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Henry Hamburger

Datos Biográficos

ID4382707
NOMBREHenry Hamburger
NOMBRESHenry
APELLIDOHamburger
FIRMAHAMBURGER H
AFILIACIONESSchool of Social Sciences University of California (Irvine)
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS4
TOTAL DE CITAS53
TOTAL COMO AUTOR4
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1973
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN1975
ÍNDICE H2
  • Learning-Theoretic Foundations of Linguistic Universals

    Kenneth Wexler, Peter W Culicover et al.•ARTICLE•Theoretical Linguistics•1975

    Some aspects of a theory of grammar are presented which derive from a formal theory of language acquisition. One aspect of the theory is a universal constraint on analyzability known as the Freezing Principle, which supplants a variety of constraints proposed in the literature. A second aspect of the theory is the Invariance Principle, a constraint on the relationship between semantic and syntactic structure that makes verifiable predictions of s…

  • Group Size and Cooperation

    Open Access•Henry Hamburger, Melvin Guyer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1975•Citada por: 30•Referencias: 7

    To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three…

  • N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma

    Henry Hamburger•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1973•Citada por: 22•Referencias: 6

    Multi‐person versions of Prisoner's Dilemma are widely applicable in the social sciences. Examination of two important classes of real‐world situations reveals that although both can appropriately be called Prisoner's Dilemma, they have incompatible payoff structures. Thus Prisoner's Dilemma games constitute an important but apparently ambiguous set of models. We therefore undertake a taxonomy of multi‐person Prisoner's Dilemma. Some aspects of t…

  • Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

    Open Access•Melvin Guyer, John R E Fox et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1973•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 10

    Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty tri…

  • Group Size and Cooperation

    Open Access•Henry Hamburger, Melvin Guyer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1975•Citada por: 30•Referencias: 7

    To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three…

  • N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma

    Henry Hamburger•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1973•Citada por: 22•Referencias: 6

    Multi‐person versions of Prisoner's Dilemma are widely applicable in the social sciences. Examination of two important classes of real‐world situations reveals that although both can appropriately be called Prisoner's Dilemma, they have incompatible payoff structures. Thus Prisoner's Dilemma games constitute an important but apparently ambiguous set of models. We therefore undertake a taxonomy of multi‐person Prisoner's Dilemma. Some aspects of t…

  • Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

    Open Access•Melvin Guyer, John R E Fox et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1973•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 10

    Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty tri…

  • N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma

    Henry Hamburger•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1973•Citada por: 22•Referencias: 6

    Multi‐person versions of Prisoner's Dilemma are widely applicable in the social sciences. Examination of two important classes of real‐world situations reveals that although both can appropriately be called Prisoner's Dilemma, they have incompatible payoff structures. Thus Prisoner's Dilemma games constitute an important but apparently ambiguous set of models. We therefore undertake a taxonomy of multi‐person Prisoner's Dilemma. Some aspects of t…

  • Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

    Open Access•Melvin Guyer, John R E Fox et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1973•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 10

    Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty tri…

  • Learning-Theoretic Foundations of Linguistic Universals

    Kenneth Wexler, Peter W Culicover et al.•ARTICLE•Theoretical Linguistics•1975

    Some aspects of a theory of grammar are presented which derive from a formal theory of language acquisition. One aspect of the theory is a universal constraint on analyzability known as the Freezing Principle, which supplants a variety of constraints proposed in the literature. A second aspect of the theory is the Invariance Principle, a constraint on the relationship between semantic and syntactic structure that makes verifiable predictions of s…

  • Group Size and Cooperation

    Open Access•Henry Hamburger, Melvin Guyer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1975•Citada por: 30•Referencias: 7

    To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three…

Computer Science (4 obras) · Dilemma (3 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 obras) · Game theory (3 obras) · Mathematical economics (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Prisoner's dilemma (3 obras) · Psychology (3 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (2 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (2 obras)

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