Graham Oddie
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3873746 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Graham Oddie |
| NOMBRES | Graham |
| APELLIDO | Oddie |
| FIRMA | ODDIE G |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Otago |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9934-246X |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 22 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 78 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 22 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1979 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic world
What Accuracy Could Not Be
Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy …
Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement
Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances
According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting (appropriate, or good, or obligatory, or something) to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. The idea seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for the thin evaluative attributesâ like goodness, betterness, and degrees of value. This paper is an extended argument for the thesis th…
The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude
Value, Reality, and Desire
This book presents an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false — there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent — they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are…
Value, Reality, and Desire
Moral Realism, Moral Relativism and Moral Rules (A Compatibility Argument)
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value
Act and Maxim
Suppose that a smoker, on each occasion that the urge to smoke arises, could resist smoking, although it would be unpleasant for him to do so. Should he give up smoking? To do so would be to assure a long-term good; the restoration of healthy lungs for himself, say, and the cessation of harm by way of passive smoking for others. But each act of compliance with the maxim 'Refrain from smoking whenever the desire arises' will involve a short-term d…
Act and value
Backwards causation and the permanence of the past
Verisimilitude by Power Relations
A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arriva…
The Aesthetic Adequacy of Copies
Ilkka Niiniluoto, 1984
The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness
The importance for realism of the concept of truthlikeness was first stressed by Popper. Popper himself not only mapped out a program for defining truth-likeness (in terms of falsity content and truth content) but produced the first definitions within this program. These were shown to be inadequate. But the program lingered on, and the most recent attempt to revive it is that of Newton-Smith. His attempt is a failure, not because of some minor de…
Likeness to truth
The logic of ability, freedom and responsibility
Cohen on verisimilitude and natural necessity
Verisimilitude Reviewed
Changing numbers
Miller's So-Called Paradox of Information
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value
Verisimilitude Reviewed
What Accuracy Could Not Be
Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy …
The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude
Cohen on verisimilitude and natural necessity
The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness
The importance for realism of the concept of truthlikeness was first stressed by Popper. Popper himself not only mapped out a program for defining truth-likeness (in terms of falsity content and truth content) but produced the first definitions within this program. These were shown to be inadequate. But the program lingered on, and the most recent attempt to revive it is that of Newton-Smith. His attempt is a failure, not because of some minor de…
The Aesthetic Adequacy of Copies
Miller's So-Called Paradox of Information
Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement
Moral Realism, Moral Relativism and Moral Rules (A Compatibility Argument)
Verisimilitude by Power Relations
A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arriva…
Ilkka Niiniluoto, 1984
Miller's So-Called Paradox of Information
Changing numbers
Verisimilitude Reviewed
The logic of ability, freedom and responsibility
Cohen on verisimilitude and natural necessity
The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness
The importance for realism of the concept of truthlikeness was first stressed by Popper. Popper himself not only mapped out a program for defining truth-likeness (in terms of falsity content and truth content) but produced the first definitions within this program. These were shown to be inadequate. But the program lingered on, and the most recent attempt to revive it is that of Newton-Smith. His attempt is a failure, not because of some minor de…
Likeness to truth
Ilkka Niiniluoto, 1984
The Aesthetic Adequacy of Copies
Backwards causation and the permanence of the past
Verisimilitude by Power Relations
A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arriva…
Act and value
Act and Maxim
Suppose that a smoker, on each occasion that the urge to smoke arises, could resist smoking, although it would be unpleasant for him to do so. Should he give up smoking? To do so would be to assure a long-term good; the restoration of healthy lungs for himself, say, and the cessation of harm by way of passive smoking for others. But each act of compliance with the maxim 'Refrain from smoking whenever the desire arises' will involve a short-term d…
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value
Moral Realism, Moral Relativism and Moral Rules (A Compatibility Argument)
Value, Reality, and Desire
This book presents an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false — there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent — they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are…
Value, Reality, and Desire
The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude
Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances
According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting (appropriate, or good, or obligatory, or something) to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. The idea seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for the thin evaluative attributesâ like goodness, betterness, and degrees of value. This paper is an extended argument for the thesis th…
Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement
What Accuracy Could Not Be
Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy …
Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic world
Epistemology (18 obras) · Philosophy (17 obras) · Computer Science (12 obras) · Mathematics (9 obras) · Philosophy of science (9 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 obras) · Metaphysics (6 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Library science (5 obras)