Nina Emery
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 460465 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Nina Emery |
| NOMBRES | Nina |
| APELLIDO | Emery |
| FIRMA | EMERY N |
| AFILIACIONES | Mount Holyoke College |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8726-4292 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Time
Mooreanism in metaphysics from Mooreanism in physics
I argue that the way the world appears to be plays an important role in standard scientific practice, and that therefore the way the world appears to be ought to play a similar role in metaphysics as well. I then show how the argument bears on a specific first-order debate in metaphysics – the debate over whether there are composite objects. This debate is often thought to be a paradigm case of a metaphysical debate that is largely insulated from…
The Governing Conception of Laws
In her paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws,” Helen Beebee argues that it is not a conceptual truth that laws of nature govern, and thus that one need not insist on a metaphysical account of laws that makes sense of their governing role. I agree with the first point but not the second. Although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact that laws govern follows straightforwardly from an important (though under-appreciated) principle of scient…
A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
Metaphysicians, by and large, aim to be scientifically respectable in their theorizing. To what extent do they succeed? That’s an excellent question. But before we can answer it, we need to answer a more basic question: What does it mean to be scientifically respectable in your metaphysical theorizing, anyway?In this important and original book, Andreas Hüttemann puts forward a novel way of thinking about this second question. He puts forward, in…
Quantum correlations and the explanatory power of radical metaphysical hypotheses
Vaccine Hesitancies Across the World in the Era of Covid-19
Temporal Ersatzism and Relativity
Temporal eliminativism is the view that the present is privileged because past and future entities do not exist. Temporal ersatzism is the view that the present is privileged because, although past and future entities exist, they are not concrete. I argue that shifting from temporal eliminativism to temporal ersatzism can help to address objections to the former theory that are due to relativity theory—but only if temporal ersatzism is understood…
A Naturalist’s Guide to Objective Chance
I argue that there are such things as nomological probabilities—probabilities that play a certain explanatory role with respect to stable, long-run relative frequencies. Indeed, I argue, we should be willing to accept nomological probabilities even if they turn out to be metaphysically weird or even wholly sui generis entities. I then give an example of one way in which this argument should shape future work on the metaphysics of chance by descri…
Against Radical Quantum Ontologies
Some theories of quantum mechanical phenomena endorse wave function realism , according to which the physical space we inhabit is very different from the physical space we appear to inhabit. In this paper I explore an argument against wave function realism that appeals to a type of simplicity that, although often overlooked, plays a crucial role in scientific theory choice. The type of simplicity in question is simplicity of fit between the way a…
Temporal ersatzism
Temporal ersatzism is the view that past entities exist, but are not concrete. The view is analogous to modal ersatzism, according to which merely possible worlds exist, but are not concrete. The goal of this paper is to give the reader a sense of the scope of available temporal ersatzist views, the ways in which the analogy with modal ersatzism may be helpful in characterizing and defending those views, and the sorts of considerations that are r…
The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism
A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to en…
Chance, Possibility, and Explanation
I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental …
Chance, Possibility, and Explanation
I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental …
A Naturalist’s Guide to Objective Chance
I argue that there are such things as nomological probabilities—probabilities that play a certain explanatory role with respect to stable, long-run relative frequencies. Indeed, I argue, we should be willing to accept nomological probabilities even if they turn out to be metaphysically weird or even wholly sui generis entities. I then give an example of one way in which this argument should shape future work on the metaphysics of chance by descri…
Against Radical Quantum Ontologies
Some theories of quantum mechanical phenomena endorse wave function realism , according to which the physical space we inhabit is very different from the physical space we appear to inhabit. In this paper I explore an argument against wave function realism that appeals to a type of simplicity that, although often overlooked, plays a crucial role in scientific theory choice. The type of simplicity in question is simplicity of fit between the way a…
The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism
A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to en…
Vaccine Hesitancies Across the World in the Era of Covid-19
Temporal ersatzism
Temporal ersatzism is the view that past entities exist, but are not concrete. The view is analogous to modal ersatzism, according to which merely possible worlds exist, but are not concrete. The goal of this paper is to give the reader a sense of the scope of available temporal ersatzist views, the ways in which the analogy with modal ersatzism may be helpful in characterizing and defending those views, and the sorts of considerations that are r…
The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism
A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to en…
Chance, Possibility, and Explanation
I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental …
A Naturalist’s Guide to Objective Chance
I argue that there are such things as nomological probabilities—probabilities that play a certain explanatory role with respect to stable, long-run relative frequencies. Indeed, I argue, we should be willing to accept nomological probabilities even if they turn out to be metaphysically weird or even wholly sui generis entities. I then give an example of one way in which this argument should shape future work on the metaphysics of chance by descri…
Against Radical Quantum Ontologies
Some theories of quantum mechanical phenomena endorse wave function realism , according to which the physical space we inhabit is very different from the physical space we appear to inhabit. In this paper I explore an argument against wave function realism that appeals to a type of simplicity that, although often overlooked, plays a crucial role in scientific theory choice. The type of simplicity in question is simplicity of fit between the way a…
Temporal ersatzism
Temporal ersatzism is the view that past entities exist, but are not concrete. The view is analogous to modal ersatzism, according to which merely possible worlds exist, but are not concrete. The goal of this paper is to give the reader a sense of the scope of available temporal ersatzist views, the ways in which the analogy with modal ersatzism may be helpful in characterizing and defending those views, and the sorts of considerations that are r…
Temporal Ersatzism and Relativity
Temporal eliminativism is the view that the present is privileged because past and future entities do not exist. Temporal ersatzism is the view that the present is privileged because, although past and future entities exist, they are not concrete. I argue that shifting from temporal eliminativism to temporal ersatzism can help to address objections to the former theory that are due to relativity theory—but only if temporal ersatzism is understood…
Quantum correlations and the explanatory power of radical metaphysical hypotheses
Vaccine Hesitancies Across the World in the Era of Covid-19
The Governing Conception of Laws
In her paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws,” Helen Beebee argues that it is not a conceptual truth that laws of nature govern, and thus that one need not insist on a metaphysical account of laws that makes sense of their governing role. I agree with the first point but not the second. Although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact that laws govern follows straightforwardly from an important (though under-appreciated) principle of scient…
A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
Metaphysicians, by and large, aim to be scientifically respectable in their theorizing. To what extent do they succeed? That’s an excellent question. But before we can answer it, we need to answer a more basic question: What does it mean to be scientifically respectable in your metaphysical theorizing, anyway?In this important and original book, Andreas Hüttemann puts forward a novel way of thinking about this second question. He puts forward, in…
Mooreanism in metaphysics from Mooreanism in physics
I argue that the way the world appears to be plays an important role in standard scientific practice, and that therefore the way the world appears to be ought to play a similar role in metaphysics as well. I then show how the argument bears on a specific first-order debate in metaphysics – the debate over whether there are composite objects. This debate is often thought to be a paradigm case of a metaphysical debate that is largely insulated from…
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Time
Epistemology (10 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Metaphysics (8 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Philosophy of science (3 obras)