Didier Laussel

Datos Biográficos

ID5736616
NOMBREDidier Laussel
NOMBRESDidier
APELLIDOLaussel
FIRMALAUSSEL D
AFILIACIONESCNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, AMSE, Aix-Marseille Univ
ORCID0000-0002-1590-493X
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS37
TOTAL DE CITAS2
TOTAL COMO AUTOR37
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1980
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2022
ÍNDICE H1

  • Do firms always benefit from the presence of active customers

    Didier LausselARTICLEApplied Economics2022

    We study price personalization in a two period duopoly with horizontally differentiated products. In the second period, a firm has collected detailed information on its old customers, using it to engage in price personalization. Customers, when returning to buy, may choose to incur a cost in order to access the standard offer of their previous provider in addition to its personalized offer and the standard offer of its rival. The analysis confirm…

  • Profit Effects of Consumers’ Identity Management

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Ngo Van Long et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2021

  • Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation

    Open AccessPaolo G Garella, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEInternational Journal of…2021

  • Quality and price personalization under customer recognition

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Ngo Van Long et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Dynamics and…2020

  • The curse of knowledge

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Ngo Van Long et al.ARTICLEThe RAND Journal of Economics2020

    We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventu…

  • Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices

    Nada Ben Elhadj, Didier LausselARTICLEApplied Economics2017

    We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lowe…

  • Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach

    Hejer Lasram, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEApplied Economics2016

    We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more compet…

  • Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition

    Open AccessDimitrios Xefteris, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEInternational Journal of Game…2016

  • Is Targeted Advertising always Beneficial

    Nada Ben Elhadj-Ben Brahim, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed et al.CHAPTEREconometric Methods and Their…2014

    The following sections are included:IntroductionThe Model and Some Preliminary ResultsTargeted AdvertisingComparison with Random AdvertisingConclusionAppendixReferences

  • Advertising Spillovers and Market Structure

    Nada Ben Elhadj, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed et al.ARTICLERecherches économiques de Louvain2014

    Dans ce papier, nous caractérisons l’équilibre d’un marché duopolistique en présence d’externalités publicitaires. Nous montrons que la distinction pertinente n’est pas entre des externalités publicitaires purement positives et des externalités purement négatives mais entre des externalités fortement positives et des externalités faiblement positives ou négatives. En outre, nous montrons que, selon l’intensité des externalités publicitaires et le…

  • The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies

    Didier Laussel, Raymond RiezmanCHAPTER2013

    We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The one-candidate-per-country equilibria exhibit a "protectionist drift" owing to this d…

  • When the squeakiest wheel gets the most oil

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Tanguy van YperseleARTICLEEuropean Economic Review2012

  • Advertising and the Rise of Free Daily Newspapers

    Open AccessJEAN J GABSZEWICZ, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEEconomica2012Referencias: 6

    This paper develops a model of the daily newspaper industry in order to provide a tentative explanation for the rise of free newspapers. This explanation is based on the growth of net advertising revenues per reader, i.e. of the difference between advertising revenue per reader and unit printing cost. Our analysis explains why the new entrant chooses to enter as a free newspaper with a minimum quality level, rather than as a traditional outlet wi…

  • The TV News Scheduling Game

    JEAN J GABSZEWICZ, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEJournal of Media Economics2010

    This article first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergström (1995) Cancian, M., Bills, A. and Bergstrüm, T. 1995. Hotelling location problem with directional constraints: An application to television news scheduling.. Journal of Industrial Economics, 43: 121–124. [Google Scholar] problem, which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows one to consider some extensions of the TV newscast scheduling…

  • The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the Televison News Scheduling Game

    Open AccessJEAN J GABSZEWICZ, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEJournal of Industrial Economics2008

  • Market Games and Successive Oligopolies

    Open AccessJEAN J GABSZEWICZ, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2007

  • Trade and the location of industries

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Thierry PaulARTICLEJournal of International Economics2006

  • Advertising and the Rise of the Free Daily Newspapers

    Open AccessJEAN J GABSZEWICZ, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2006

  • Fixed Transport Costs and International Trade

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Raymond Riezman et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2006

  • L'effet taille de marché un réexamen du modèle de Helpman-Krugman et de quelques extensions

    Didier Laussel, Thierry PaulARTICLERevue d économie politique2005

    L’objectif de cet article est d’apporter un nouvel éclairage dans la littérature consacrée à « l’effet taille de marché » (« the home market effect ») et développée depuis quelques années autour du modèle de Helpman et Krugman (1985). Nous présentons des travaux qui montrent que les conditions d’existence de l’échange net entre deux pays et les structures d’échange et de spécialisation peuvent varier très sensiblement avec la taille relative du g…

  • Does advertising lower the price of newspapers to consumers? A theoretical appraisal

    Open AccessJEAN J GABSZEWICZ, Didier Laussel et al.ARTICLEEconomics Letters2005

  • The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Raymond RiezmanARTICLEEuropean Economic Review2004

  • Intersectoral adjustment and unemployment in a two-country Ricardian model

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Philippe Michel et al.ARTICLERecherches économiques de Louvain2004

    In a two-country Ricardian model, we study the dynamics of intersectoral reallocation of labour following upon a once and for all move to free trade. The job creation/destruction process in both sectors is slow and this results in unemployment during the transition toward the long run free trade equilibrium. We identify different free trade regimes depending on whether or not the world relative price is between the two autarkic prices. In some re…

  • Delegation effects in representative democracies

    Open AccessDidier LausselARTICLEJournal of Public Economics2002

  • Unidimensional Downsian politics

    Open AccessDidier Laussel, Michel Le BretonARTICLEEconomics Letters2002