Murat C Mungan
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4581365 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Murat C Mungan |
| NOMBRES | Murat C |
| APELLIDO | Mungan |
| FIRMA | MUNGAN M C |
| AFILIACIONES | George Mason University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1948-6488 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 21 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Punishment Menus
Optimal law enforcement and regulation models generally assume a single punishment scheme. However, when there is unobservable heterogeneity in violation propensities, welfare can be improved by offering punishment menus to potential offenders ex ante. When this is done, individuals with low violation propensities will choose low audit probabilities and high penalties, while individuals with high violation propensities will choose high audit prob…
Oriented data-generating processes
Decision makers attempting to classify a binary state of the world may commit two types of errors. Even when the two alternative states have equal prior probabilities and when the two types of errors are equally costly, a classification criterion may be chosen which leads to one type of error being committed more frequently than the other, because of asymmetries in the data that informs their decisions. We formalize this possibility through a cat…
Informational Properties of Liability Regimes
Fault-based liability regimes require an inquiry into the nature of the defendant’s conduct that is absent in strict liability regimes. Therefore, fault-based liability can convey superior information compared to strict liability. Further reflection reveals that this is true only if the evidence related to the nature of defendants’ actions is sufficiently informative. Otherwise, such evidence can add noise to the information conveyed through judg…
The Blackstone ratio, modified
In his discussion of evidentiary policies, Blackstone famously noted that ‘it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer’ (Blackstone 1769). The conventional wisdom among lawyers, judges as well as academics holds that accepting this statement as a maxim necessitates the adoption of pro-defendant evidentiary rules. It is also commonly believed that costs associated with false convictions being greater than those associ…
Punishment menus and their deterrent effects
Defamation with Bayesian Audiences
How strictly should the law regulate false defamatory statements? We first show that the presence of judicial errors often puts defamation law on a Laffer curve: regulation that is too lax or too strict is inferior to moderate regulation. While moderate regulation is ideal, it is not always attainable because of practical and legal constraints. With these constraints, we consider a Bayesian audience that takes the strictness of defamation law int…
Does the Severity of Sanctions Influence Learning about Enforcement Policy? Experimental Evidence
The literature on law enforcement often assumes that the updating of beliefs regarding the probability of detection is a process that is independent from the severity of the sanction. We test this presumption experimentally, using a taking game in which the probability of detection may be either high or low with commonly known probabilities. Individuals gain information about their probability of detection from their experience in the taking game…
Seemingly irrelevant information? The impact of legal team size on third party perceptions
Optimal standards of proof in antitrust
Economic analyses of antitrust institutions have thus far focused predominantly on optimal penalties and the design of substantive legal rules, and have largely ignored the standard of proof used in trials as a policy tool in shaping behavior. This neglected tool can play a unique role in the antitrust context, where a given firm may have the choice to engage in exceptional anticompetitive or procompetitive behavior, or simply follow more convent…
The Exclusionary Rule Revisited
We revisit the economic theory of exclusionary rules. First, we show that more exclusion may induce enforcers to conduct more searches, contrary to the standard notion that more exclusion leads to fewer searches. Second, we identify and investigate the complexities that arise when enforcers may harass suspects (imposing significant costs without legal proceedings) instead of conducting legal searches. If one attempts to choose the optimal exclusi…
Letting offenders choose their punishment
Punishment menus allow offenders to choose the punishment to which they will be subjected from a set of options. We present several behaviorally informed rationales for why punishment menus may serve as effective deterrents, notably by causing people to refrain from entering a calculative mindset; reducing their psychological reactance; causing them to reconsider the reputational impacts of punishment; and reducing suspicions about whether the ac…
Law, Criminal
In this entry, the structure of the criminal law is reviewed. The review begins by explaining the types of elements that can be used in defining crimes with an emphasis on behavioral (e.g., actus reus ) and mental (e.g., mens rea ) elements. Substantive and evidentiary defenses are categorized and are explained along with the most frequently discussed functions of punishment
