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Michael Mckoy

Datos Biográficos

ID4389938
NOMBREMichael Mckoy
NOMBRESMichael
APELLIDOMckoy
FIRMAMCKOY M
AFILIACIONESWheaton College - Illinois
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS5
TOTAL DE CITAS76
TOTAL COMO AUTOR5
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2012
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2024
ÍNDICE H2
  • Great Power and Great Responsibility

    Michael Mckoy•ARTICLE•New Political Science•2024

  • Constructing a “Democratic” Peace

    Michael Mckoy•ARTICLE•Democracy and Security•2020

    Wheaton College, Department of Politics and International Relations A poor understanding of the causes of the “democratic peace” has contributed to poor policymaking, including attempts to impose democratic governments in order to establish interstate peace. This article explores how Allied policymakers sought to establish peace following World War II while imposing democratic regimes in Germany and Japan. Their strategy for permanently pacifying…

  • Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory

    Open Access•Jack S Levy, Michael K Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2015•Citada por: 57•Referencias: 36

    Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to exa…

  • Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War

    Michael K Mckoy, Michael Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•2012•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 11

    January 01 2012 Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War Michael K. McKoy, Michael K. McKoy Michael K. McKay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. He thanks John Ikenberry, Alexander Łanoszka, and Praise Oh for their comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar David A. Lake David A. Lake David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Scie…

  • The Patron’s Dilemma

    Open Access•Michael K Mckoy, Michael Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2012•Citada por: 18•Referencias: 50

    We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime’s foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critica…

  • Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory

    Open Access•Jack S Levy, Michael K Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2015•Citada por: 57•Referencias: 36

    Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to exa…

  • The Patron’s Dilemma

    Open Access•Michael K Mckoy, Michael Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2012•Citada por: 18•Referencias: 50

    We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime’s foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critica…

  • Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War

    Michael K Mckoy, Michael Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•2012•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 11

    January 01 2012 Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War Michael K. McKoy, Michael K. McKoy Michael K. McKay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. He thanks John Ikenberry, Alexander Łanoszka, and Praise Oh for their comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar David A. Lake David A. Lake David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Scie…

  • Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War

    Michael K Mckoy, Michael Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•2012•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 11

    January 01 2012 Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War Michael K. McKoy, Michael K. McKoy Michael K. McKay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. He thanks John Ikenberry, Alexander Łanoszka, and Praise Oh for their comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar David A. Lake David A. Lake David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Scie…

  • The Patron’s Dilemma

    Open Access•Michael K Mckoy, Michael Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2012•Citada por: 18•Referencias: 50

    We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime’s foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critica…

  • Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory

    Open Access•Jack S Levy, Michael K Mckoy et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2015•Citada por: 57•Referencias: 36

    Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to exa…

  • Constructing a “Democratic” Peace

    Michael Mckoy•ARTICLE•Democracy and Security•2020

    Wheaton College, Department of Politics and International Relations A poor understanding of the causes of the “democratic peace” has contributed to poor policymaking, including attempts to impose democratic governments in order to establish interstate peace. This article explores how Allied policymakers sought to establish peace following World War II while imposing democratic regimes in Germany and Japan. Their strategy for permanently pacifying…

  • Great Power and Great Responsibility

    Michael Mckoy•ARTICLE•New Political Science•2024

Law (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Politics (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · Art (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Democracy (2 obras) · Democratization (2 obras) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (2 obras)

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