Åsa Wikforss
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5214535 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Åsa Wikforss |
| NOMBRES | Åsa |
| APELLIDO | Wikforss |
| FIRMA | WIKFORSS Å |
| AFILIACIONES | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8662-6770 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2001 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Shifting Concepts
Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms
The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and tha…
Still No Guidance
In a recent article in this journal, A sbjørn S teglich‐ P etersen criticizes an argument we have called the “no‐guidance argument”. He claims that our argument fails because it (1) “presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour” and (2) “betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm” ( S teglich‐ P etersen, 2013, p. 279). If these claims could be substantiated, the no‐guida…
Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water
Since H ilary P utnam and S aul K ripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ‘ P utnam‐ K ripke’ view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that P utnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of K ripke. In particular, P utnam has from the very start been sceptical of K ripke's modal claims, and in later…
To the Editor of Theoria
Against Content Normativity
As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: ‘CE normativism’, according to which it is essential to content that certain ‘oughts’ can be derived from it, and ‘CD normativism’, according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny.…
Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism
Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very…
Naming Natural Kinds
Direct Knowledge and Other Minds
The notion of direct knowledge is central to John McDowell’s philosophy. It is of importance not just for his account of empirical knowledge but also for his account of rule-following, singular thought, the past, ethics, and other minds. The reason McDowell appeals to the notion of direct knowledge is that he wishes to oppose certain inferential models that he thinks are pernicious and lead to skepticism. 1 For instance, in Mind and World he argu…
Externalism and Incomplete Understanding
Sarah Sawyer has challenged my claim that social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts. Sawyer denies that Burge's later sofa thought‐experiment relies on this assumption: the unifying principle behind the thought‐experiments supporting social externalism, she argues, is just that referents play a role in the individuation of concepts. I argue that Sawyer fails to show that social ex…
Social Externalism and Conceptual Errors
I offer a defence of individualism by critically examining the preconditions of Tyler Burge's famous thought‐experiment involving the concept of arthritis. I argue that the thought‐experiment relies on a problematic notion of conceptual error, one of which Burge himself should be critical, given his Quinean commitments. Once this misstep in the experiment is made explicit, individualism emerges as a much stronger position than it is usually taken…
Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism
Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very…
Naming Natural Kinds
Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms
The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and tha…
Social Externalism and Conceptual Errors
I offer a defence of individualism by critically examining the preconditions of Tyler Burge's famous thought‐experiment involving the concept of arthritis. I argue that the thought‐experiment relies on a problematic notion of conceptual error, one of which Burge himself should be critical, given his Quinean commitments. Once this misstep in the experiment is made explicit, individualism emerges as a much stronger position than it is usually taken…
Externalism and Incomplete Understanding
Sarah Sawyer has challenged my claim that social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts. Sawyer denies that Burge's later sofa thought‐experiment relies on this assumption: the unifying principle behind the thought‐experiments supporting social externalism, she argues, is just that referents play a role in the individuation of concepts. I argue that Sawyer fails to show that social ex…
Social Externalism and Conceptual Errors
I offer a defence of individualism by critically examining the preconditions of Tyler Burge's famous thought‐experiment involving the concept of arthritis. I argue that the thought‐experiment relies on a problematic notion of conceptual error, one of which Burge himself should be critical, given his Quinean commitments. Once this misstep in the experiment is made explicit, individualism emerges as a much stronger position than it is usually taken…
Direct Knowledge and Other Minds
The notion of direct knowledge is central to John McDowell’s philosophy. It is of importance not just for his account of empirical knowledge but also for his account of rule-following, singular thought, the past, ethics, and other minds. The reason McDowell appeals to the notion of direct knowledge is that he wishes to oppose certain inferential models that he thinks are pernicious and lead to skepticism. 1 For instance, in Mind and World he argu…
Externalism and Incomplete Understanding
Sarah Sawyer has challenged my claim that social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts. Sawyer denies that Burge's later sofa thought‐experiment relies on this assumption: the unifying principle behind the thought‐experiments supporting social externalism, she argues, is just that referents play a role in the individuation of concepts. I argue that Sawyer fails to show that social ex…
Naming Natural Kinds
Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism
Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very…
Against Content Normativity
As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: ‘CE normativism’, according to which it is essential to content that certain ‘oughts’ can be derived from it, and ‘CD normativism’, according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny.…
To the Editor of Theoria
Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water
Since H ilary P utnam and S aul K ripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ‘ P utnam‐ K ripke’ view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that P utnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of K ripke. In particular, P utnam has from the very start been sceptical of K ripke's modal claims, and in later…
Still No Guidance
In a recent article in this journal, A sbjørn S teglich‐ P etersen criticizes an argument we have called the “no‐guidance argument”. He claims that our argument fails because it (1) “presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour” and (2) “betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm” ( S teglich‐ P etersen, 2013, p. 279). If these claims could be substantiated, the no‐guida…
Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms
The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and tha…
Shifting Concepts
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Externalism (5 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Identity (music) (3 obras) · Internalism and externalism (3 obras)