Stefan Ambec
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5735849 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stefan Ambec |
| NOMBRES | Stefan |
| APELLIDO | Ambec |
| FIRMA | AMBEC S |
| AFILIACIONES | Toulouse School of Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9066-5035 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2005 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment
Regulation via the Polluter‐pays Principle
We are especially grateful to anonymous referees and the Editor Martin Cripps for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research started while the second author was visiting Toulouse School of Economics (INRA-LERNA). It received financial support from INRA (France), the ANR (France) through the project ANR-12-BSH1-0003-01 on ‘Political Economy of the Environment’, the SSHRC (Canada) and the FRQSC (Québec)
The Porter Hypothesis at 20
Some twenty years ago, Harvard Business School economist and strategy professor Michael Porter challenged conventional wisdom about the impact of environmental regulation on business by declaring that well-designed regulation could actually enhance competitiveness. The traditional view of environmental regulation held by virtually all economists until that time was that requiring firms to reduce an externality like pollution necessarily restricte…
Environmental Policy, Innovation and Performance
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of the so‐called Porter Hypothesis. The “weak” version of the hypothesis posits that environmental regulation will stimulate environmental innovations. The “narrow” version of the hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental policy regimes give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as technology‐based standards. Finally, the “strong” version posits that pr…
Fair intergenerational sharing of a natural resource
Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems
Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems
Regulation via the Polluter‐pays Principle
We are especially grateful to anonymous referees and the Editor Martin Cripps for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research started while the second author was visiting Toulouse School of Economics (INRA-LERNA). It received financial support from INRA (France), the ANR (France) through the project ANR-12-BSH1-0003-01 on ‘Political Economy of the Environment’, the SSHRC (Canada) and the FRQSC (Québec)
Fair intergenerational sharing of a natural resource
Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems
Fair intergenerational sharing of a natural resource
Environmental Policy, Innovation and Performance
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of the so‐called Porter Hypothesis. The “weak” version of the hypothesis posits that environmental regulation will stimulate environmental innovations. The “narrow” version of the hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental policy regimes give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as technology‐based standards. Finally, the “strong” version posits that pr…
The Porter Hypothesis at 20
Some twenty years ago, Harvard Business School economist and strategy professor Michael Porter challenged conventional wisdom about the impact of environmental regulation on business by declaring that well-designed regulation could actually enhance competitiveness. The traditional view of environmental regulation held by virtually all economists until that time was that requiring firms to reduce an externality like pollution necessarily restricte…
Regulation via the Polluter‐pays Principle
We are especially grateful to anonymous referees and the Editor Martin Cripps for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research started while the second author was visiting Toulouse School of Economics (INRA-LERNA). It received financial support from INRA (France), the ANR (France) through the project ANR-12-BSH1-0003-01 on ‘Political Economy of the Environment’, the SSHRC (Canada) and the FRQSC (Québec)
Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment
Economics (6 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (3 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras) · Business (2 obras) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (2 obras) · Economic theories and models (2 obras) · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth (2 obras) · Environmental economics (2 obras)