An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws
The price of expungements
Optimal Enforcement with Heterogeneous Private Costs of Punishment
We formalize the idea that regulatory devices may generate different incentive effects for different individuals. These unequal incentive effects can generate social costs by causing some individuals to be overdeterred and others to be underdeterred. This is an underappreciated dimension over which one ought to compare the efficiency of various regulatory tools. We then note various methods to reduce inefficiencies caused by unequal incentive eff…
The Effect of Public Health Insurance on Criminal Recidivism
Mental health and substance use disorders are highly prevalent among incarcerated individuals. Many prisoners reenter the community without receiving any specialized treatment and return to prison with existing behavioral health problems. We consider a Beckerian law enforcement theory to identify different channels through which access to healthcare may impact ex‐offenders’ propensities to recidivate, and empirically estimate the effect of access…
The General versus Specific Deterrence Effects of Expungements
Conditional Privacy Rights
People have subjective valuations of privacy. Thus, absent further considerations, efficiency requires that a person be afforded privacy if, and only if, his subjective valuation of privacy exceeds the social value of the information that would be disclosed through a violation of that person's privacy. Absolute regimes that either always allow privacy, or never allow privacy, cannot achieve this result. This article shows that a conditional priva…
Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement
The Property-Contract Balance
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
A Utilitarian Justification for Heightened Standards of Proof in Criminal Trials
This paper contributes to the interpretation of the standard of proof in criminal trials in two ways. First, it provides a purely utilitarian explanation as to why there are asymmetric costs associated with false convictions and acquittals. It relies on the fact that noncriminals may engage in precautionary activities in order to avoid false convictions. Second, it shows that this difference in the costs associated with false-conviction and -acqu…
The Effect of Public Health Insurance on Criminal Recidivism
Mental health and substance use disorders are highly prevalent among incarcerated individuals. Many prisoners reenter the community without receiving any specialized treatment and return to prison with existing behavioral health problems. We consider a Beckerian law enforcement theory to identify different channels through which access to healthcare may impact ex‐offenders’ propensities to recidivate, and empirically estimate the effect of access…
Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement
A Utilitarian Justification for Heightened Standards of Proof in Criminal Trials
This paper contributes to the interpretation of the standard of proof in criminal trials in two ways. First, it provides a purely utilitarian explanation as to why there are asymmetric costs associated with false convictions and acquittals. It relies on the fact that noncriminals may engage in precautionary activities in order to avoid false convictions. Second, it shows that this difference in the costs associated with false-conviction and -acqu…
The Property-Contract Balance
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Conditional Privacy Rights
People have subjective valuations of privacy. Thus, absent further considerations, efficiency requires that a person be afforded privacy if, and only if, his subjective valuation of privacy exceeds the social value of the information that would be disclosed through a violation of that person's privacy. Absolute regimes that either always allow privacy, or never allow privacy, cannot achieve this result. This article shows that a conditional priva…
Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement
The General versus Specific Deterrence Effects of Expungements
An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws
The price of expungements
Optimal Enforcement with Heterogeneous Private Costs of Punishment
We formalize the idea that regulatory devices may generate different incentive effects for different individuals. These unequal incentive effects can generate social costs by causing some individuals to be overdeterred and others to be underdeterred. This is an underappreciated dimension over which one ought to compare the efficiency of various regulatory tools. We then note various methods to reduce inefficiencies caused by unequal incentive eff…
The Effect of Public Health Insurance on Criminal Recidivism
Mental health and substance use disorders are highly prevalent among incarcerated individuals. Many prisoners reenter the community without receiving any specialized treatment and return to prison with existing behavioral health problems. We consider a Beckerian law enforcement theory to identify different channels through which access to healthcare may impact ex‐offenders’ propensities to recidivate, and empirically estimate the effect of access…
