Yingyi Qian
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3822706 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Yingyi Qian |
| NOMBRES | Yingyi |
| APELLIDO | Qian |
| FIRMA | QIAN Y |
| AFILIACIONES | Stanford University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 573 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1993 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2006 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Entrepreneurship in China and Russia Compared
Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinct…
Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives
Entrepreneurship
Who are China's Entrepreneurs
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers' performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encoura…
Reform without Losers
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers o…
From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style
In 1995, China began a profound reform of its state‐owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state‐owned enterprises at the county level and mass lay‐offs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments have initiated these reforms, which are proceeding in economically and politically sensible ways. We then argue that privatization, Chinese style, rests on an adequate ec…
Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--hel…
China's transition to markets
This paper studies the relationship between decentralization and the success of reform in China. We argue that a particular form of decentralization—called market-preserving federalism Chinese style—provides the critical foundations for market success. China's form of decentralization has served the critical purpose of creating markets at a time when political resistance to economic reform remained strong and when the durability of the reforms wa…
Federalism, Chinese Style
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. Th…
Why China's economic reforms differ
China's thirteen years of economic reforms (1979-1991) have achieved an average GNP annual growth rate of 8.6%.What makes China's reforms differ from those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the sustained entry and expansion of the non-state sector.We argue that the organization structure of the economy matters.Unlike their unitary hierarchical structure based on functional or specialization principles (the Uform), China's hierarchical eco…
Federalism, Chinese Style
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. Th…
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--hel…
Reform without Losers
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers o…
Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinct…
Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory
Why China's economic reforms differ
China's thirteen years of economic reforms (1979-1991) have achieved an average GNP annual growth rate of 8.6%.What makes China's reforms differ from those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the sustained entry and expansion of the non-state sector.We argue that the organization structure of the economy matters.Unlike their unitary hierarchical structure based on functional or specialization principles (the Uform), China's hierarchical eco…
Federalism, Chinese Style
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. Th…
China's transition to markets
This paper studies the relationship between decentralization and the success of reform in China. We argue that a particular form of decentralization—called market-preserving federalism Chinese style—provides the critical foundations for market success. China's form of decentralization has served the critical purpose of creating markets at a time when political resistance to economic reform remained strong and when the durability of the reforms wa…
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--hel…
From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style
In 1995, China began a profound reform of its state‐owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state‐owned enterprises at the county level and mass lay‐offs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments have initiated these reforms, which are proceeding in economically and politically sensible ways. We then argue that privatization, Chinese style, rests on an adequate ec…
Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers' performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encoura…
Reform without Losers
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers o…
Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives
Entrepreneurship
Who are China's Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship in China and Russia Compared
Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinct…
Political science (12 obras) · Economics (11 obras) · China (8 obras) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (7 obras) · Market economy (7 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Business (5 obras) · Economic system (5 obras) · Federalism (5 obras) · Incentive (5 obras)