Wayne A Davis
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3823771 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Wayne A Davis |
| NOMBRES | Wayne A |
| APELLIDO | Davis |
| FIRMA | DAVIS W A |
| AFILIACIONES | Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 18 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1979 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Indexical shift
“Indexical shift” is said to occur when allegedly “pure” indexicals have referents other than those Kaplan codified. I argue first that indexical shift is even more widespread than has so far been recognized, occurring even in English propositional attitude and speech act reports, and that I , here , and how like he and that can be used anaphorically and demonstratively as well as deictically. I then argue that the leading theories developed to a…
Epistemic Possibility, Concessive Knowledge Attributions, and Fallibilism
I argue that modal terms have an epistemic interpretation on which concessive knowledge attributions are semantically contradictory. This is compatible with the fallibilist view that the basis on which we know something need not entail it, but not with the view that what is known need not be epistemically certain or necessary. The apparent contradictoriness of concessive knowledge attributions is not due to mere implicature, nor to assertion upda…
Loose talk, the context of assessment, and skeptical invariantism
Russell ([2022]. “Fancy Loose Talk About Knowledge.” Inquiry 65: 789–820.) defends a novel form of skeptical invariantism, according to which knowledge ascriptions are hardly ever true because they are so demanding, but nonetheless are ordinarily used loosely to communicate truths, where the felicity of loose talk is relative to the context of assessment as well as the context of use. I argue that while there is very good reason to believe that ‘…
Propositions and attitudinal objects
Metalinguistic' negations, denial, and idioms
How normative is implicature
Meaning, expression, and thought
This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a …
Meaning, Expression and Thought
This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean programme, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a…
Probabilistic Causality
Technical flaws in the coherence theory
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
Indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions. I seek to account for this difference within the general possible-worlds framework developed by Stalnaker and Lewis. I argue that their truth conditions hold for indicative conditionals, and that similar but different conditions hold for subjunctive conditionals. An indicative conditional is true only if its consequent is true in the antecedent-world that is most similar to …
How normative is implicature
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
Indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions. I seek to account for this difference within the general possible-worlds framework developed by Stalnaker and Lewis. I argue that their truth conditions hold for indicative conditionals, and that similar but different conditions hold for subjunctive conditionals. An indicative conditional is true only if its consequent is true in the antecedent-world that is most similar to …
Metalinguistic' negations, denial, and idioms
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
Indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions. I seek to account for this difference within the general possible-worlds framework developed by Stalnaker and Lewis. I argue that their truth conditions hold for indicative conditionals, and that similar but different conditions hold for subjunctive conditionals. An indicative conditional is true only if its consequent is true in the antecedent-world that is most similar to …
Technical flaws in the coherence theory
Probabilistic Causality
Meaning, Expression and Thought
This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean programme, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a…
Meaning, expression, and thought
This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a …
How normative is implicature
Metalinguistic' negations, denial, and idioms
Propositions and attitudinal objects
Epistemic Possibility, Concessive Knowledge Attributions, and Fallibilism
I argue that modal terms have an epistemic interpretation on which concessive knowledge attributions are semantically contradictory. This is compatible with the fallibilist view that the basis on which we know something need not entail it, but not with the view that what is known need not be epistemically certain or necessary. The apparent contradictoriness of concessive knowledge attributions is not due to mere implicature, nor to assertion upda…
Loose talk, the context of assessment, and skeptical invariantism
Russell ([2022]. “Fancy Loose Talk About Knowledge.” Inquiry 65: 789–820.) defends a novel form of skeptical invariantism, according to which knowledge ascriptions are hardly ever true because they are so demanding, but nonetheless are ordinarily used loosely to communicate truths, where the felicity of loose talk is relative to the context of assessment as well as the context of use. I argue that while there is very good reason to believe that ‘…
Indexical shift
“Indexical shift” is said to occur when allegedly “pure” indexicals have referents other than those Kaplan codified. I argue first that indexical shift is even more widespread than has so far been recognized, occurring even in English propositional attitude and speech act reports, and that I , here , and how like he and that can be used anaphorically and demonstratively as well as deictically. I then argue that the leading theories developed to a…
Philosophy (8 obras) · Psychology (7 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Linguistics (4 obras) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Pragmatics (3 obras)