Seemingly irrelevant information? The impact of legal team size on third party perceptions
Optimal standards of proof in antitrust
Economic analyses of antitrust institutions have thus far focused predominantly on optimal penalties and the design of substantive legal rules, and have largely ignored the standard of proof used in trials as a policy tool in shaping behavior. This neglected tool can play a unique role in the antitrust context, where a given firm may have the choice to engage in exceptional anticompetitive or procompetitive behavior, or simply follow more convent…
The Exclusionary Rule Revisited
We revisit the economic theory of exclusionary rules. First, we show that more exclusion may induce enforcers to conduct more searches, contrary to the standard notion that more exclusion leads to fewer searches. Second, we identify and investigate the complexities that arise when enforcers may harass suspects (imposing significant costs without legal proceedings) instead of conducting legal searches. If one attempts to choose the optimal exclusi…
Letting offenders choose their punishment
Punishment menus allow offenders to choose the punishment to which they will be subjected from a set of options. We present several behaviorally informed rationales for why punishment menus may serve as effective deterrents, notably by causing people to refrain from entering a calculative mindset; reducing their psychological reactance; causing them to reconsider the reputational impacts of punishment; and reducing suspicions about whether the ac…
Law, Criminal
In this entry, the structure of the criminal law is reviewed. The review begins by explaining the types of elements that can be used in defining crimes with an emphasis on behavioral (e.g., actus reus ) and mental (e.g., mens rea ) elements. Substantive and evidentiary defenses are categorized and are explained along with the most frequently discussed functions of punishment
Defamation with Bayesian Audiences
How strictly should the law regulate false defamatory statements? We first show that the presence of judicial errors often puts defamation law on a Laffer curve: regulation that is too lax or too strict is inferior to moderate regulation. While moderate regulation is ideal, it is not always attainable because of practical and legal constraints. With these constraints, we consider a Bayesian audience that takes the strictness of defamation law int…
Does the Severity of Sanctions Influence Learning about Enforcement Policy? Experimental Evidence
The literature on law enforcement often assumes that the updating of beliefs regarding the probability of detection is a process that is independent from the severity of the sanction. We test this presumption experimentally, using a taking game in which the probability of detection may be either high or low with commonly known probabilities. Individuals gain information about their probability of detection from their experience in the taking game…
Punishment menus and their deterrent effects
Informational Properties of Liability Regimes
Fault-based liability regimes require an inquiry into the nature of the defendant’s conduct that is absent in strict liability regimes. Therefore, fault-based liability can convey superior information compared to strict liability. Further reflection reveals that this is true only if the evidence related to the nature of defendants’ actions is sufficiently informative. Otherwise, such evidence can add noise to the information conveyed through judg…
The Blackstone ratio, modified
In his discussion of evidentiary policies, Blackstone famously noted that ‘it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer’ (Blackstone 1769). The conventional wisdom among lawyers, judges as well as academics holds that accepting this statement as a maxim necessitates the adoption of pro-defendant evidentiary rules. It is also commonly believed that costs associated with false convictions being greater than those associ…
Punishment Menus
Optimal law enforcement and regulation models generally assume a single punishment scheme. However, when there is unobservable heterogeneity in violation propensities, welfare can be improved by offering punishment menus to potential offenders ex ante. When this is done, individuals with low violation propensities will choose low audit probabilities and high penalties, while individuals with high violation propensities will choose high audit prob…
Oriented data-generating processes
Decision makers attempting to classify a binary state of the world may commit two types of errors. Even when the two alternative states have equal prior probabilities and when the two types of errors are equally costly, a classification criterion may be chosen which leads to one type of error being committed more frequently than the other, because of asymmetries in the data that informs their decisions. We formalize this possibility through a cat…
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (15 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Political science (13 obras) · Economics (12 obras) · Law and economics (10 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (8 obras) · Criminology (7 obras) · Business (6 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras)