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Jonathan L Kvanvig

Datos Biográficos

ID487732
NOMBREJonathan L Kvanvig
NOMBRESJonathan L
APELLIDOKvanvig
FIRMAKVANVIG J L
AFILIACIONESUniversity of Missouri
ORCID0000-0002-0355-1196
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS38
TOTAL DE CITAS30
TOTAL COMO AUTOR37
TOTAL COMO EDITOR1
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1984
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2024
ÍNDICE H4
  • Sosa, humanistic inquiry, and the need for a richer epistemological psychology

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2024

  • Religious Disagreement and Pluralism

    Matthew A Benton, Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Religious Disagreement and…•2021

    This volume explores many issues at the intersection of the epistemology of disagreement and religious epistemology. Epistemological questions about the significance of disagreement have advanced in concert with broader developments in social epistemology concerning testimony, the nature of expertise and epistemic authority, the role of institutions, group belief, and epistemic injustice, among others. During this period, related issues in the ep…

  • Anselmian adversities

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Religious Studies•2020

    Two competing metatheologies – approaches that propose a certain starting point for generating a proper account of the nature of God – are Perfect Being Theology (PBT), the approach to theology originating with Anselm in his efforts to find a way of demonstrating that such a perfect being exists, and Creator Theology (CT). This article argues that CT has significant advantages over PBT. The adversities that afflict PBT, to which CT is immune, are…

  • Can Skeptics Earn Their Keep

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2020

    This paper investigates the prospects for skepticism once we distinguish between bare skeptical theses and arguments and mature philosophical theory. If all skeptics have to offer is bare theses and arguments, skepticism presents only a challenge of reflective equilibrium. But if skeptics can move toward developed theory, then skeptics have, as I will put it, earned their keep. Just as foundationalism should be taken seriously in part because the…

  • Functional Faith in Religious Contexts

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Faith and Humility•2018

    The primary focus to this point has been to reveal the extent to which faith worth having is not a distinctively sacred topic. Such a focus can make it seem that this kind of faith is one that doesn’t fit well in sacred arenas, where the standard assumptions about faith require substantive doctrinal commitments. I intend to argue that this perception is mistaken, and that the language of faith in SacredWrit is driven largely if not completely by …

  • Conclusion

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Faith and Humility•2018

    This chapter summarizes the results obtained. Faith is both a secular and a sacred virtue, displaying the same nature in both contexts. This nature is fundamentally dispositional rather than doxastic or cognitive, and the states that realize the disposition are behavioural, cognitive, affective, and conative. Though a virtue, faith has a downside, and the same is true of humility. The distinctive relationship between the two is that each is a vir…

  • Faith and Humility

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Faith and Humility•2018

    This work is devoted to articulating the connection between the nature, value, and virtues of faith and humility. The goal is to understand both in a way that does not discriminate between religious andmundane contexts, between sacred and secular. It arises from a conviction that these two character traits are important to a flourishing life, and intimately related to each other in such a way that the presence of one demands the presence of the o…

  • Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, Jonathan Kvanvig•BOOK•Oxford Studies in Philosophy of…•2015

  • Rationality and Reflection

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Rationality and Reflection•2014

    Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality - perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.

  • Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, Jonathan Kvanvig•BOOK•Oxford Studies In Philosophy Of…•2012

    'Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion' is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy. Topics covered include secular belief, theories of analogical predication, nominalism and divine aseity, meticulous providence and gratuitous evil, many-one identity and how it relates to the Trinity, atheism and theistic belief, the Epistemology of the Agape struggle, Wittgensteinian Quasi-F…

  • Oxford Studies In Philosophy Of Religion

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Oxford Studies In Philosophy Of…•2012

  • Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Critica•2010

    Ernest Sosa’s latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabi…

  • The incarnation and the knowability paradox

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig, Jonathan Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Synthese•2010•Referencias: 16

  • Epistemic Luck

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig, Jonathan Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Citada por: 4

  • Hell

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology•2007

  • The knowability paradox

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•The knowability paradox•2006

    "The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to express that idea than to maintain that all truths are…

  • Closure Principles

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2006•Citada por: 8•Referencias: 28

    A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know thatp, andpentailsq, then you know thatq. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know thatp, andpentailsq, then you are…

  • On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars’ Problem

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Veritas (Porto Alegre)•2005

    Há uma profunda divisão entre duas concepções fundamentais na epistemologia ao longo dos últimos trinta a quarenta anos. Alguns rotulam essa divisão como sendo aquela entre internalistas e externalistas, e essa caracterização pode, mesmo, ser exata, conforme alguma explicação dessa distinção. Eu abordarei a divisão por um ângulo diferente, dado que uma abordagem melhor é conceber a divisão como surgindo de uma compreensão do Problema de Sellars. …

  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Value of Knowledge and the…•2003

    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of …

  • Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Citada por: 2

  • Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Value of Knowledge and the…•2003

  • Zagzebski on Justification

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, Linda Zagzebski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000•Citada por: 1

  • Lewis on Finkish Dispositions

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999•Citada por: 1

    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to dist…

  • The Problem of Hell

    Gerard J Hughes, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1996

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Problem of Hell. By Jonathan L. Kvanvig. (Oxford UP, 1994. Pp. viii + 182. Price £22.50.) Gerard J. Hughes Gerard J. Hughes Heythrop College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 182, January 1996, Pages 133–134, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956320 Published: 01 January 1996

  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, James A Montmarquet et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Citada por: 1

Siguiente
  • Closure Principles

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2006•Citada por: 8•Referencias: 28

