José L Zalabardo
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5910937 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | José L Zalabardo |
| NOMBRES | José L |
| APELLIDO | Zalabardo |
| FIRMA | ZALABARDO J L |
| AFILIACIONES | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1247-3548 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1989 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning
Alexander Miller’s book is a valuable contribution to the debates initiated by Saul Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. It offers an excellent presentation of the problems, an appealing account of the historical development of some of the main attempts to deal with these problems, and a lucid proposal for how to address some of the difficulties faced by these strategies. The book is organized in five chapters and an …
Pragmatist Semantics
The book defends a pragmatist account of the meaning grounds of central semantic discourses—ascriptions of truth, of propositional attitudes, and of meanings. On a pragmatist account, what makes the sentences of these discourses have the meanings they have is the procedures that regulate their acceptance and rejection. The application of the pragmatist template to ethical discourse is also explored. The pragmatist approach is presented as an alte…
Goddard and Judge on Tractarian Objects
I discuss the idea that the objects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are propertyless bare particulars, an idea defended by Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge in their monograph, The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. I present the difficulties that Goddard and Judge raise for this construal concerning the idea that Tractarian objects have natures that determine their possibilities of combination, and I assess the solution they propose. I offer an alternativ…
Inferentialism and knowledge
I take issue with Robert Brandom’s claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn’t undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherr…
Logic without metaphysics
Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first…
Safety, sensitivity and differential support
The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe
One strand in the rule-following considerations
Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress
I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational …
Bonjour, Externalism and The Regress Problem
Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Research Article| January 01 2005 Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge José L. Zalabardo José L. Zalabardo Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 33–61. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-33 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation José L. Zalabardo; Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowle…
A problem for information theoretic semantics
Rules, Communities and Judgements
El trabajo de Zalabardo se ocupa de una de las ideas centrales de Wittgenstein en relación con la noción de seguir una regla y de algunas de las interpretaciones que se han hecho de ella. Toma las interpretaciones de Kripke y Blackburn y muestra por qué considera que son inadecuadas. A su vez, propone una interpretación alternativa. La idea de Wittgenstein es que si toda regla se puede interpretar de diversas formas, y si para comprobar que la re…
Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress
I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational …
Bonjour, Externalism and The Regress Problem
Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Research Article| January 01 2005 Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge José L. Zalabardo José L. Zalabardo Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 33–61. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-33 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation José L. Zalabardo; Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowle…
Safety, sensitivity and differential support
The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe
Rules, Communities and Judgements
El trabajo de Zalabardo se ocupa de una de las ideas centrales de Wittgenstein en relación con la noción de seguir una regla y de algunas de las interpretaciones que se han hecho de ella. Toma las interpretaciones de Kripke y Blackburn y muestra por qué considera que son inadecuadas. A su vez, propone una interpretación alternativa. La idea de Wittgenstein es que si toda regla se puede interpretar de diversas formas, y si para comprobar que la re…
A problem for information theoretic semantics
Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Research Article| January 01 2005 Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge José L. Zalabardo José L. Zalabardo Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 33–61. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-33 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation José L. Zalabardo; Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowle…
Bonjour, Externalism and The Regress Problem
Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress
I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational …
One strand in the rule-following considerations
Safety, sensitivity and differential support
The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe
Goddard and Judge on Tractarian Objects
I discuss the idea that the objects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are propertyless bare particulars, an idea defended by Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge in their monograph, The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. I present the difficulties that Goddard and Judge raise for this construal concerning the idea that Tractarian objects have natures that determine their possibilities of combination, and I assess the solution they propose. I offer an alternativ…
Inferentialism and knowledge
I take issue with Robert Brandom’s claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn’t undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherr…
Logic without metaphysics
Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first…
Pragmatist Semantics
The book defends a pragmatist account of the meaning grounds of central semantic discourses—ascriptions of truth, of propositional attitudes, and of meanings. On a pragmatist account, what makes the sentences of these discourses have the meanings they have is the procedures that regulate their acceptance and rejection. The application of the pragmatist template to ethical discourse is also explored. The pragmatist approach is presented as an alte…
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning
Alexander Miller’s book is a valuable contribution to the debates initiated by Saul Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. It offers an excellent presentation of the problems, an appealing account of the historical development of some of the main attempts to deal with these problems, and a lucid proposal for how to address some of the difficulties faced by these strategies. The book is organized in five chapters and an …
Philosophy (11 obras) · Epistemology (10 obras) · Metaphysics (8 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras) · Philosophy of science (5 obras) · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications (5 obras) · Psychology (4 obras)