Sam Bucovetsky
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5868626 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Sam Bucovetsky |
| NOMBRES | Sam |
| APELLIDO | Bucovetsky |
| FIRMA | BUCOVETSKY S |
| AFILIACIONES | York University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 51 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1982 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2014 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich
How to avoid transferring a valuable asset
Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure
Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure
Asymmetric tax competition
Inequality in the Local Public Sector
Effects on renters' welfare of changes in local government spending are examined in a multijurisdiction model. In equilibrium each income class chooses the jurisdiction whose combination of local public output and housing price maximizes utility. Comparative-static analysis of this equilibrium is used to show how inequality in local public expenditure benefits low-income residents. If low-income residents are observed to choose jurisdictions with…
Asymmetric tax competition
Inequality in the Local Public Sector
Effects on renters' welfare of changes in local government spending are examined in a multijurisdiction model. In equilibrium each income class chooses the jurisdiction whose combination of local public output and housing price maximizes utility. Comparative-static analysis of this equilibrium is used to show how inequality in local public expenditure benefits low-income residents. If low-income residents are observed to choose jurisdictions with…
Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure
Inequality in the Local Public Sector
Effects on renters' welfare of changes in local government spending are examined in a multijurisdiction model. In equilibrium each income class chooses the jurisdiction whose combination of local public output and housing price maximizes utility. Comparative-static analysis of this equilibrium is used to show how inequality in local public expenditure benefits low-income residents. If low-income residents are observed to choose jurisdictions with…
Asymmetric tax competition
Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure
Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure
How to avoid transferring a valuable asset
Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich
Economics (6 obras) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (5 obras) · Microeconomics (5 obras) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (4 obras) · Public economics (4 obras) · Competition (biology (3 obras) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (3 obras) · Jurisdiction (3 obras) · Public finance (3 obras) · Business (2 obras)