Emily A Sellars
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4372105 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Emily A Sellars |
| NOMBRES | Emily A |
| APELLIDO | Sellars |
| FIRMA | SELLARS E A |
| AFILIACIONES | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0388-1697 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 74 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
The Jesuit expulsion
Fiscal legibility and state development
We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them …
The Politics of Decentralization Level
Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political op…
When State Building Backfires
We examine the complementary influence of elite politics, popular grievances, and central government weakness on rebellion. Efforts to strengthen the central state often come at the expense of the elite intermediaries charged with maintaining local political control. By driving a wedge between local elites and the central government, centralizing reforms can reduce intermediaries' willingness to repress mobilization, providing an opening for popu…
From Conquest to Centralization
Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state …
Locational fundamentals, trade, and the changing urban landscape of Mexico
Emigration and Collective Action
I develop a model of emigration and collective action to illustrate that the presence of exit opportunities can undermine political mobilization. In a setting where collective action is risky and where success requires the participation of a large number of citizens, exit options reduce mobilization through two mechanisms. First, profitable migration opportunities raise the opportunity cost of collective action, dampening political participation …
Labor scarcity, land tenure, and historical legacy
From Conquest to Centralization
Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state …
Emigration and Collective Action
I develop a model of emigration and collective action to illustrate that the presence of exit opportunities can undermine political mobilization. In a setting where collective action is risky and where success requires the participation of a large number of citizens, exit options reduce mobilization through two mechanisms. First, profitable migration opportunities raise the opportunity cost of collective action, dampening political participation …
Labor scarcity, land tenure, and historical legacy
When State Building Backfires
We examine the complementary influence of elite politics, popular grievances, and central government weakness on rebellion. Efforts to strengthen the central state often come at the expense of the elite intermediaries charged with maintaining local political control. By driving a wedge between local elites and the central government, centralizing reforms can reduce intermediaries' willingness to repress mobilization, providing an opening for popu…
The Politics of Decentralization Level
Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political op…
Fiscal legibility and state development
We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them …
Locational fundamentals, trade, and the changing urban landscape of Mexico
Labor scarcity, land tenure, and historical legacy
Emigration and Collective Action
I develop a model of emigration and collective action to illustrate that the presence of exit opportunities can undermine political mobilization. In a setting where collective action is risky and where success requires the participation of a large number of citizens, exit options reduce mobilization through two mechanisms. First, profitable migration opportunities raise the opportunity cost of collective action, dampening political participation …
Locational fundamentals, trade, and the changing urban landscape of Mexico
From Conquest to Centralization
Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state …
When State Building Backfires
We examine the complementary influence of elite politics, popular grievances, and central government weakness on rebellion. Efforts to strengthen the central state often come at the expense of the elite intermediaries charged with maintaining local political control. By driving a wedge between local elites and the central government, centralizing reforms can reduce intermediaries' willingness to repress mobilization, providing an opening for popu…
The Politics of Decentralization Level
Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political op…
Fiscal legibility and state development
We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them …
The Jesuit expulsion
Economics (7 obras) · Political science (7 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (5 obras) · Development economics (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Political economy (5 obras) · Politics (5 obras) · Historical Economic and Social Studies (4 obras) · State (computer science (4 obras)