Robert Hanna
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3873702 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Robert Hanna |
| NOMBRES | Robert |
| APELLIDO | Hanna |
| FIRMA | HANNA R |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Colorado Boulder |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 37 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 60 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 37 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1984 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
The Non-Conceptuality of Rational Human Intelligence and The Impossibility of Artificial Intelligence
The core argument of this essay has four parts: (i) that all actual or really possible digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, especially including so-called “artificial intelligence” or AI, have ten fundamental limitations, (ii) that rational human intelligence is essentially a special non-basic or composite universal innate mental capacity or power for what I call authentic human creativity, by virtue of the essentially …
The Mind-Body Politic
Kant's shorter writings
This collection highlights the importance of Kant's shorter writings, which span the entire intellectual career of this seminal thinker. It contrasts with other philosophical studies of Kant's work, which typically focus on a specific period of his career, and on either his theoretical philosophy or his practical philosophy. These shorter works offer a framework for understanding several central questions of critical philosophy in the context of …
Cognition, Content, and the A Priori
This book develops a unified contemporary Kantian theory of rational human cognition and knowledge. Along the way, it provides accounts of (i) intentionality and its contents, including non-conceptual content and conceptual content, (ii) sense perception and perceptual knowledge, including perceptual self-knowledge, (iii) the analytic-synthetic distinction, (iv) the nature of logic, and (v) a priori truth and knowledge in mathematics, logic, and …
Kant’s anti-mechanism and Kantian anti-mechanism
Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content
In this paper, I argue that if you want to be a consistent Kantian transcendental idealist, then you have to defend the strongest possible version of Non-Conceptualism; but if you want to be a consistent Conceptualist, then Hegel was absolutely right that you have to go all the way to absolute idealism and what I call 'super-Conceptualism', because the strongest possible version of Non-Conceptualism trumps any weaker version of Conceptualism. So …
The return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
Without a doubt, the greatest urban legend of contemporary philosophy is the beliefthat Quine refuted the A-S distinction in the Two Dogmas of the Empiricism in1951. The central claim of this essay is that the right theory of mental content and humanrationality on the one hand, and the analytic-synthetic distinction on the other,are explanatorily complementary, mutually supporting, and jointly cogent. One veryimportant further consequence of this…
The Kantian's Revenge
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Kant and Skepticism - Michael N. Forster
In this little book, or longish essay, Forster argues that the two primary concerns of the CPR and the Critical Philosophy are first to respond to scepticism, and secondly to develop a reformed metaphysics, i.e., transcendental idealism. But most philosophical treatments of scepticism fail to distinguish between (i) Cartesian ‘veil‐of‐perception’ scepticism or Berkeleian sceptical metaphysical phenomenalism, (ii) Humean scepticism about (a) alleg…
Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction
This paper is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B Deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring thes…
Rationality and Logic
An argument that logic is intrinsically psychological and human psychology is intrinsically logical, and that the connection between human rationality and logic is both constitutive and mutual. In Rationality and Logic, Robert Hanna argues that logic is intrinsically psychological and that human psychology is intrinsically logical. He claims that logic is cognitively constructed by rational animals (including humans) and that rational animals are…
Reason, Freedom and Kant
According to Kant, being purely rational or purely reasonable and being autonomously free are one and the same thing. But how can this be so? How can my innate capacity for pure reason ever motivate me to do anything, whether the right thing or the wrong thing? What I will suggest is that the fundamental connection between reason and freedom, both for Kant and in reality, is precisely our human biological life and spontaneity of the will , a conj…
Kant and the Analytic Tradition
Truth and Human Nature
This chapter develops and defends four claims about Kant's theory of truth. The first is that Kant holds that ‘the accordance of my cognition with its object’ is the strictly and analytically correct, yet metaphysically and epistemologically neutral, explication of the concept of truth. Second, that the idea of a ‘real definition’ of truth is equivalent to Kant's notion of a criterion of truth. Third, that in denying that there is a real definiti…
Mathematics for Humans
This chapter examines Kant's much-criticized views on mathematics in general and arithmetic in particular. It makes a case for the claim that Kant's theory of arithmetic is not subject to the most familiar and forceful objection against it, namely, that his doctrine of the dependence of arithmetic on time is plainly false, or even worse, simply unintelligible. It is argued that Kant's doctrine about time and arithmetic is highly original, fully i…
Where There's a Will There's a Way
This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom a…
Direct Perceptual Realism II
This chapter explores the ‘direct’ aspect of direct perceptual realism, and in particular, Kant's theory of non-conceptual perceptual content. A cognition is direct in the Kantian sense if and only if it refers ‘immediately’ (unmittelbar) to an object, and in turn, a cognition refers immediately to an object if and only if it is non-epistemic (belief-independent), non-conceptual (concept-independent), and otherwise unmediated (in the sense that i…
Manifest Realism II
This chapter aims to work out the positive theory behind Kant's surprising claim that gold is necessarily a yellow metal, using scientific essentialism only as a critical foil. It discusses Kant's theory of natural kind terms and scientific realism in the manifest image. It explains Kant's Other Joke, which vindicates both natural science in general and fundamental physics in particular in a way that would similarly flummox the noumenal scientifi…
Direct Perceptual Realism I
This chapter examines Kant's argument for direct perceptual realism. It begins with a negative evaluation of Kant's Refutation and then moves towards a more positive line of analysis. It is argued that although Kant's Refutation of Idealism fails to establish the conceptual correctness and judgmental truth of outer perceptions of distal material objects, it does nevertheless establish the truth of content externalism. And when it is supplemented …
Manifest Realism I
This chapter makes a negative case for Kant's manifest realism by criticizing the leading contemporary version of maximal scientific realism, namely, scientific essentialism. It begins with a discussion of what is scientific essentialism. It presents four distinct ways that Kant would criticize scientific essentialism: the empirical inaccessibility of the microphysical world, why there is no necessary a posteriori, the antimony of essentialism, a…
How Do We Know Necessary Truths?
