Saltar al contenido principal

ETHNOS_APP

Inicio • Búsqueda • Revistas • Lista 0

Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen

Datos Biográficos

ID4392001
NOMBREAsbjørn Steglich‐petersen
NOMBRESAsbjørn
APELLIDOSteglich‐petersen
FIRMAPETERSEN A S
AFILIACIONESAarhus University
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS3
TOTAL DE CITAS1
OBRAS COMO AUTOR3
OBRAS COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2013
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2024
ÍNDICE H1
  • Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2024•Citada por: 1

    It has recently been argued that to permissibly act on someone’s consent to sex, the agent must possess firsthand evidence of the consent directly from the consenter (Lackey 2021; Dougherty 2018). This view is motivated by a case where it seems impermissible to act on testimonial knowledge of someone’s consent to sex. Although we agree that it is impermissible to act as if there is consent in this case, we argue that the explanation in terms of a…

  • Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen•ARTICLE•Theoria•2015

    Many epistemologists have been attracted to the view that knowledge‐ wh can be reduced to knowledge‐ that . An important challenge to this, presented by J onathan S chaffer, is the problem of “convergent knowledge”: reductive accounts imply that any two knowledge‐ wh ascriptions with identical true answers to the questions embedded in their wh ‐clauses are materially equivalent, but according to S chaffer, there are counterexamples to this equiva…

  • The No Guidance Argument

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen•ARTICLE•Theoria•2013

    In a recent article, I criticized K athrin G lüer and Åsa W ikforss's so‐called “no guidance argument” against the truth norm for belief, for conflating the conditions under which that norm recommends belief with the psychological state one must be in to apply the norm. In response, G lüer and W ikforss have offered a new formulation of the no guidance argument, which makes it apparent that no such conflation is made. However, their new formulati…

  • Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2024•Citada por: 1

    It has recently been argued that to permissibly act on someone’s consent to sex, the agent must possess firsthand evidence of the consent directly from the consenter (Lackey 2021; Dougherty 2018). This view is motivated by a case where it seems impermissible to act on testimonial knowledge of someone’s consent to sex. Although we agree that it is impermissible to act as if there is consent in this case, we argue that the explanation in terms of a…

  • The No Guidance Argument

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen•ARTICLE•Theoria•2013

    In a recent article, I criticized K athrin G lüer and Åsa W ikforss's so‐called “no guidance argument” against the truth norm for belief, for conflating the conditions under which that norm recommends belief with the psychological state one must be in to apply the norm. In response, G lüer and W ikforss have offered a new formulation of the no guidance argument, which makes it apparent that no such conflation is made. However, their new formulati…

  • Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen•ARTICLE•Theoria•2015

    Many epistemologists have been attracted to the view that knowledge‐ wh can be reduced to knowledge‐ that . An important challenge to this, presented by J onathan S chaffer, is the problem of “convergent knowledge”: reductive accounts imply that any two knowledge‐ wh ascriptions with identical true answers to the questions embedded in their wh ‐clauses are materially equivalent, but according to S chaffer, there are counterexamples to this equiva…

  • Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent

    Open Access•Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2024•Citada por: 1

    It has recently been argued that to permissibly act on someone’s consent to sex, the agent must possess firsthand evidence of the consent directly from the consenter (Lackey 2021; Dougherty 2018). This view is motivated by a case where it seems impermissible to act on testimonial knowledge of someone’s consent to sex. Although we agree that it is impermissible to act as if there is consent in this case, we argue that the explanation in terms of a…

Epistemology (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Argument map (1 obra) · Arithmetic (1 obra) · Binary number (1 obra) · Cognitive science (1 obra) · Computer Science (1 obra)

Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae