John Hamman
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4411780 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | John Hamman |
| NOMBRES | John |
| APELLIDO | Hamman |
| FIRMA | HAMMAN J |
| AFILIACIONES | Florida State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4809-159X |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 36 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1994 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Project selection with biased advice
Political Accountability and Democratic Institutions
We study the extent to which centralized democratic institutions enhance collective action under political accountability. In a public goods game with costly punishment, we vary the appointment of one group member to enforce punishment. Specifically, we compare democratically elected punishers to those appointed exogenously, under both single- and multiple-selection environments. We find that democratically appointed sanctioning authority has mut…
Fool Me Once
We investigate ‘social credibility’, a leader’s ability to convince followers that conditions are favourable and that others will follow the leader's advice. To do so, we study an experimental joint venture with three key properties: returns are uncertain, investments are complements, and investment is often more beneficial for the leader than the followers. The leader has private information about investment returns and can facilitate coordinati…
Personality Traits and Endogenous Group Formation
À l’aide d’un jeu de biens publics dans lequel les participants peuvent sélectionner leurs groupes, nous examinons le rôle que joue la personnalité dans le comportement de contributions et dans la sélection du groupe grâce à la variation des informations disponibles sur les groupes. Nous constatons que lorsque les participants ont uniquement accès aux informations sur les profils de personnalité moyens des membres du groupe, il existe une relatio…
Dependency Status and Demand for Social Insurance
Current thinking on the origins and size of the welfare state often ignores household relations in which people may depend on others for income or have dependents themselves. The influence of “dependency status” on individuals’ political preferences is unknown. We report results from a laboratory experiment designed to estimate the effect of dependency on preferences for policies that insure against labor market risk. Results indicate that (1) wi…
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods
How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. H…
Activities and Appointments
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods
How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. H…
Fool Me Once
We investigate ‘social credibility’, a leader’s ability to convince followers that conditions are favourable and that others will follow the leader's advice. To do so, we study an experimental joint venture with three key properties: returns are uncertain, investments are complements, and investment is often more beneficial for the leader than the followers. The leader has private information about investment returns and can facilitate coordinati…
Dependency Status and Demand for Social Insurance
Current thinking on the origins and size of the welfare state often ignores household relations in which people may depend on others for income or have dependents themselves. The influence of “dependency status” on individuals’ political preferences is unknown. We report results from a laboratory experiment designed to estimate the effect of dependency on preferences for policies that insure against labor market risk. Results indicate that (1) wi…
Political Accountability and Democratic Institutions
We study the extent to which centralized democratic institutions enhance collective action under political accountability. In a public goods game with costly punishment, we vary the appointment of one group member to enforce punishment. Specifically, we compare democratically elected punishers to those appointed exogenously, under both single- and multiple-selection environments. We find that democratically appointed sanctioning authority has mut…
Activities and Appointments
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods
How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. H…
Dependency Status and Demand for Social Insurance
Current thinking on the origins and size of the welfare state often ignores household relations in which people may depend on others for income or have dependents themselves. The influence of “dependency status” on individuals’ political preferences is unknown. We report results from a laboratory experiment designed to estimate the effect of dependency on preferences for policies that insure against labor market risk. Results indicate that (1) wi…
Personality Traits and Endogenous Group Formation
À l’aide d’un jeu de biens publics dans lequel les participants peuvent sélectionner leurs groupes, nous examinons le rôle que joue la personnalité dans le comportement de contributions et dans la sélection du groupe grâce à la variation des informations disponibles sur les groupes. Nous constatons que lorsque les participants ont uniquement accès aux informations sur les profils de personnalité moyens des membres du groupe, il existe une relatio…
Political Accountability and Democratic Institutions
We study the extent to which centralized democratic institutions enhance collective action under political accountability. In a public goods game with costly punishment, we vary the appointment of one group member to enforce punishment. Specifically, we compare democratically elected punishers to those appointed exogenously, under both single- and multiple-selection environments. We find that democratically appointed sanctioning authority has mut…
Fool Me Once
We investigate ‘social credibility’, a leader’s ability to convince followers that conditions are favourable and that others will follow the leader's advice. To do so, we study an experimental joint venture with three key properties: returns are uncertain, investments are complements, and investment is often more beneficial for the leader than the followers. The leader has private information about investment returns and can facilitate coordinati…
Project selection with biased advice
Economics (5 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Business (3 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (3 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (3 obras) · Politics (3 obras)