Stuart Kasdin
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4180328 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stuart Kasdin |
| NOMBRES | Stuart |
| APELLIDO | Kasdin |
| FIRMA | KASDIN S |
| AFILIACIONES | George Washington University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4820-6625 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2010 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Continuing Costs
Are there unintended consequences from Congress’ use of continuing resolutions (CRs), which are designed as short-term funding to bridge the period before regular appropriations are completed? During a CR, agencies are restricted in their ability to issue contracts, and after the CR ends, agencies may rush to complete their contracting before the fiscal year ends. To expedite contracting, we hypothesize that CRs encourage agencies to use sole-sou…
Contracts, Agency Vulnerability, and the Allocation of Federal Funds
Legislators have the potential for credit claiming from agency spending in a congressional district only when the awarded contracts or grants are sufficiently large to be noticed or appreciated. Therefore, unlike previous research on distributive politics, we examine the allocation of contracts considering the size of the contracts, not just the overall spending or the numbers of contracts per congressional district. We use a difference-in-differ…
Creating comity amidst gridlock
Budgeting Rules and Program Outcomes
It is not efficient for a budget system either to enable excessively frequent changes in programs and tax policies or to be rigid and unresponsive. Program durability is one measure of how a budget system weighs the competing goals of resoluteness and responsiveness. The federal budget has different processes—mandatory and discretionary spending and tax expenditures—each based in separate congressional committees and relying on separate procedure…
When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs
When creating a new program, an authorizing committee must choose a budget structure, either using mandatory funding or creating an authorization for appropriations to enable the appropriation committees to use discretionary funding. One hypothesis we examine is based on the strategic interplay by congressional committees seeking to control their policy domains. Based on expected purposes of a nascent program, an authorization committee must calc…
The Political Economy of Program Design
When programs are grants to states, federal funds will be used to meet both the national objectives and the local priorities of the state or local government recipients. This article examines the decision to design new federal programs as either a grant to states or as administered by federal agencies. We predict that Congress will choose either the states or the federal bureaucracy based on which agent is more likely to manage the program consis…
Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources
Recipes for Pork and Other Delicious Offerings for the New Administration
Is pork produced by feeble budgetary processes? By fixing weak budgetary procedures, can wasteful spending and opportunities for corruption be reduced? This essay looks at three varieties of pork: earmarked, ad hoc, and presidential. What can be done to curb the excesses of each one? By examining the problem of congressional earmarking, this timely article proposes a new process for controlling “earmarked” pork by supporting a new (constitutional…
When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs
When creating a new program, an authorizing committee must choose a budget structure, either using mandatory funding or creating an authorization for appropriations to enable the appropriation committees to use discretionary funding. One hypothesis we examine is based on the strategic interplay by congressional committees seeking to control their policy domains. Based on expected purposes of a nascent program, an authorization committee must calc…
Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources
Contracts, Agency Vulnerability, and the Allocation of Federal Funds
Legislators have the potential for credit claiming from agency spending in a congressional district only when the awarded contracts or grants are sufficiently large to be noticed or appreciated. Therefore, unlike previous research on distributive politics, we examine the allocation of contracts considering the size of the contracts, not just the overall spending or the numbers of contracts per congressional district. We use a difference-in-differ…
Recipes for Pork and Other Delicious Offerings for the New Administration
Is pork produced by feeble budgetary processes? By fixing weak budgetary procedures, can wasteful spending and opportunities for corruption be reduced? This essay looks at three varieties of pork: earmarked, ad hoc, and presidential. What can be done to curb the excesses of each one? By examining the problem of congressional earmarking, this timely article proposes a new process for controlling “earmarked” pork by supporting a new (constitutional…
Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources
The Political Economy of Program Design
When programs are grants to states, federal funds will be used to meet both the national objectives and the local priorities of the state or local government recipients. This article examines the decision to design new federal programs as either a grant to states or as administered by federal agencies. We predict that Congress will choose either the states or the federal bureaucracy based on which agent is more likely to manage the program consis…
When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs
When creating a new program, an authorizing committee must choose a budget structure, either using mandatory funding or creating an authorization for appropriations to enable the appropriation committees to use discretionary funding. One hypothesis we examine is based on the strategic interplay by congressional committees seeking to control their policy domains. Based on expected purposes of a nascent program, an authorization committee must calc…
Creating comity amidst gridlock
Budgeting Rules and Program Outcomes
It is not efficient for a budget system either to enable excessively frequent changes in programs and tax policies or to be rigid and unresponsive. Program durability is one measure of how a budget system weighs the competing goals of resoluteness and responsiveness. The federal budget has different processes—mandatory and discretionary spending and tax expenditures—each based in separate congressional committees and relying on separate procedure…
Contracts, Agency Vulnerability, and the Allocation of Federal Funds
Legislators have the potential for credit claiming from agency spending in a congressional district only when the awarded contracts or grants are sufficiently large to be noticed or appreciated. Therefore, unlike previous research on distributive politics, we examine the allocation of contracts considering the size of the contracts, not just the overall spending or the numbers of contracts per congressional district. We use a difference-in-differ…
Continuing Costs
Are there unintended consequences from Congress’ use of continuing resolutions (CRs), which are designed as short-term funding to bridge the period before regular appropriations are completed? During a CR, agencies are restricted in their ability to issue contracts, and after the CR ends, agencies may rush to complete their contracting before the fiscal year ends. To expedite contracting, we hypothesize that CRs encourage agencies to use sole-sou…
Political science (8 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Public Administration (7 obras) · Public Administration (7 obras) · Business (6 obras) · Economics (6 obras) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (5 obras) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (5 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 obras)