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Shawn D Scamahorn

Datos Biográficos

ID4383162
NOMBREShawn D Scamahorn
NOMBRESShawn D
APELLIDOScamahorn
FIRMASCAMAHORN S D
AFILIACIONESWashington State University
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS1
TOTAL DE CITAS29
TOTAL COMO AUTOR1
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1996
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN1996
ÍNDICE H1
  • Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

    Open Access•Craig D Parks, Robert F Henager et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Citada por: 29•Referencias: 23

    This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message b…

  • Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

    Open Access•Craig D Parks, Robert F Henager et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Citada por: 29•Referencias: 23

    This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message b…

  • Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

    Open Access•Craig D Parks, Robert F Henager et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Citada por: 29•Referencias: 23

    This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message b…

Adversary (1 obras) · Affect (linguistics (1 obras) · Communication (1 obras) · Communication (1 obras) · Computer Science (1 obras) · Computer security (1 obras) · Cultural Differences and Values (1 obras) · Dilemma (1 obras) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (1 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 obras)

Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae