LISA L MARTIN
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5754424 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | LISA L MARTIN |
| NOMBRES | LISA L |
| APELLIDO | MARTIN |
| FIRMA | MARTIN L L |
| AFILIACIONES | Harvard University Cambridge Massachusetts |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 26 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1122 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1992 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 11 |
Global Governance
Modern international interactions are structured by institutions of global governance, both formal and informal. Most of these institutions are encompassed by the liberal international order. Like domestic institutions, these international institutions are challenged by the prevalence and depth of disinformation. The demand for disinformation, in turn, has been fed by the order's lack of attention to growing domestic economic inequality. Disinfor…
U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-1980
Global Governance
Modern international interactions are structured by institutions of global governance, both formal and informal. Most of these institutions are encompassed by the liberal international order. Like domestic institutions, these international institutions are challenged by the prevalence and depth of disinformation. The demand for disinformation, in turn, has been fed by the order’s lack of attention to growing domestic economic inequality. Disinfor…
The Leverage of Economic Theories
Challenges to the Liberal Order
AsInternational Organizationcommemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects;…
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
The role of international institutions has been central to the study of world politics at least since the conclusion of World War II. Much of this research was, and continues to be, pioneered in the pages of International Organization. In this article we take stock of past work on international institutions, trace the evolution of major themes in scholarship over time, and highlight areas for productive new research. Our central argument is that …
Gender, Teaching Evaluations, and Professional Success in Political Science
Evaluations of teaching effectiveness rely heavily on student evaluations of teaching. However, an accumulating body of evidence shows that these evaluations are subject to gender bias. Theories of leadership and role incongruity suggest that this bias should be especially prominent in large courses. This article examines publicly available data from two large political science departments and finds that female instructors receive substantively a…
The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade
The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Trade surveys the literature on the politics of international trade and highlights the most exciting recent scholarly developments. The Handbook is focused on work by political scientists that draws extensively on work in economics, but is distinctive in its applications and attention to political features; that is, it takes politics seriously. The Handbook's framework is organized in part alon…
Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade
International Economic Institutions
This article focuses on international economic institutions, particularly on institutions that structure trade and financial relationships. It considers the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), regional trade organizations, and the Bretton Woods institutions. The article provides some background information on the study of institutions, generally in international relations. It also focuses on trade…
The President and International Commitments
U.S. presidents can choose the form of international agreements that they negotiate. Using the Constitution's Article II procedure to gain ratification of a formal treaty is a costly and time‐consuming endeavor, so presidents frequently turn to executive agreements that do not require approval by two thirds of the Senate. Given this alternative, why do presidents ever choose the Article II procedure? This article argues that treaties serve as a c…
Institutional Effects on State Behavior
We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private intere…
Democratic Commitments
From the refusal of the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track trade authority and certain foreign aid packages to the obstacles placed by Western European parliaments in the path of economic integration, legislatures often interfere with national leaders' efforts to reach and implement predictable international agreements. This seems to give an advantage to dictators, who can bluff with confidence and make decisions without consultation, and many a…
Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics
If the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation, more may not always be better. Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes. The global trade regime, which aims to liberalize trade, has become increasingly legalized over time. Increased legalization has changed the …
The Contributions of Rational Choice
October 01 1999 The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism Lisa L. Martin Lisa L. Martin Professor of Government at Harvard University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Lisa L. Martin Professor of Government at Harvard University. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo…
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
Studies of international institutions, organizations, and regimes have consistently appeared in the pages of International Organization. We review the theoretical and empirical work on international institutions and identify promising directions for the institutionalist research program. Early studies of international institutions were rich with empirical insights and often influenced by theoretical developments in other fields of political scien…
Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Todas as notas de rodapé estão no final do texto
International Relations and Politics
Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems
Like individuals facing common-pool resource problems, states search for ways to solve collective-action problems in the international system without turning to external enforcement. Heterogeneity of power and of preference intensities may enhance the probability of cooperation, if states are able to link issues credibly. International decision-making rules that require more than majority support will also increase the demand for issue linkage. C…
U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-1980
Credibility, Costs, and Institutions
The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on…
Coercive Cooperation
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitmen…
Institutions and Cooperation
Coercive Cooperation
When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States took the lead in organizing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. Since unilateral sanctions rarely succeed, co-operation was a necessity. This innovative study shows that multilateral, or co-operative, sanctions are coercive not only in their pressure on their target but also in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with…
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
Studies of international institutions, organizations, and regimes have consistently appeared in the pages of International Organization. We review the theoretical and empirical work on international institutions and identify promising directions for the institutionalist research program. Early studies of international institutions were rich with empirical insights and often influenced by theoretical developments in other fields of political scien…
Challenges to the Liberal Order
AsInternational Organizationcommemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects;…
Interests, power, and multilateralism
Multilateralism characterizes, to varying degrees, patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct. The utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront. Thus, the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution, as in coordination …
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Todas as notas de rodapé estão no final do texto
Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics
If the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation, more may not always be better. Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes. The global trade regime, which aims to liberalize trade, has become increasingly legalized over time. Increased legalization has changed the …
Credibility, Costs, and Institutions
The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on…
Coercive Cooperation
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitmen…
Institutional Effects on State Behavior
We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private intere…
The President and International Commitments
U.S. presidents can choose the form of international agreements that they negotiate. Using the Constitution's Article II procedure to gain ratification of a formal treaty is a costly and time‐consuming endeavor, so presidents frequently turn to executive agreements that do not require approval by two thirds of the Senate. Given this alternative, why do presidents ever choose the Article II procedure? This article argues that treaties serve as a c…
Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems
Like individuals facing common-pool resource problems, states search for ways to solve collective-action problems in the international system without turning to external enforcement. Heterogeneity of power and of preference intensities may enhance the probability of cooperation, if states are able to link issues credibly. International decision-making rules that require more than majority support will also increase the demand for issue linkage. C…
Institutions and Cooperation
The Contributions of Rational Choice
October 01 1999 The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism Lisa L. Martin Lisa L. Martin Professor of Government at Harvard University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Lisa L. Martin Professor of Government at Harvard University. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo…
Gender, Teaching Evaluations, and Professional Success in Political Science
Evaluations of teaching effectiveness rely heavily on student evaluations of teaching. However, an accumulating body of evidence shows that these evaluations are subject to gender bias. Theories of leadership and role incongruity suggest that this bias should be especially prominent in large courses. This article examines publicly available data from two large political science departments and finds that female instructors receive substantively a…
Coercive Cooperation
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitmen…
Institutions and Cooperation
Coercive Cooperation
When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States took the lead in organizing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. Since unilateral sanctions rarely succeed, co-operation was a necessity. This innovative study shows that multilateral, or co-operative, sanctions are coercive not only in their pressure on their target but also in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with…
Interests, power, and multilateralism
Multilateralism characterizes, to varying degrees, patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct. The utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront. Thus, the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution, as in coordination …
U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-1980
Credibility, Costs, and Institutions
The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on…
International Relations and Politics
Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems
Like individuals facing common-pool resource problems, states search for ways to solve collective-action problems in the international system without turning to external enforcement. Heterogeneity of power and of preference intensities may enhance the probability of cooperation, if states are able to link issues credibly. International decision-making rules that require more than majority support will also increase the demand for issue linkage. C…
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Todas as notas de rodapé estão no final do texto
Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
Studies of international institutions, organizations, and regimes have consistently appeared in the pages of International Organization. We review the theoretical and empirical work on international institutions and identify promising directions for the institutionalist research program. Early studies of international institutions were rich with empirical insights and often influenced by theoretical developments in other fields of political scien…
The Contributions of Rational Choice
October 01 1999 The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism Lisa L. Martin Lisa L. Martin Professor of Government at Harvard University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Lisa L. Martin Professor of Government at Harvard University. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo…
Democratic Commitments
From the refusal of the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track trade authority and certain foreign aid packages to the obstacles placed by Western European parliaments in the path of economic integration, legislatures often interfere with national leaders' efforts to reach and implement predictable international agreements. This seems to give an advantage to dictators, who can bluff with confidence and make decisions without consultation, and many a…
Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics
If the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation, more may not always be better. Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes. The global trade regime, which aims to liberalize trade, has become increasingly legalized over time. Increased legalization has changed the …
Institutional Effects on State Behavior
We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private intere…
The President and International Commitments
U.S. presidents can choose the form of international agreements that they negotiate. Using the Constitution's Article II procedure to gain ratification of a formal treaty is a costly and time‐consuming endeavor, so presidents frequently turn to executive agreements that do not require approval by two thirds of the Senate. Given this alternative, why do presidents ever choose the Article II procedure? This article argues that treaties serve as a c…
International Economic Institutions
This article focuses on international economic institutions, particularly on institutions that structure trade and financial relationships. It considers the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), regional trade organizations, and the Bretton Woods institutions. The article provides some background information on the study of institutions, generally in international relations. It also focuses on trade…
The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade
The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Trade surveys the literature on the politics of international trade and highlights the most exciting recent scholarly developments. The Handbook is focused on work by political scientists that draws extensively on work in economics, but is distinctive in its applications and attention to political features; that is, it takes politics seriously. The Handbook's framework is organized in part alon…
Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade
Gender, Teaching Evaluations, and Professional Success in Political Science
Evaluations of teaching effectiveness rely heavily on student evaluations of teaching. However, an accumulating body of evidence shows that these evaluations are subject to gender bias. Theories of leadership and role incongruity suggest that this bias should be especially prominent in large courses. This article examines publicly available data from two large political science departments and finds that female instructors receive substantively a…
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
The role of international institutions has been central to the study of world politics at least since the conclusion of World War II. Much of this research was, and continues to be, pioneered in the pages of International Organization. In this article we take stock of past work on international institutions, trace the evolution of major themes in scholarship over time, and highlight areas for productive new research. Our central argument is that …
The Leverage of Economic Theories
Challenges to the Liberal Order
AsInternational Organizationcommemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects;…
U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-1980
Global Governance
Modern international interactions are structured by institutions of global governance, both formal and informal. Most of these institutions are encompassed by the liberal international order. Like domestic institutions, these international institutions are challenged by the prevalence and depth of disinformation. The demand for disinformation, in turn, has been fed by the order’s lack of attention to growing domestic economic inequality. Disinfor…
Political science (23 obras) · Economics (19 obras) · Law (18 obras) · Law (12 obras) · Politics (11 obras) · International Development and Aid (9 obras) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (9 obras) · Political economy (9 obras) · Law and economics (7 obras) · International trade (6 obras)