Ben Greiner
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5735294 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Ben Greiner |
| NOMBRES | Ben |
| APELLIDO | Greiner |
| FIRMA | BEN GREINER |
| AFILIACIONES | UNSW Sydney |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4493-8100 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2005 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence
In a series of four experiments I demonstrate the existence of significant aversion to basically non-existent strategic uncertainty in very simple bargaining games. This aversion goes far beyond ordinary risk or ambiguity aversion. Specifically, although almost nobody expects or chooses the rejection of an offered equal split in a bargaining game, participants behave as if there would be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This …
Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions
We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed‐bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi‐unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed‐bid auctions in terms of …
Subject pool recruitment procedures
This paper discusses aspects of recruiting subjects for economic laboratory experiments, and shows how the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments can help. The software package provides experimenters with a free, convenient, and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions.
Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks
Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks
Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence
In a series of four experiments I demonstrate the existence of significant aversion to basically non-existent strategic uncertainty in very simple bargaining games. This aversion goes far beyond ordinary risk or ambiguity aversion. Specifically, although almost nobody expects or chooses the rejection of an offered equal split in a bargaining game, participants behave as if there would be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This …
Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks
Subject pool recruitment procedures
This paper discusses aspects of recruiting subjects for economic laboratory experiments, and shows how the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments can help. The software package provides experimenters with a free, convenient, and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions.
Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions
We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed‐bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi‐unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed‐bid auctions in terms of …
Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence
In a series of four experiments I demonstrate the existence of significant aversion to basically non-existent strategic uncertainty in very simple bargaining games. This aversion goes far beyond ordinary risk or ambiguity aversion. Specifically, although almost nobody expects or chooses the rejection of an offered equal split in a bargaining game, participants behave as if there would be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This …
Computer Science (3 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 obras) · Mathematics (2 obras) · Ambiguity (1 obras) · Ambiguity aversion (1 obras) · Auction theory (1 obras) · Business (1 obras)