    A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know thatp, andpentailsq, then you know thatq. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know thatp, andpentailsq, then you are…

  • A critique of van Fraassen's voluntaristic epistemology

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Synthese•1994•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 4

  • Epistemic Luck

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig, Jonathan Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Citada por: 4

  • Conservatism and its virtues

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Synthese•1989•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 7

  • The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind

    John Greco, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994•Citada por: 3

  • Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Citada por: 2

  • Zagzebski on Justification

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, Linda Zagzebski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000•Citada por: 1

  • Lewis on Finkish Dispositions

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999•Citada por: 1

    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to dist…

  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, James A Montmarquet et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Citada por: 1

  • The Occasionalist Proselytizer

    Hugh J Mccann, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1991•Citada por: 1

    On what is perhaps the most popular conception among believers, God created the world the beginning, and it has existed on its own ever since. No direct activity on God's part is needed to explain the world's persistence, and although the unfolding of its history is a matter of great concern to Him, it would take an extraordinary act of intervention on God's part for anything that occurs to count as a direct manifestation of His power. We have ar…

  • Subjective Justification

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Mind•1984

    Journal Article Subjective Justification Get access JONATHAN L. KVANVIG JONATHAN L. KVANVIG DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAMENOTRE DAME, INDIANA 46556, U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XCIII, Issue 369, January 1984, Pages 71–84, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIII.369.71 Published: 01 January 1984

  • Divine transcendence

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Religious Studies•1984

    Christians hold that God is transcendent, that He is other than all else that exists. For example, Paul Tillich claims, The divine beings and the Supreme Being, God, are representations of that which is ultimately referred to in the religious act. They are representations, for the unconditioned transcendent surpasses every possible conception of a being, including even the conception of a Supreme Being ... It is the religious function of atheism …

  • Is there an ?us? in ?justification

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Synthese•1985

  • Conservatism and its virtues

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Synthese•1989•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 7

  • The Possibility of an All-Knowing God

    William Hasker, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1989

  • Adams on Actualism and Presentism

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1989

    In Time and Thisness .(Midwest Studies in Philosophy i i (i986): 3 I 5-z9), Robert Adams argues for what I shall call Temporal Dependency Thesis (TDT). According to TDT, no propositions about an individual and no thisnesses of exist prior to existence of individual in question, where a thisness property of being x, or of being identical with and a singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, p…

  • Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Journal of the American Academy…•1989

    Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience Get access Jonathan L. Kvanvig Jonathan L. Kvanvig Jonathan L. Kvanvig is Professor of Philosophy at Texas A & M University, College Station, TX 77843-4237. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Volume LVII, Issue 3, Fall 1989, Pages 485–508, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/LVII.3.485 Published: 01 October 1989

  • The Occasionalist Proselytizer

    Hugh J Mccann, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1991•Citada por: 1

    On what is perhaps the most popular conception among believers, God created the world the beginning, and it has existed on its own ever since. No direct activity on God's part is needed to explain the world's persistence, and although the unfolding of its history is a matter of great concern to Him, it would take an extraordinary act of intervention on God's part for anything that occurs to count as a direct manifestation of His power. We have ar…

  • Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 2, Epistemology

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, James E Tomberlin•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1991

  • A critique of van Fraassen's voluntaristic epistemology

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Synthese•1994•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 4

  • The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind

    Steven D Hales, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1994

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind. By Jonathan L. Kvanvig. (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992. Pp. xii + 198. Price $39.50.) Steven D. Hales Steven D. Hales Georgia Slate University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 175, April 1994, Pages 254–255, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219748 Published: 01 April 199…

  • The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind

    John Greco, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994•Citada por: 3

  • The Problem of Hell

    A A Howsepian, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1995

  • The Problem of Hell

    Gerard J Hughes, Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1996

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Problem of Hell. By Jonathan L. Kvanvig. (Oxford UP, 1994. Pp. viii + 182. Price £22.50.) Gerard J. Hughes Gerard J. Hughes Heythrop College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 182, January 1996, Pages 133–134, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956320 Published: 01 January 1996

  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, James A Montmarquet et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Citada por: 1

  • Lewis on Finkish Dispositions

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999•Citada por: 1

    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to dist…

  • Zagzebski on Justification

    Jonathan L Kvanvig, Linda Zagzebski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000•Citada por: 1

  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Value of Knowledge and the…•2003

    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of …

  • Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Citada por: 2

  • Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•Value of Knowledge and the…•2003

  • On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars’ Problem

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Veritas (Porto Alegre)•2005

    Há uma profunda divisão entre duas concepções fundamentais na epistemologia ao longo dos últimos trinta a quarenta anos. Alguns rotulam essa divisão como sendo aquela entre internalistas e externalistas, e essa caracterização pode, mesmo, ser exata, conforme alguma explicação dessa distinção. Eu abordarei a divisão por um ângulo diferente, dado que uma abordagem melhor é conceber a divisão como surgindo de uma compreensão do Problema de Sellars. …

  • The knowability paradox

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•The knowability paradox•2006

    "The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to express that idea than to maintain that all truths are…

  • Closure Principles

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2006•Citada por: 8•Referencias: 28

    A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know thatp, andpentailsq, then you know thatq. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know thatp, andpentailsq, then you are…

  • Hell

    Jonathan L Kvanvig•BOOK•The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology•2007

  • Epistemic Luck

    Open Access•Jonathan L Kvanvig, Jonathan Kvanvig•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Citada por: 4

Philosophy (36 obras) · Epistemology (30 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (15 obras) · Philosophy (12 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 obras) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (12 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Theology (10 obras) · Metaphysics (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras)

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