Carlotta Pavese
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 460800 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Carlotta Pavese |
| NOMBRES | Carlotta |
| APELLIDO | Pavese |
| FIRMA | PAVESE C |
| AFILIACIONES | Cornell University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0759-8853 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 18 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 82 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2016 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Intentionalism Out of Control
Suppose I say, ‘That is my dog’ and manage to refer to my dog, Fido. According to intentionalism, my intention to refer to Fido is part of the explanation of the way that the demonstrative gets Fido as its referent. A natural corollary is that the speaker is, to some extent, in control of this semantic fact. In this paper, we argue that intentionalism must give up the claim that the speaker is always in control, and thus, that intentions are alwa…
Technical Knowledge as Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle
Doctors heal people, and architects build houses. Their expertise guides them in their performance. Aristotle calls this expertise a technē . He often tells us that technē comes with a productive form of knowledge ( poiētikē epistēmē ). But what kind of knowledge does he associate with technē ? We argue that for Aristotle technical knowledge is scientific knowledge—knowledge that can be modeled in terms of demonstrations. The view we develop enjo…
Knowledge, skills, and creditability
Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic…
The know-how solution to Kraemer's puzzle
Skills as Knowledge
This paper advances a unified theory of skilful and intentional action. According to our theory, the distinguishing feature of both skilful and intentional actions is that they are guided by the agent’s knowledge of the means of performing the task at hand. This theory leads naturally to an intellectualist view of skills, according to which skills are propositional knowledge states. We show that this view enjoys a number of explanatory advantages…
Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments
Practical knowledge first
Reasoning and Presuppositions
It is a platitude that when we reason, we often take things for granted, sometimes even justifiably so. Although it is a platitude that we often take things for granted when we reason—whether justifiably or not—one might think that we do not have to. In fact, it is a natural expectation that were we not pressed by time, lack of energy or focus, we could always in principle make explicit in the form of premises every single presupposition we make …
Knowledge and mentality
This paper reexamines the case for mentality — the thesis that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, and not only derivatively, simply by virtue of being composed out of mental states or by virtue of being a property of mental states — and explores a novel argument for it. I argue that a certain property singled out by psychologists and philosophers of cognitive science as distinctive of skillful behavior ( agentive control ) is best unde…
Practical concepts and productive reasoning
Know-how, action, and luck
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill And Expertise
According to virtue epistemology, one should primarily understand knowledge in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. There are various ways of understanding this thesis. Along one axis, there is the debate about whether we should focus on the agent’s reliable cognitive skills in general, or whether we should instead treat knowledge as primarily concerned with the manifestation of more elevated epistemic standin…
Modal Virtue Epistemology
Know-How and Gradability
Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be…
Skill in epistemology I
Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill
Skill in epistemology II
The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (Sections 1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stan…
Modal Virtue Epistemology
Know-How and Gradability
Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be…
Know-how, action, and luck
Skill in epistemology I
Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill
Skill in epistemology II
The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (Sections 1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stan…
Practical knowledge first
Practical concepts and productive reasoning
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill And Expertise
According to virtue epistemology, one should primarily understand knowledge in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. There are various ways of understanding this thesis. Along one axis, there is the debate about whether we should focus on the agent’s reliable cognitive skills in general, or whether we should instead treat knowledge as primarily concerned with the manifestation of more elevated epistemic standin…
Knowledge and mentality
This paper reexamines the case for mentality — the thesis that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, and not only derivatively, simply by virtue of being composed out of mental states or by virtue of being a property of mental states — and explores a novel argument for it. I argue that a certain property singled out by psychologists and philosophers of cognitive science as distinctive of skillful behavior ( agentive control ) is best unde…
Skill in epistemology I
Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill
Skill in epistemology II
The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (Sections 1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stan…
Know-How and Gradability
Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be…
Modal Virtue Epistemology
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill And Expertise
According to virtue epistemology, one should primarily understand knowledge in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. There are various ways of understanding this thesis. Along one axis, there is the debate about whether we should focus on the agent’s reliable cognitive skills in general, or whether we should instead treat knowledge as primarily concerned with the manifestation of more elevated epistemic standin…
Reasoning and Presuppositions
It is a platitude that when we reason, we often take things for granted, sometimes even justifiably so. Although it is a platitude that we often take things for granted when we reason—whether justifiably or not—one might think that we do not have to. In fact, it is a natural expectation that were we not pressed by time, lack of energy or focus, we could always in principle make explicit in the form of premises every single presupposition we make …
Knowledge and mentality
This paper reexamines the case for mentality — the thesis that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, and not only derivatively, simply by virtue of being composed out of mental states or by virtue of being a property of mental states — and explores a novel argument for it. I argue that a certain property singled out by psychologists and philosophers of cognitive science as distinctive of skillful behavior ( agentive control ) is best unde…
Practical concepts and productive reasoning
Know-how, action, and luck
Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments
Practical knowledge first
Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic…
The know-how solution to Kraemer's puzzle
Skills as Knowledge
This paper advances a unified theory of skilful and intentional action. According to our theory, the distinguishing feature of both skilful and intentional actions is that they are guided by the agent’s knowledge of the means of performing the task at hand. This theory leads naturally to an intellectualist view of skills, according to which skills are propositional knowledge states. We show that this view enjoys a number of explanatory advantages…
Knowledge, skills, and creditability
Technical Knowledge as Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle
Doctors heal people, and architects build houses. Their expertise guides them in their performance. Aristotle calls this expertise a technē . He often tells us that technē comes with a productive form of knowledge ( poiētikē epistēmē ). But what kind of knowledge does he associate with technē ? We argue that for Aristotle technical knowledge is scientific knowledge—knowledge that can be modeled in terms of demonstrations. The view we develop enjo…
Intentionalism Out of Control
Suppose I say, ‘That is my dog’ and manage to refer to my dog, Fido. According to intentionalism, my intention to refer to Fido is part of the explanation of the way that the demonstrative gets Fido as its referent. A natural corollary is that the speaker is, to some extent, in control of this semantic fact. In this paper, we argue that intentionalism must give up the claim that the speaker is always in control, and thus, that intentions are alwa…
Epistemology (15 obras) · Philosophy (14 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 obras) · Psychology (12 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Action (physics) (5 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Cognitive science (4 obras)