Neal A Tognazzini
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 457353 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Neal A Tognazzini |
| NOMBRES | Neal A |
| APELLIDO | Tognazzini |
| FIRMA | TOGNAZZINI N A |
| AFILIACIONES | William & Mary |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3145-3144 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2007 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Unhitching the Semi from Semicompatibilism
John Martin Fischer has long championed semicompatibilism, the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility even if determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Since (as Fischer agues) moral responsibility is grounded in facts about the actual sequence, it is not threatened by the Consequence Argument, which threatens only the idea that we have access to alternative sequences. This view is attractive in part bec…
What Time Travel Teaches Us About Moral Responsibility
This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral…
Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
This paper evaluates a new argument for the fixity of the past, recently defended by Wesley H. Holliday in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review 121). The fixity of the past is a premise used to argue for incompatibilism, and one that many compatibilists deny. Holliday claims that his argument ends the stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists concerning this premise. It is argued that Holliday’s argument, whi…
Reactive Attitudes and Volitional Necessity
Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence
The Nature and Ethics of Blame
Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully u…
Owning Up to Luck
Although libertarians and compatibilists disagree about whether moral responsibility requires the falsity of determinism, they tend to agree that moral responsibility is at least compatible with the falsity of determinism. But there is a real worry about how that can be: after all, if my actions aren’t determined, then isn’t their occurrence just a matter of luck? In this paper, I offer a suggestion for how to understand and deal with this proble…
The Physiognomy of Responsibility
Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed
Free Will and Luck
Book Review| April 01 2009 Free Will and Luck Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. vii + 223 pp. Neal A. Tognazzini Neal A. Tognazzini Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 259–261. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-049 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Neal A. Tognazzini; Free Will…
A Problem for Guidance Control
Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons‐responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's ac…
The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation
The Nature and Ethics of Blame
Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully u…
The Physiognomy of Responsibility
Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence
Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed
The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation
The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation
A Problem for Guidance Control
Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons‐responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's ac…
Free Will and Luck
Book Review| April 01 2009 Free Will and Luck Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. vii + 223 pp. Neal A. Tognazzini Neal A. Tognazzini Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 259–261. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-049 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Neal A. Tognazzini; Free Will…
Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed
Owning Up to Luck
Although libertarians and compatibilists disagree about whether moral responsibility requires the falsity of determinism, they tend to agree that moral responsibility is at least compatible with the falsity of determinism. But there is a real worry about how that can be: after all, if my actions aren’t determined, then isn’t their occurrence just a matter of luck? In this paper, I offer a suggestion for how to understand and deal with this proble…
The Physiognomy of Responsibility
Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence
The Nature and Ethics of Blame
Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully u…
Reactive Attitudes and Volitional Necessity
Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
This paper evaluates a new argument for the fixity of the past, recently defended by Wesley H. Holliday in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review 121). The fixity of the past is a premise used to argue for incompatibilism, and one that many compatibilists deny. Holliday claims that his argument ends the stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists concerning this premise. It is argued that Holliday’s argument, whi…
Unhitching the Semi from Semicompatibilism
John Martin Fischer has long championed semicompatibilism, the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility even if determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Since (as Fischer agues) moral responsibility is grounded in facts about the actual sequence, it is not threatened by the Consequence Argument, which threatens only the idea that we have access to alternative sequences. This view is attractive in part bec…
What Time Travel Teaches Us About Moral Responsibility
This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral…
Epistemology (8 obras) · Free Will and Agency (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Citation (5 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · War, Ethics, and Justification (4 obras) · Library science (3 obras)