This chapter provides a general framework for properly understanding Kant's famous modal-epistemological slogan, ‘reason has insight only into what it self-produces according to its own design,’ in terms of active a priori knowledge and pure practical reason, while rejecting any appeal to strong transcendental idealism, and also effectively avoiding platonism, conventionalism, scientific essentialism, and modal scepticism alike. This framework wi…
Rationality and the Ethics of Logic
Kant's Correspondence Theory of Truth
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Kant, Science, and Human Nature
This book argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the ‘exact sciences’ — relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. It has two aims, one negative and one positive. Its negative aim is to develop a Kantian critique of scientific naturalism. Its positive and more fundamental aim is to work out the elements of a humane, realistic, and non…
Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy
Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and of the relation between them
Psychologism
When did psychology become a distinct discipline? What links the Continental and Analytic traditions in philosophy? Both these questions are answered by this extraordinary account of psychologism in Germany at the turn of the century. Martin Kusch explores the origins of psychologism through the work of two major figures in the history of Twentieth Century philosophy: Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl. Using psychological and historical reconstruc…
Kant, Science, and Human Nature
This book argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the ‘exact sciences’ — relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. It has two aims, one negative and one positive. Its negative aim is to develop a Kantian critique of scientific naturalism. Its positive and more fundamental aim is to work out the elements of a humane, realistic, and non…
Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction
This paper is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B Deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring thes…
Carnap's Construction of the World
A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism
According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) Gold is a yellow metal is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of essentialism (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) Gold is the element with atomic …
Logical Cognition
We face thereby a remarkable situation in connection -with the ideal objectivities with which the logician has to do. They have, on the one hand, a peculiar kind of being-for-themselves and also a being-in-themselves; and we have the a priori truths relating to them. This 'in-itself means: they are what they are, irrespective of whether they are counted, thought, judged, known or not... On the other hand, it is unthinkable that such ideal objects…
The Inner and the Outer
In Skeptical idealism says that possibly nothing exists outside my own conscious mental states. Purported refutations of skeptical idealism – whether Descartes's, Locke's, Reid's, Kant's, Moore's, Putnam's, or Burge's – are philosophically scandalous: they have convinced no one. I argue (1) that what is wrong with the failed refutations is that they have attempted to prove the wrong thing – i.e., that necessarily I have veridical perceptions of d…
The Relation of Form and Stuff in Husserl's Grammar of Pure Logic
Husserl, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, shows that formal logic is the anticipation (or empty intention) of inquiry into the relations of thought, language, and being which he calls transcendental An essential aspect of Husserl's treatment of formal logic is his endeavor to show both the necessity and the complexity of the relation of form and stuff (or content) in propositions considered at the most elemental level of pure logic. This H…
Participants and Bystanders
Logical Cognition
We face thereby a remarkable situation in connection -with the ideal objectivities with which the logician has to do. They have, on the one hand, a peculiar kind of being-for-themselves and also a being-in-themselves; and we have the a priori truths relating to them. This 'in-itself means: they are what they are, irrespective of whether they are counted, thought, judged, known or not... On the other hand, it is unthinkable that such ideal objects…
A Study of Concepts
Past, Space, and Self
Extending Direct Reference
Psychologism
When did psychology become a distinct discipline? What links the Continental and Analytic traditions in philosophy? Both these questions are answered by this extraordinary account of psychologism in Germany at the turn of the century. Martin Kusch explores the origins of psychologism through the work of two major figures in the history of Twentieth Century philosophy: Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl. Using psychological and historical reconstruc…
A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism
According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) Gold is a yellow metal is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of essentialism (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) Gold is the element with atomic …
Kant, Truth and Human Nature
Etude de la conception nominale de la verite developpee par Kant dans la Logique transcendantale de la «Critique de la raison pure», en reponse au scepticisme cynique de Pilate. Examinant la these de l'accord de la cognition avec son objet, qui autorise l'interpretation de la position kantienne en termes de theorie de la correspondance, l'A. rejette l'hypothese d'une definition reelle de la verite au profit d'une conception pluraliste et contrain…
