Richard E Wagner
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 486802 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Richard E Wagner |
| NOMBRES | Richard E |
| APELLIDO | Wagner |
| FIRMA | WAGNER R E |
| AFILIACIONES | George Mason University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8567-5776 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 61 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 143 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 59 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 3 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1966 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Reconceptualizing Public Choice inside a Theory of Complex Social Systems
Public Choice theory was initiated by economists and political scientists in the late-1950s and early 1960s and is generally described as the application of economic concepts and formulations to political phenomena. This essay explores the possibilities for Public Choice if it were to engage more fully with theories of complex systems, and particularly the budding field of complexity economics. We explain that economizing action and public choice…
Systems-Theoretic LawMacro
This article was written for a Liberty Fund conference on "Liberty in Relation to Law and Macroeconomics." The paper works with recognition that the models we use are not neutral devices to see more clearly into reality because they also shade that reality in different ways. For instance, a model grounded on systemic equilibrium and aggregation will almost necessarily assign turbulence to market interaction and thereby place the calming of turbul…
Introduction to the Special Issue “Law in Relation to Macroeconomics”
Giuseppe Eusepi
Pandemic Politics within a System of Entangled Political Economy
This essay uses entangled political economy to explore how concerns over Covid-19 have influenced conduct within the public square. Entangled political economy represents a merging of ideas that Frank Knight (1933) and Harold Lasswell (1936) set forth to indicate that politics and economics dealt with the same societal material. We explore the relationship between entanglement and public reason within a context of Michael Polanyi’s (1962) concept…
Constitutional catallaxy
Most liberal constitutional theorising, as exemplified by Buchanan (1975) and Rawls (1971), operates with a two-level scheme of analysis. The first level entails agreement on the rules through which a polity is constituted; the second level entails self-interested action inside that framework of rules. Within this framework a polity is constituted through agreement on the rules that frame political action. In this paper, we explore how this schem…
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice
Governance within a system of entangled political economy
James M. Buchanan
Political parties
Political entrepreneurship, emergent dynamics, and constitutional politics
Constitutional political economy mostly distinguishes between rules and actions, with rules selected prior to actions within those rules. While we accept the coherence of this distinction, we pursue it within an open rather than closed scheme of analysis. Doing this entails recognition that societies rarely exhibit universal agreement about constitutional provisions. Recognizing the incomplete character of constitutional agreement points to the e…
James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy
The Autonomy of the Political within Political Economy
Political economy is a term in wide use and has been for centuries. Yet standard economic theory reduces politics to ethics or economics. This reduction is enabled by the presumption of closed choice data or given utility and cost functions. In this conceptual framework, the political vanishes into an activity of preference satisfaction according to a welfare function (ethics) or into trade (economics). To bring the political back to life within …
James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy
James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction examines the contemporary meaning and significance of James M. Buchanan’s body of work. The book uses Buchanan’s past contributions to explore the present and future relevance of his scholarly contributions and insights. It seeks mainly to explain what insight for their work contemporary scholars might acquire by becoming familiar with some of Buchanan’s formulations. Buch…
Economic Coordination across Divergent Institutional Frameworks
Economic theory contains a significant theoretical antinomy. Markets are thought to secure coordination in self-organized fashion. In contrast, polities are portrayed as securing coordination through planning and administration. Doing this is to commit what Michael Resnick calls the ‘centralized mindset’, which is to attribute an observed order to some ordering agent. This article seeks to dissolve this theoretical antinomy by explaining how the …
Politics as a Peculiar Business
Economists typically treat government as something outside the business realm, a sort of "Lord of the Manor". Richard Wagner argues that this is the wrong approach and can ultimately be destructive to capitalism and to society
The Tax State as Source of Perpetual Crisis
The term “tax state” originated in a controversy between Rudolf Goldscheid and Joseph Schumpeter over the treatment of Austria’s public debt in the aftermath of World War I. Goldscheid asserted that this debt represented a crisis for a state that relied on taxation. Schumpeter argued that the crisis was temporary and could be resolved by a one-time capital levy to reduce the debt, after which the state could resume its tax-based mode of operation…
Virginia political economy
From mixed economy to entangled political economy
James Buchanan’s public debt theory
Form vs. substance in selection through competition
Betty Tillman, a remembrance of times long ago
Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law
Tax Prices in a Democratic Polity
While Antonio de Viti de Marco was a significant figure within the Italian school of public finance that flourished between 1880 and 1940, his theoretical framework also has relevance today. Contemporary theory largely adopts a sequential framework where states act to modify previously established market outcomes. In contrast, de Viti worked with a framework where political and market outcomes were established simultaneously because he regarded t…
Property, State, and Entangled Political Economy
Most theories of political economy operate in terms of what might be called separated political economy, as illustrated by the formulation: political economy = polity + economy. Within this formulation it is reasonable to speak of the state intervening into the market economy. In contrast to separated political economy, this paper explores some aspects of what might be called an entangled political economy, wherein relations among state-based and…
Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice
The cameralists
The Calculus of consent
Tax Prices in a Democratic Polity
