Juan‐Pablo Montero
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5730802 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Juan‐Pablo Montero |
| NOMBRES | Juan‐Pablo |
| APELLIDO | Montero |
| FIRMA | MONTERO J P |
| AFILIACIONES | Complex Engineering System Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6815-0158 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1999 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Using List Prices to Collude or to Compete
Collusion is deemed unlikely in wholesale markets where upstream suppliers and intermediate buyers privately negotiate discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. However, many wholesale markets include both small and large buyers who compete in the retail market. We study the role of publicly announced list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. When suppliers collude, public announcements o…
Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement
An imperfectly informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for eac…
Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market
Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However, whenever the large agent's endowment falls short of his efficient endowment – allocation pr…
Markets for Clean Air
A market-based experiment 2. A political history of Federal Acid Rain Legislation 3. The political economy of allowance allocations 4. The pre-1995 trend in SO2 emissions 5. Title IV compliance and Emission reductions, 1995-97 6. Emissions trading: the effect on abatement behavior 7. Emissions trading: development of the allowance market 8. Title IV's voluntary compliance program 9. The cost of compliance with the Title IV in Phase I 10. Cost sav…
Voluntary Compliance with Market‐Based Environmental Policy
The U. S. Acid Rain Program implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities' sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and included voluntary compliance possibilities for nonaffected sources. I observe significant voluntary participation‐albeit with small impact on the SO2 market‐mostly from sources with counterfactual emissions below their allowance allocations. An ex post analysis suggests that costs from the resulting higher emissions outweigh sav…
Markets for Clean Air
A market-based experiment 2. A political history of Federal Acid Rain Legislation 3. The political economy of allowance allocations 4. The pre-1995 trend in SO2 emissions 5. Title IV compliance and Emission reductions, 1995-97 6. Emissions trading: the effect on abatement behavior 7. Emissions trading: development of the allowance market 8. Title IV's voluntary compliance program 9. The cost of compliance with the Title IV in Phase I 10. Cost sav…
Voluntary Compliance with Market‐Based Environmental Policy
The U. S. Acid Rain Program implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities' sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and included voluntary compliance possibilities for nonaffected sources. I observe significant voluntary participation‐albeit with small impact on the SO2 market‐mostly from sources with counterfactual emissions below their allowance allocations. An ex post analysis suggests that costs from the resulting higher emissions outweigh sav…
Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market
Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However, whenever the large agent's endowment falls short of his efficient endowment – allocation pr…
Voluntary Compliance with Market‐Based Environmental Policy
The U. S. Acid Rain Program implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities' sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and included voluntary compliance possibilities for nonaffected sources. I observe significant voluntary participation‐albeit with small impact on the SO2 market‐mostly from sources with counterfactual emissions below their allowance allocations. An ex post analysis suggests that costs from the resulting higher emissions outweigh sav…
Markets for Clean Air
A market-based experiment 2. A political history of Federal Acid Rain Legislation 3. The political economy of allowance allocations 4. The pre-1995 trend in SO2 emissions 5. Title IV compliance and Emission reductions, 1995-97 6. Emissions trading: the effect on abatement behavior 7. Emissions trading: development of the allowance market 8. Title IV's voluntary compliance program 9. The cost of compliance with the Title IV in Phase I 10. Cost sav…
Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market
Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However, whenever the large agent's endowment falls short of his efficient endowment – allocation pr…
Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement
An imperfectly informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for eac…
Using List Prices to Collude or to Compete
Collusion is deemed unlikely in wholesale markets where upstream suppliers and intermediate buyers privately negotiate discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. However, many wholesale markets include both small and large buyers who compete in the retail market. We study the role of publicly announced list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. When suppliers collude, public announcements o…
Business (4 obras) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (4 obras) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (4 obras) · Economics (4 obras) · Industrial organization (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Acid rain (2 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 obras) · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies (2 obras) · Allowance (engineering (1 obras)