David Papineau
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 443978 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | David Papineau |
| NOMBRES | David |
| APELLIDO | Papineau |
| FIRMA | PAPINEAU D |
| AFILIACIONES | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4345-4905 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 41 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 109 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 38 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1976 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Causal inference and the metaphysics of causation
The techniques of causal inference are widely used throughout the non-experimental sciences to derive causal conclusions from probabilistic premises. This poses a philosophical question. What in the nature of causation accounts for the possibility of causal inference? In this paper I shall seek to answer this question. I shall develop a metaphysical theory of causation designed to explain the success of causal inference techniques. I shall then i…
Swampman, teleosemantics and kind essences
One powerful and influential approach to mental representation analyses representation in terms of biological functions, and biological functions in terms of histories of natural selection. This “teleosemantic” package, however, faces a familiar challenge. Surely representation depends only on the present-day structures of cognitive systems, and not on their historical provenance. “Swampman” drives the point home. Suppose a bolt of lightning crea…
Reply to Laura Gow's critical notice of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
I am grateful to Laura Gow for her generous and illuminating comments. I will focus on her queries, as this will allow me to elaborate on some points that were treated rather quickly in the book. Gow challenges me on three points. (1) Does my central argument against representationalism about perception commit me to an overly abstract view of properties? (2) What does my view imply about the representational contents of beliefs prompted by sensor…
The disvalue of knowledge
I argue that the concept of knowledge is a relic of a bygone age, erroneously supposed to do no harm. I illustrate this claim by showing how a concern with knowledge distorts the use of statistical evidence in criminal courts, and then generalize the point to show that this concern hampers our enterprises across the board and not only in legal contexts
Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory
This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The co…
Teleosemantics
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Realism, Ramsey sentences and the pessimistic meta-induction
Kripke's Proof Is Ad Hominem Not Two‐dimensional
Teleosemantics
Teleosemantics seeks to explain meaning and other intentional phenomena in terms of their function in the life of the species. This volume of new essays from an impressive line-up of well-known contributors offers a valuable summary of the current state of the teleosemantics debate.
The tyranny of common sense
Précis of Thinking about Consciousness
Replies to Commentators
Philosophy of Science
This chapter contains sections titled: The Epistemology of Science The Metaphysics of Science
Thinking about Consciousness
Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinc…
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Evolution and the Human Mind
List of contributors Preface 1. Introduction Peter Carruthers and Andrew Chamberlain 2. Massively modular minds: evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture Richard Samuels 3. Individual differences in early understanding of mind: genes, non-shared environment and modularity Claire Hughes and Robert Plomin 4. Darwin in the madhouse: evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders Dominic Murphy and Stephen Stich 5. Evolu…
I – David Papineau
This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophie…
Theory-Dependent Terms
The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy.…
Discussion of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts
Precis of Philosophical Naturalism
Reply to Commentators
Professor Thayer's helpful queries provide a welcome opportunity to clarify my distinction of criteria of evidence versus guidelines for the conduct of inquiry, and my understanding of the contrasts personal/impersonal, individual/social, objective/subjective/relative. Articulating criteria of evidence differs from giving guidelines for the conduct of inquiry as articulating criteria of nutritiousness differs from giving directions for menu-plann…
Many Minds are No Worse than One
The Virtues of Randomization
Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an ess…
Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism
Truth and Teleology
Representation and Explanation
Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism…
Many Minds are No Worse than One
Theory-Dependent Terms
The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy.…
Theory and Meaning
This book is concerned with those aspects of the theory of meaning for scientific terms that are relevant to questions about the evaluation of scientific theories. The contemporary debate about theory choice in science is normally presented as a conflict between two sets of ideas. The book shows that there is no real contest here; that the two sets of ideas are in fact quite compatible
The disvalue of knowledge
I argue that the concept of knowledge is a relic of a bygone age, erroneously supposed to do no harm. I illustrate this claim by showing how a concern with knowledge distorts the use of statistical evidence in criminal courts, and then generalize the point to show that this concern hampers our enterprises across the board and not only in legal contexts
The Virtues of Randomization
Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an ess…
Causal Asymmetry
Replies to Commentators
Kripke's Proof Is Ad Hominem Not Two‐dimensional
Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism
Realism, Ramsey sentences and the pessimistic meta-induction
The vis viva controversy
Discussion of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts
Response to Ehring's ‘Papineau on Causal Asymmetry’
Ideal Types and Empirical Theories
Ideal Types and Empirical Theories
The vis viva controversy
For Science in the Social Sciences
For Science in the Social Sciences
Theory and Meaning
This book is concerned with those aspects of the theory of meaning for scientific terms that are relevant to questions about the evaluation of scientific theories. The contemporary debate about theory choice in science is normally presented as a conflict between two sets of ideas. The book shows that there is no real contest here; that the two sets of ideas are in fact quite compatible
Theory and Meaning
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Theory and Meaning. By D. Papineau. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 210. Prioe £9.75) Graham Priest Graham Priest Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 31, Issue 122, January 1981, Pages 77–79, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218684 Published: 01 January 1981
Theory and Meaning
Representation and Explanation
Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism…
Causal Asymmetry
Reality andrepresentation
Response to Ehring's ‘Papineau on Causal Asymmetry’
An unnatural anti-realism
Conditionals
Journal Article Conditionals Get access Frank JacksonConditionals. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. Pp. vi + 148. Price £19.50.) David Papineau David Papineau University of Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 493–498, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219834 Published: 01 October 1989
Truth and Teleology
Reality and Representation
Realism and anti-realism an argument for anti-realism of belief belief and representation the teleological theory of representation the possibility of error universal rationality naturalized epistemology naturalized realism inferential processes relativism, history and scepticism
Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism
The Virtues of Randomization
Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an ess…
Theory-Dependent Terms
The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy.…
Discussion of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts
Precis of Philosophical Naturalism
Reply to Commentators
Professor Thayer's helpful queries provide a welcome opportunity to clarify my distinction of criteria of evidence versus guidelines for the conduct of inquiry, and my understanding of the contrasts personal/impersonal, individual/social, objective/subjective/relative. Articulating criteria of evidence differs from giving guidelines for the conduct of inquiry as articulating criteria of nutritiousness differs from giving directions for menu-plann…
Many Minds are No Worse than One
I – David Papineau
This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophie…
Evolution and the Human Mind
List of contributors Preface 1. Introduction Peter Carruthers and Andrew Chamberlain 2. Massively modular minds: evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture Richard Samuels 3. Individual differences in early understanding of mind: genes, non-shared environment and modularity Claire Hughes and Robert Plomin 4. Darwin in the madhouse: evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders Dominic Murphy and Stephen Stich 5. Evolu…
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Philosophy (34 obras) · Epistemology (33 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (15 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (15 obras) · Computer Science (14 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Sociology (10 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 obras) · Psychology (9 obras)