Jonas Olson
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3873757 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jonas Olson |
| NOMBRES | Jonas |
| APELLIDO | Olson |
| FIRMA | OLSON J |
| AFILIACIONES | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8323-9882 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 25 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 36 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 8 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2002 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Kriegel on Brentano on value and fittingness
Uriah Kriegel's Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, and Value is a good illustration of how fascinating a subject the history of philosophy can be. It contextualizes and scrutinizes Brentano's philosophy and explains the many ways in which it offers alternatives to currently dominant paradigms. Although the book is written in a spirit clearly sympathetic to Brentano's system, Kriegel is up front about its weakness and shortcomings. This…
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like att…
The Metaphysics of Reasons
This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go bey…
Thomas Hurka, British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing (Oxford
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Population Axiology
The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory
Contributors Introduction to Value Theory: Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson Part I: Foundations 1. Value and Normativity: Michael J. Zimmerman 2. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value: Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen 3. Doubts about Intrinsic Value: Jonas Olson 4. Value and Desires: Graham Oddie 5. Value and Emotions: Christine Tappolet 6. Neutral and Relative Value: Garrett Cullity 7. Value and Time: Krister Bykvist 8. Monism and Pluralism about Value: Chris Heathwood…
Kantian Axiology and the Dualism of Practical Reason
General and Personal Good
Monism and Pluralism about Value
Value and Normativity
The Value of Existence
Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging existential question has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy, mainly for two reasons. First, traditional “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counterintuitive implications in population ethics, for example, the repugnant conclusion. Second, it has seemed evident to many that an outcome can be better than another …
Neutral and Relative Value
This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory
Moral Error Theory
Moral Error Theory
Jonas Olson presents an original account of the historical background of moral error theory, and examines in particular J.L. Mackie's influential contributions to the debate. In Part I (History), Olson provides the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and some of the more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richa…
Thinking About Reasons
During the last three decades, Jonathan Dancy's work has opened up new avenues in many areas of philosophy. Seven of the fourteen papers in this volume relate in one way or another to Dancy's influential work on particularism in ethics and holism about reasons, and with one exception, they are all largely sympathetic. The exception is Stephen Darwall's paper, which challenges particularists to account for the concept of moral obligation. Accordin…
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of bein…
Skorupski’s Middle Way in Metaethics
The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson an…
Expressivism and Moral Certitude
Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non…
The Good in the Right
G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons
Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing …
Regimenting Reasons
The Belief‐Desire model (the B‐D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It…
Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Journal Article Buck‐Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Get access Jonas Olson Jonas Olson Uppsala University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 215, April 2004, Pages 295–300, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x Published: 17 May 2004
A Particular Consequentialism
Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se , but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be…
Revisiting the Tropic of Value
In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen I defend trope‐value reductionism against three challenges. 1 focus mainly on their central o…
Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Journal Article Buck‐Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Get access Jonas Olson Jonas Olson Uppsala University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 215, April 2004, Pages 295–300, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x Published: 17 May 2004
Expressivism and Moral Certitude
Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non…
The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson an…
Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic
In The Moral Problem Michael Smith presents what he claims is a decisive argument against moral externalism. Smith's claims that (i) moral externalists are committed to explain the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation in terms of de dicto desires, and (ii) de dicto desires to perform moral acts amounts to moral fetishism. The argument is spelled out and the difference between desires de dicto and desires de re explained. The tena…
The Value of Existence
Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging existential question has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy, mainly for two reasons. First, traditional “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counterintuitive implications in population ethics, for example, the repugnant conclusion. Second, it has seemed evident to many that an outcome can be better than another …
G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons
Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing …
Thinking About Reasons
During the last three decades, Jonathan Dancy's work has opened up new avenues in many areas of philosophy. Seven of the fourteen papers in this volume relate in one way or another to Dancy's influential work on particularism in ethics and holism about reasons, and with one exception, they are all largely sympathetic. The exception is Stephen Darwall's paper, which challenges particularists to account for the concept of moral obligation. Accordin…
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like att…
Neutral and Relative Value
This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory
Skorupski’s Middle Way in Metaethics
Revisiting the Tropic of Value
In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen I defend trope‐value reductionism against three challenges. 1 focus mainly on their central o…
Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic
In The Moral Problem Michael Smith presents what he claims is a decisive argument against moral externalism. Smith's claims that (i) moral externalists are committed to explain the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation in terms of de dicto desires, and (ii) de dicto desires to perform moral acts amounts to moral fetishism. The argument is spelled out and the difference between desires de dicto and desires de re explained. The tena…
A Particular Consequentialism
Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se , but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be…
Revisiting the Tropic of Value
In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen I defend trope‐value reductionism against three challenges. 1 focus mainly on their central o…
Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Journal Article Buck‐Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Get access Jonas Olson Jonas Olson Uppsala University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 215, April 2004, Pages 295–300, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x Published: 17 May 2004
Regimenting Reasons
The Belief‐Desire model (the B‐D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It…
The Good in the Right
G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons
Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing …
The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson an…
Expressivism and Moral Certitude
Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non…
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of bein…
Skorupski’s Middle Way in Metaethics
Moral Error Theory
Moral Error Theory
Jonas Olson presents an original account of the historical background of moral error theory, and examines in particular J.L. Mackie's influential contributions to the debate. In Part I (History), Olson provides the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and some of the more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richa…
Thinking About Reasons
During the last three decades, Jonathan Dancy's work has opened up new avenues in many areas of philosophy. Seven of the fourteen papers in this volume relate in one way or another to Dancy's influential work on particularism in ethics and holism about reasons, and with one exception, they are all largely sympathetic. The exception is Stephen Darwall's paper, which challenges particularists to account for the concept of moral obligation. Accordin…
Population Axiology
The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory
Contributors Introduction to Value Theory: Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson Part I: Foundations 1. Value and Normativity: Michael J. Zimmerman 2. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value: Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen 3. Doubts about Intrinsic Value: Jonas Olson 4. Value and Desires: Graham Oddie 5. Value and Emotions: Christine Tappolet 6. Neutral and Relative Value: Garrett Cullity 7. Value and Time: Krister Bykvist 8. Monism and Pluralism about Value: Chris Heathwood…
Kantian Axiology and the Dualism of Practical Reason
General and Personal Good
Monism and Pluralism about Value
Value and Normativity
The Value of Existence
Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging existential question has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy, mainly for two reasons. First, traditional “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counterintuitive implications in population ethics, for example, the repugnant conclusion. Second, it has seemed evident to many that an outcome can be better than another …
Neutral and Relative Value
This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory
Thomas Hurka, British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing (Oxford
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Metaphysics of Reasons
This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go bey…
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like att…
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