While Antonio de Viti de Marco was a significant figure within the Italian school of public finance that flourished between 1880 and 1940, his theoretical framework also has relevance today. Contemporary theory largely adopts a sequential framework where states act to modify previously established market outcomes. In contrast, de Viti worked with a framework where political and market outcomes were established simultaneously because he regarded t…
From Continental Public Finance to Public Choice
Research Article| December 01 2005 From Continental Public Finance to Public Choice: Mapping Continuity Jürgen G. Backhaus; Jürgen G. Backhaus Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Richard E. Wagner Richard E. Wagner Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2005) 37 (Suppl_1): 314–332. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-37-Suppl_1-314 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & ta…
Public Choice as an Academic Enterprise
This paper treats the development of public choice as an academic enterprise that originated at the University of Virginia and that grew to maturity at VPI. It seeks to distinguish between the particularistic and personal sources of programmatic success on the one hand, and institutional and organizational sources on the other. Only to the extent the success is institutional or organizational is there something that potentially can be duplicated …
States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises
This paper seeks to overcome an antinomy within the theory of political economy: while market outcomes are treated as resulting from polycentric competition, political outcomes are treated as resulting from hierarchic planning. We seek to overcome this antinomy by treating political outcomes as likewise resulting from polycentric competition, taking due account of relevant institutional differences. For example, a parliamentary assembly is treate…
A theory of entangled political economy, with application to Tarp and NRA
Self-interest, public interest, and public health
Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law
Crafting social rules
Finding social dilemma
Governance within a system of entangled political economy
Political entrepreneurship, emergent dynamics, and constitutional politics
Constitutional political economy mostly distinguishes between rules and actions, with rules selected prior to actions within those rules. While we accept the coherence of this distinction, we pursue it within an open rather than closed scheme of analysis. Doing this entails recognition that societies rarely exhibit universal agreement about constitutional provisions. Recognizing the incomplete character of constitutional agreement points to the e…
Virginia political economy
From mixed economy to entangled political economy
Indebted state versus intermediary state
Municipal corporations, economic calculation, and political pricing
Social Democracy, Societal Tectonics, and Parasitical Pricing
Constitutional order in a federal republic
Politics, central banking, and economic order
SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY by William Greider New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 798 pp., $24.95 Greider pursues the theme that the Federal Reserve System promotes the interests of Wall Street—banks and bondholders—over those of Main Street—the rest of society. The wealth of fascinating observations he makes are, unfortunately, organized by a 1950s‐style Keynesianism and a faith in unlimited, majoritarian dem…
Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice
Rational Models, Politics, and Policy Analysis
Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs
Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice
Public Finance, Planning and Economic Development
Rational Models, Politics, and Policy Analysis
Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice
Introduction by the Symposium Editors
Tax Policy toward Private Foundations
Democracy in Deficit
Spending More and Enjoying It Less
On Economics, Political Science, and Public Policy
The cameralists
The Calculus of consent
Constitutional order in a federal republic
Politics, central banking, and economic order
SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY by William Greider New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 798 pp., $24.95 Greider pursues the theme that the Federal Reserve System promotes the interests of Wall Street—banks and bondholders—over those of Main Street—the rest of society. The wealth of fascinating observations he makes are, unfortunately, organized by a 1950s‐style Keynesianism and a faith in unlimited, majoritarian dem…
Starting Even
Self-interest, public interest, and public health
Crafting social rules
The impending transformation of public choice scholarship
Social Democracy, Societal Tectonics, and Parasitical Pricing
Complexity, Governance and Constitutional Craftsmanship
Economic policy is commonly treated as a vehicle for selecting among possible allocative outcomes within an economy. An economy, however, is a complex network of relationships whose patterns can be understood but whose details can be neither predicted nor controlled. Because of this complexity, allocative outcomes are not direct objects of choice. They are simply emergent consequences of human interaction that takes place within some framework of…
Custom, Legislation and Market Order
This comment is part of a symposium on Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom in the Economy (1998
Handbook of Public Finance
Handbook of Public Finance
"The Handbook of Public Finance provides a definitive source, reference, and text for the field of public finance. In 18 chapters it surveys the state of the art - the tradition and breadth of the field but also its current status and recent developments. The Handbook's intellectual foundation and orientation is truly multidisciplinary. Throughout its examination of the standard material of public finance, it explores the connections between that…
Public Choice as an Academic Enterprise
This paper treats the development of public choice as an academic enterprise that originated at the University of Virginia and that grew to maturity at VPI. It seeks to distinguish between the particularistic and personal sources of programmatic success on the one hand, and institutional and organizational sources on the other. Only to the extent the success is institutional or organizational is there something that potentially can be duplicated …
From Continental Public Finance to Public Choice
Research Article| December 01 2005 From Continental Public Finance to Public Choice: Mapping Continuity Jürgen G. Backhaus; Jürgen G. Backhaus Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Richard E. Wagner Richard E. Wagner Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2005) 37 (Suppl_1): 314–332. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-37-Suppl_1-314 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & ta…
Political science (51 obras) · Economics (46 obras) · Law (45 obras) · Politics (36 obras) · Economic Theory and Institutions (27 obras) · Law (27 obras) · Sociology (26 obras) · Law and economics (24 obras) · Political economy (22 obras) · Public finance (22 obras)