Andrew Bacon
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 460102 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Andrew Bacon |
| NOMBRES | Andrew |
| APELLIDO | Bacon |
| FIRMA | BACON A |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Southern California |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Could the Truths of Mathematics Have Been Different?
Could the truths of mathematics have been different than they in fact are? If so, which truths could have been different? Do the contingent mathematical facts supervene on physical facts, or are they free floating? This article investigates these questions within a framework of higher-order modal logic, drawing sometimes surprising connections between the necessity of arithmetic and analysis and other theses of modal metaphysics: the thesis that …
Zermelian Extensibility
According to an influential idea in the philosophy of set theory, certain mathematical concepts, such as the notion of a well‐order and set, are indefinitely extensible. Following Parsons (1983), this has often been cashed out in modal terms. This paper explores instead an extensional articulation of the idea, formulated in higher‐order logic, that straightforwardly formalizes some remarks of Zermelo. The resulting picture is incompatible with th…
A Theory of Structured Propositions
This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn’t arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic, but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the λ-calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist…
Against Disquotation
We argue against the disquotational meaning schema—‘φ’ means that φ—and suggest that rejecting it is the key to resolving further intensional paradoxes about the limits of thought
Logical Combinatorialism
In explaining the notion of a fundamental property or relation, metaphysicians will often draw an analogy with languages. The fundamental properties and relations stand to reality as the primitive predicates and relations stand to a language: the smallest set of vocabulary God would need in order to write the “book of the world.” This paper attempts to make good on this metaphor. To that end, a modality is introduced that, put informally, stands …
Radical Anti‐disquotationalism
Vagueness and Thought
The Logic of Opacity
We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher‐order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it …
Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes
Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. Thi…
The Logic of Opacity
We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher‐order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it …
Logical Combinatorialism
In explaining the notion of a fundamental property or relation, metaphysicians will often draw an analogy with languages. The fundamental properties and relations stand to reality as the primitive predicates and relations stand to a language: the smallest set of vocabulary God would need in order to write the “book of the world.” This paper attempts to make good on this metaphor. To that end, a modality is introduced that, put informally, stands …
A Theory of Structured Propositions
This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn’t arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic, but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the λ-calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist…
Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes
Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. Thi…
Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes
Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. Thi…
The Logic of Opacity
We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher‐order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it …
Radical Anti‐disquotationalism
Vagueness and Thought
Logical Combinatorialism
In explaining the notion of a fundamental property or relation, metaphysicians will often draw an analogy with languages. The fundamental properties and relations stand to reality as the primitive predicates and relations stand to a language: the smallest set of vocabulary God would need in order to write the “book of the world.” This paper attempts to make good on this metaphor. To that end, a modality is introduced that, put informally, stands …
Against Disquotation
We argue against the disquotational meaning schema—‘φ’ means that φ—and suggest that rejecting it is the key to resolving further intensional paradoxes about the limits of thought
A Theory of Structured Propositions
This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn’t arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic, but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the λ-calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist…
Could the Truths of Mathematics Have Been Different?
Could the truths of mathematics have been different than they in fact are? If so, which truths could have been different? Do the contingent mathematical facts supervene on physical facts, or are they free floating? This article investigates these questions within a framework of higher-order modal logic, drawing sometimes surprising connections between the necessity of arithmetic and analysis and other theses of modal metaphysics: the thesis that …
Zermelian Extensibility
According to an influential idea in the philosophy of set theory, certain mathematical concepts, such as the notion of a well‐order and set, are indefinitely extensible. Following Parsons (1983), this has often been cashed out in modal terms. This paper explores instead an extensional articulation of the idea, formulated in higher‐order logic, that straightforwardly formalizes some remarks of Zermelo. The resulting picture is incompatible with th…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Linguistics (4 obras) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (4 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Programming language (3 obras) · Property (philosophy) (3 obras)