion that stricter merger control is needed. Second, greater vigilance is needed to prevent do…

  • Acquisitions to Enter New Markets

    Open Access•Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2025

    How should antitrust enforcers treat acquisitions by successful firms to enter new markets? Should a major pharmaceutical company with an extensive sales and distribution network be permitted to acquire a popular drug that does not compete against any of the drugs it already owns? Throughout American economic history, expansion by successful firms into new markets has played a vital role in promoting competition and spurring economic growth. Howe…

Business (9 obras) · Economics (9 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Merger and Competition Analysis (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Industrial organization (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Law and economics (3 obras) · Actuarial science (2 obras)

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