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Federico Valenciano

Datos Biográficos

ID4386099
NOMBREFederico Valenciano
NOMBRESFederico
APELLIDOValenciano
FIRMAVALENCIANO F
AFILIACIONESUniversity of the Basque Country
ORCID0000-0001-8750-9122
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS6
TOTAL DE CITAS11
TOTAL COMO AUTOR6
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2005
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2024
ÍNDICE H2
  • Core–periphery and nested networks emerging from a simple model of network formation

    Open Access•Norma Olaizola, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2024•Referencias: 16

  • Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation

    Open Access•Norma Olaizola, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2015•Referencias: 11

  • Majorities with a quorum

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2011•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 10

    Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…

  • Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2008•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 26

    Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …

  • Success Versus Decisiveness

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Ricardo Martínez et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2006•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 23

    In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union

  • A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 32

  • Success Versus Decisiveness

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Ricardo Martínez et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2006•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 23

    In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union

  • Majorities with a quorum

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2011•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 10

    Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…

  • Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2008•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 26

    Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …

  • A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 32

  • A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 32

  • Success Versus Decisiveness

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Ricardo Martínez et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2006•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 23

    In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union

  • Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2008•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 26

    Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …

  • Majorities with a quorum

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2011•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 10

    Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…

  • Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation

    Open Access•Norma Olaizola, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2015•Referencias: 11

  • Core–periphery and nested networks emerging from a simple model of network formation

    Open Access•Norma Olaizola, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2024•Referencias: 16

Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Economics (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Mathematical economics (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Voting (4 obras) · Cardinal voting systems (3 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (3 obras)

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