Jeffrey M Drope
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4371996 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jeffrey M Drope |
| NOMBRES | Jeffrey M |
| APELLIDO | Drope |
| FIRMA | DROPE J M |
| AFILIACIONES | Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 107 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2004 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2016 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Combustible cigarettes cost less to use than e-cigarettes
Existing prices of e-cigarettes are generally much higher than of combustible cigarettes. If policymakers wish to tax e-cigarettes less than combustibles, forceful policy action-almost certainly through excise taxation-must raise the price of combustible cigarettes beyond the price of using e-cigarettes
Tobacco Surcharges on 2015 Health Insurance Plans Sold in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces
In 2014, few health insurance plans sold in the Affordable Care Act’s Federally Facilitated Marketplaces had age-dependent tobacco surcharges, possibly because of a system glitch. The 2015 tobacco surcharges show wide variation, with more plans implementing tobacco surcharges that increase with age. This underscores concerns that older tobacco users will find postsubsidy health insurance premiums difficult to afford. Future monitoring of enrollme…
New Evidence for the Theory of Groups
Group theorists led by Olson have observed that common interests do not produce collective action, except under conditions that overcome the free-rider incentive. While collective action theories have captured the imagination of the discipline, there has been surprisingly little examination of the relationship between business collective action and patterns of market structures. Research has instead focused more on firm-level political activity. …
The Political Economy of Nontariff Trade Barriers in Emerging Economies
This article examines the counterpoint to recent economic reform programs: policies that potentially defy the reform process. Policy “reversal” is particularly evident in the area of trade liberalization where nations reduced tariffs while simultaneously introducing nontariff barriers (NTB), particularly the widespread antidumping (AD) measure. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these new “postliberalization” trade policies by co…
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally ap…
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
The issue of whether or not money influences policymaking has been widely debated in American politics. While a direct link between money and policy outcomes has proven difficult to make, bureaucratic decisions on trade protection provide an opportunity to link politically active firms and industries to policy outcomes. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce both play a major role in making trade policy …
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
Despite the fact that domestic and foreign corporations, along with trade associations, are some of the most politically active groups in the United States, earlier research has identified a substantial number of firms that are politically inactive. Using fresh data collected from the 2000 election cycle for the Fortune 1000 and the Forbes top foreign investors, we examine business soft money, lobbying expenditures, as well as PAC contributions, …
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally ap…
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
The issue of whether or not money influences policymaking has been widely debated in American politics. While a direct link between money and policy outcomes has proven difficult to make, bureaucratic decisions on trade protection provide an opportunity to link politically active firms and industries to policy outcomes. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce both play a major role in making trade policy …
New Evidence for the Theory of Groups
Group theorists led by Olson have observed that common interests do not produce collective action, except under conditions that overcome the free-rider incentive. While collective action theories have captured the imagination of the discipline, there has been surprisingly little examination of the relationship between business collective action and patterns of market structures. Research has instead focused more on firm-level political activity. …
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
Despite the fact that domestic and foreign corporations, along with trade associations, are some of the most politically active groups in the United States, earlier research has identified a substantial number of firms that are politically inactive. Using fresh data collected from the 2000 election cycle for the Fortune 1000 and the Forbes top foreign investors, we examine business soft money, lobbying expenditures, as well as PAC contributions, …
The Political Economy of Nontariff Trade Barriers in Emerging Economies
This article examines the counterpoint to recent economic reform programs: policies that potentially defy the reform process. Policy “reversal” is particularly evident in the area of trade liberalization where nations reduced tariffs while simultaneously introducing nontariff barriers (NTB), particularly the widespread antidumping (AD) measure. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these new “postliberalization” trade policies by co…
Tobacco Surcharges on 2015 Health Insurance Plans Sold in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces
In 2014, few health insurance plans sold in the Affordable Care Act’s Federally Facilitated Marketplaces had age-dependent tobacco surcharges, possibly because of a system glitch. The 2015 tobacco surcharges show wide variation, with more plans implementing tobacco surcharges that increase with age. This underscores concerns that older tobacco users will find postsubsidy health insurance premiums difficult to afford. Future monitoring of enrollme…
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
The issue of whether or not money influences policymaking has been widely debated in American politics. While a direct link between money and policy outcomes has proven difficult to make, bureaucratic decisions on trade protection provide an opportunity to link politically active firms and industries to policy outcomes. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce both play a major role in making trade policy …
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
Despite the fact that domestic and foreign corporations, along with trade associations, are some of the most politically active groups in the United States, earlier research has identified a substantial number of firms that are politically inactive. Using fresh data collected from the 2000 election cycle for the Fortune 1000 and the Forbes top foreign investors, we examine business soft money, lobbying expenditures, as well as PAC contributions, …
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally ap…
The Political Economy of Nontariff Trade Barriers in Emerging Economies
This article examines the counterpoint to recent economic reform programs: policies that potentially defy the reform process. Policy “reversal” is particularly evident in the area of trade liberalization where nations reduced tariffs while simultaneously introducing nontariff barriers (NTB), particularly the widespread antidumping (AD) measure. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these new “postliberalization” trade policies by co…
New Evidence for the Theory of Groups
Group theorists led by Olson have observed that common interests do not produce collective action, except under conditions that overcome the free-rider incentive. While collective action theories have captured the imagination of the discipline, there has been surprisingly little examination of the relationship between business collective action and patterns of market structures. Research has instead focused more on firm-level political activity. …
Tobacco Surcharges on 2015 Health Insurance Plans Sold in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces
In 2014, few health insurance plans sold in the Affordable Care Act’s Federally Facilitated Marketplaces had age-dependent tobacco surcharges, possibly because of a system glitch. The 2015 tobacco surcharges show wide variation, with more plans implementing tobacco surcharges that increase with age. This underscores concerns that older tobacco users will find postsubsidy health insurance premiums difficult to afford. Future monitoring of enrollme…
Combustible cigarettes cost less to use than e-cigarettes
Existing prices of e-cigarettes are generally much higher than of combustible cigarettes. If policymakers wish to tax e-cigarettes less than combustibles, forceful policy action-almost certainly through excise taxation-must raise the price of combustible cigarettes beyond the price of using e-cigarettes
Economics (9 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Politics (7 obras) · Business (6 obras) · Collective action (5 obras) · Action (physics (4 obras) · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism (4 obras) · Law and economics (4 obras)