Jimmy Alfonso Licon
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4460195 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jimmy Alfonso Licon |
| NOMBRES | Jimmy Alfonso |
| APELLIDO | Licon |
| FIRMA | LICON J A |
| AFILIACIONES | Arizona State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9451-291X |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
ChatGPT is Bullshit (Partly) Because People are Bullshitters
On Sophistry, Signaling, and the Persistence of Bullshit
Without Thinking Twice
Ignorance of the costs and benefits of actions, like aiding someone in distress without thinking twice, is a reliable moral signal of altruism and trustworthiness – such actions, performed while ignorant, risk incurring costs with little or no benefit. Why care? First, this paper contributes to the literature applying signaling theory to moral issues. Second, it highlights some moral benefits of ignorance. And finally, it stresses how reliable se…
Democracy Incentivizes Bullshit
Democracies face an epistemic crisis: incentivizing bullshit. Here “bullshit”—coined by philosopher Harry Frankfurt—means convincing truth-insensitive statements or claims. This paper focuses on several democratic factors that incentivize bullshit: deliberative transparency, epistemic spillover effects, and rational irrationality. These factors pollute the epistemic commons, decrease institutional trust, and enact epistemic injustice. Unfortunate…
Better Not to Know
Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable know…
Some moral benefits of ignorance
When moral philosophers study ignorance, their efforts are almost exclusively confined to its exculpatory and blameworthy aspects. Unfortunately, though, this trend overlooks that certain kinds of propositional ignorance, namely of the personal costs and benefits of altruistic actions, can indirectly incentivize those actions. Humans require cooperation from others to survive, and that can be facilitated by a good reputation. One avenue to a good…
Should we Hope Apparent Atrocities Are Illusory
Philosophers have recently turned to axiological questions related to God and, to a minor extent, related to morality. This paper contributes to the latter project. The world contains atrocities such as famine and war. Can we rationally hope that these atrocities are merely moral illusions? First, we have good reason to hope that moral atrocities are only apparent because our world would be morally worse if they were real. Some critics argue that…
Aspirational theism and gratuitous suffering
Philosophers have long wondered whether God exists; and yet, they have ignored the question of whether we should hope that He exists – call this stance aspirational theism . In this article, I argue that we have a weighty pro tanto reason to adopt this stance: theism offers a metaphysical guarantee against gratuitous suffering (i.e. God would not permit gratuitous suffering). On the other hand, few atheist alternatives offer such a guarantee – an…
Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
May argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter the implausibility thesis). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that pace May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an is…
Sin obras prominentes en esta página.
Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
May argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter the implausibility thesis). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that pace May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an is…
Aspirational theism and gratuitous suffering
Philosophers have long wondered whether God exists; and yet, they have ignored the question of whether we should hope that He exists – call this stance aspirational theism . In this article, I argue that we have a weighty pro tanto reason to adopt this stance: theism offers a metaphysical guarantee against gratuitous suffering (i.e. God would not permit gratuitous suffering). On the other hand, few atheist alternatives offer such a guarantee – an…
Some moral benefits of ignorance
When moral philosophers study ignorance, their efforts are almost exclusively confined to its exculpatory and blameworthy aspects. Unfortunately, though, this trend overlooks that certain kinds of propositional ignorance, namely of the personal costs and benefits of altruistic actions, can indirectly incentivize those actions. Humans require cooperation from others to survive, and that can be facilitated by a good reputation. One avenue to a good…
Should we Hope Apparent Atrocities Are Illusory
Philosophers have recently turned to axiological questions related to God and, to a minor extent, related to morality. This paper contributes to the latter project. The world contains atrocities such as famine and war. Can we rationally hope that these atrocities are merely moral illusions? First, we have good reason to hope that moral atrocities are only apparent because our world would be morally worse if they were real. Some critics argue that…
Democracy Incentivizes Bullshit
Democracies face an epistemic crisis: incentivizing bullshit. Here “bullshit”—coined by philosopher Harry Frankfurt—means convincing truth-insensitive statements or claims. This paper focuses on several democratic factors that incentivize bullshit: deliberative transparency, epistemic spillover effects, and rational irrationality. These factors pollute the epistemic commons, decrease institutional trust, and enact epistemic injustice. Unfortunate…
Better Not to Know
Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable know…
ChatGPT is Bullshit (Partly) Because People are Bullshitters
On Sophistry, Signaling, and the Persistence of Bullshit
Without Thinking Twice
Ignorance of the costs and benefits of actions, like aiding someone in distress without thinking twice, is a reliable moral signal of altruism and trustworthiness – such actions, performed while ignorant, risk incurring costs with little or no benefit. Why care? First, this paper contributes to the literature applying signaling theory to moral issues. Second, it highlights some moral benefits of ignorance. And finally, it stresses how reliable se…
Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (6 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Ignorance (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (2 obras) · Moral disengagement (2 obras) · Moral psychology (2 obras)