Richard Van Weelden
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4371848 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Richard Van Weelden |
| NOMBRES | Richard |
| APELLIDO | Van Weelden |
| FIRMA | VAN WEELDEN R |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4236-1950 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 70 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2008 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Pandora's ballot box
We study how office‐seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind, however, an electorally disadvantaged party may initiate a referendum to elevate new issues. It does so with the goal of dividing its stronger opponent's supporters. We identify conditions under which direct dem…
Persuasion in veto bargaining
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We show that the proposer‐optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case, the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits…
Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections
We consider an election between two parties that nominate candidates for office. The parties are polarized along a traditional cleavage, but they are also internally divided along a second issue dimension. We introduce a threat of entry from Outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass party elites. We consider when voters will turn to Outsiders, and identify the conditions under which Outsiders will enter the election thr…
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their establish…
Elections and Divisiveness
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how politicians allocate their time across issues. When voters are uncertain about an incumbent’s preferences, there is a pervasive incentive to “posture” by spending too much time on divisive issues (which are more informative about a politician’s preferences) at the expense of time spent on common-values issues (which provide greater benefit to voters). Higher transparency over the p…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
Ideology and information in policymaking
We consider how the incentives for politicians to pander to public opinion depend on preference heterogeneity and information. Politicians are more likely to pander on issues where politicians’ preferences are divided than on issues where there is a clear majority view. As pandering involves ignoring socially valuable information that goes against the ex ante preferred action of the majority, an increase in the ex ante probability that a politici…
Deliberation Rules and Voting
Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state
Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections
We consider an election between two parties that nominate candidates for office. The parties are polarized along a traditional cleavage, but they are also internally divided along a second issue dimension. We introduce a threat of entry from Outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass party elites. We consider when voters will turn to Outsiders, and identify the conditions under which Outsiders will enter the election thr…
Elections and Divisiveness
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how politicians allocate their time across issues. When voters are uncertain about an incumbent’s preferences, there is a pervasive incentive to “posture” by spending too much time on divisive issues (which are more informative about a politician’s preferences) at the expense of time spent on common-values issues (which provide greater benefit to voters). Higher transparency over the p…
Ideology and information in policymaking
We consider how the incentives for politicians to pander to public opinion depend on preference heterogeneity and information. Politicians are more likely to pander on issues where politicians’ preferences are divided than on issues where there is a clear majority view. As pandering involves ignoring socially valuable information that goes against the ex ante preferred action of the majority, an increase in the ex ante probability that a politici…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their establish…
Deliberation Rules and Voting
Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state
Pandora's ballot box
We study how office‐seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind, however, an electorally disadvantaged party may initiate a referendum to elevate new issues. It does so with the goal of dividing its stronger opponent's supporters. We identify conditions under which direct dem…
Persuasion in veto bargaining
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We show that the proposer‐optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case, the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits…
Deliberation Rules and Voting
Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state
Ideology and information in policymaking
We consider how the incentives for politicians to pander to public opinion depend on preference heterogeneity and information. Politicians are more likely to pander on issues where politicians’ preferences are divided than on issues where there is a clear majority view. As pandering involves ignoring socially valuable information that goes against the ex ante preferred action of the majority, an increase in the ex ante probability that a politici…
Elections and Divisiveness
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how politicians allocate their time across issues. When voters are uncertain about an incumbent’s preferences, there is a pervasive incentive to “posture” by spending too much time on divisive issues (which are more informative about a politician’s preferences) at the expense of time spent on common-values issues (which provide greater benefit to voters). Higher transparency over the p…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their establish…
Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections
We consider an election between two parties that nominate candidates for office. The parties are polarized along a traditional cleavage, but they are also internally divided along a second issue dimension. We introduce a threat of entry from Outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass party elites. We consider when voters will turn to Outsiders, and identify the conditions under which Outsiders will enter the election thr…
Pandora's ballot box
We study how office‐seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind, however, an electorally disadvantaged party may initiate a referendum to elevate new issues. It does so with the goal of dividing its stronger opponent's supporters. We identify conditions under which direct dem…
Persuasion in veto bargaining
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We show that the proposer‐optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case, the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits…
Law (8 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Economics (7 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 obras) · Politics (5 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Law and economics (3 obras) · Media Influence and Politics (3 obras)