Why Gold is Necessarily a Yellow Metal
At least Kant thinks it's a part of the concept that gold is to be a yellow metal. He thinks that we know this a priori , and that we could not discover it to be empirically false ... Is Kant right about this? (Saul Kripke) Gold [is] ... a yellow malleable ductile high density metallic element resistant to chemical reaction. (Oxford English Dictionary) Nature considered materially is the totality of all objects of experience. (Immanuel Kant, P , …
Carnap's Construction of the World
The Inner and the Outer
In Skeptical idealism says that possibly nothing exists outside my own conscious mental states. Purported refutations of skeptical idealism – whether Descartes's, Locke's, Reid's, Kant's, Moore's, Putnam's, or Burge's – are philosophically scandalous: they have convinced no one. I argue (1) that what is wrong with the failed refutations is that they have attempted to prove the wrong thing – i.e., that necessarily I have veridical perceptions of d…
Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy
Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and of the relation between them
Truth and Human Nature
This chapter develops and defends four claims about Kant's theory of truth. The first is that Kant holds that ‘the accordance of my cognition with its object’ is the strictly and analytically correct, yet metaphysically and epistemologically neutral, explication of the concept of truth. Second, that the idea of a ‘real definition’ of truth is equivalent to Kant's notion of a criterion of truth. Third, that in denying that there is a real definiti…
Mathematics for Humans
This chapter examines Kant's much-criticized views on mathematics in general and arithmetic in particular. It makes a case for the claim that Kant's theory of arithmetic is not subject to the most familiar and forceful objection against it, namely, that his doctrine of the dependence of arithmetic on time is plainly false, or even worse, simply unintelligible. It is argued that Kant's doctrine about time and arithmetic is highly original, fully i…
Where There's a Will There's a Way
This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom a…
Direct Perceptual Realism II
This chapter explores the ‘direct’ aspect of direct perceptual realism, and in particular, Kant's theory of non-conceptual perceptual content. A cognition is direct in the Kantian sense if and only if it refers ‘immediately’ (unmittelbar) to an object, and in turn, a cognition refers immediately to an object if and only if it is non-epistemic (belief-independent), non-conceptual (concept-independent), and otherwise unmediated (in the sense that i…
Manifest Realism II
This chapter aims to work out the positive theory behind Kant's surprising claim that gold is necessarily a yellow metal, using scientific essentialism only as a critical foil. It discusses Kant's theory of natural kind terms and scientific realism in the manifest image. It explains Kant's Other Joke, which vindicates both natural science in general and fundamental physics in particular in a way that would similarly flummox the noumenal scientifi…
Direct Perceptual Realism I
This chapter examines Kant's argument for direct perceptual realism. It begins with a negative evaluation of Kant's Refutation and then moves towards a more positive line of analysis. It is argued that although Kant's Refutation of Idealism fails to establish the conceptual correctness and judgmental truth of outer perceptions of distal material objects, it does nevertheless establish the truth of content externalism. And when it is supplemented …
Manifest Realism I
This chapter makes a negative case for Kant's manifest realism by criticizing the leading contemporary version of maximal scientific realism, namely, scientific essentialism. It begins with a discussion of what is scientific essentialism. It presents four distinct ways that Kant would criticize scientific essentialism: the empirical inaccessibility of the microphysical world, why there is no necessary a posteriori, the antimony of essentialism, a…
How Do We Know Necessary Truths?
This chapter provides a general framework for properly understanding Kant's famous modal-epistemological slogan, ‘reason has insight only into what it self-produces according to its own design,’ in terms of active a priori knowledge and pure practical reason, while rejecting any appeal to strong transcendental idealism, and also effectively avoiding platonism, conventionalism, scientific essentialism, and modal scepticism alike. This framework wi…
Rationality and the Ethics of Logic
Kant's Correspondence Theory of Truth
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Kant, Science, and Human Nature
This book argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the ‘exact sciences’ — relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. It has two aims, one negative and one positive. Its negative aim is to develop a Kantian critique of scientific naturalism. Its positive and more fundamental aim is to work out the elements of a humane, realistic, and non…
Reason, Freedom and Kant
According to Kant, being purely rational or purely reasonable and being autonomously free are one and the same thing. But how can this be so? How can my innate capacity for pure reason ever motivate me to do anything, whether the right thing or the wrong thing? What I will suggest is that the fundamental connection between reason and freedom, both for Kant and in reality, is precisely our human biological life and spontaneity of the will , a conj…
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