Joe Stratmann
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5912263 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Joe Stratmann |
| NOMBRES | Joe |
| APELLIDO | Stratmann |
| FIRMA | STRATMANN J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Tennessee at Knoxville |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8683-3158 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Rationalism Self-Restrained
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason famously purports to preclude rational cognition of objects beyond possible experience (“rational ignorance”). On the prevailing approach (popularized by Strawson’s Bounds of Sense), the conditions on immediate, experiential cognition explain why rational cognition cannot extend beyond it. Yet I argue that the prevailing approach risks surrendering reason to heteronomy, shackling reason to external constraints that …
How metaphysics feigns what isn’t there
Kant accuses the traditional metaphysician of not only transgressing the bounds of possible experience, but also misjudging her favoured real entities to be given in experience – resulting in the error of subreption. Unfortunately, Kant’s general diagnosis of how and why subreptions arise is far from obvious. I argue that progress can be made by first reconstructing the neglected pioneering diagnosis offered by Christian Wolff. On Wolff’s view, s…
From Wild Despair to Kantian Hope
A common view among latter-day Kantians is that hope is needed to defeat the threat of moral demotivation. I argue against this view by drawing on Kant’s neglected account of despair. On this account, despair is an affect in response to hopelessness. A certain kind of despair—wild despair—can be intensely motivating. Wild moral despair (as I call it) can even help to sustain moral motivation. Yet this presents a challenge: since wild moral despai…
Miracles, Metaphysics, and Method in Wolff and Kant
Kant’s critical procedure aims to determine the conditions and boundaries of reason’s use in synthetic a priori cognition through an antecedent critique of reason. The prevailing view maintains that his arch-dogmatic predecessor, Christian Wolff, fell short of the critical procedure because he overlooked the possibility of synthetic truth altogether. I first argue that Wolff in fact accepts synthetic truths. On his miracle account of synthetic tr…
The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason
For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (Citation2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces trenchant difficulties here—resulting in the problem of missing value. I first propose that Kant’s project of a critique of pure reason faces this problem: he supposes that the notion of ground is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics. This i…
Kant’s Rationalist Account of Hope
Few fates seem worse than living without cause for hope . Yet what is it to have a cause for hope? And how is it related to having hope? Although these questions have received relatively little philosophical attention, I argue that Kant advances a rationalist account of hope that addresses them. My central thesis has two parts. First, hope is a rational attitude for Kant; certain rational conditions are needed to differentiate hope from other des…
From dogmatic slumber to rationalist nightmares
What awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber? On the traditional narrative, he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of causal connections. A more recent narrative claims that he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of non‐logical connections more generally. In this paper, I argue that a key part of Kant's awakening was far wider‐reaching: he came to realize that all dogmas must be abandoned . An oft‐overlooked technical …
In Leibniz’s Wake
The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at al…
The End of Explanation
Human reason demands ultimate explanation ; it demands a Because that admits of no further Because – something unconditioned . Pace dogmatic rationalist metaphysics, Kant concludes that theoretical reason must remain modest; it cannot know or cognize the existence of particular unconditioned entities (e.g. God or Leibnizian monads). The prevailing view goes even further; it maintains that theoretical reason cannot even know that something or othe…
Kant’s Mathematical Antinomies and the Problem of Circular Conditioning
On the reading of Kant's resolutions of the first two antinomies advanced here, Kant not only denies that the empirical world has a ground floor of empirical objects lacking proper parts in the resolution of the second antinomy, but he also denies that it has a ceiling consisting in a composite whole enclosing all other empirical objects in the resolution of the first antinomy. Indeed, the order of explanation (i.e. real conditioning) in the firs…
The End of Explanation
Human reason demands ultimate explanation ; it demands a Because that admits of no further Because – something unconditioned . Pace dogmatic rationalist metaphysics, Kant concludes that theoretical reason must remain modest; it cannot know or cognize the existence of particular unconditioned entities (e.g. God or Leibnizian monads). The prevailing view goes even further; it maintains that theoretical reason cannot even know that something or othe…
Kant’s Mathematical Antinomies and the Problem of Circular Conditioning
On the reading of Kant's resolutions of the first two antinomies advanced here, Kant not only denies that the empirical world has a ground floor of empirical objects lacking proper parts in the resolution of the second antinomy, but he also denies that it has a ceiling consisting in a composite whole enclosing all other empirical objects in the resolution of the first antinomy. Indeed, the order of explanation (i.e. real conditioning) in the firs…
The End of Explanation
Human reason demands ultimate explanation ; it demands a Because that admits of no further Because – something unconditioned . Pace dogmatic rationalist metaphysics, Kant concludes that theoretical reason must remain modest; it cannot know or cognize the existence of particular unconditioned entities (e.g. God or Leibnizian monads). The prevailing view goes even further; it maintains that theoretical reason cannot even know that something or othe…
In Leibniz’s Wake
The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at al…
From dogmatic slumber to rationalist nightmares
What awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber? On the traditional narrative, he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of causal connections. A more recent narrative claims that he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of non‐logical connections more generally. In this paper, I argue that a key part of Kant's awakening was far wider‐reaching: he came to realize that all dogmas must be abandoned . An oft‐overlooked technical …
The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason
For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (Citation2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces trenchant difficulties here—resulting in the problem of missing value. I first propose that Kant’s project of a critique of pure reason faces this problem: he supposes that the notion of ground is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics. This i…
Kant’s Rationalist Account of Hope
Few fates seem worse than living without cause for hope . Yet what is it to have a cause for hope? And how is it related to having hope? Although these questions have received relatively little philosophical attention, I argue that Kant advances a rationalist account of hope that addresses them. My central thesis has two parts. First, hope is a rational attitude for Kant; certain rational conditions are needed to differentiate hope from other des…
Rationalism Self-Restrained
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason famously purports to preclude rational cognition of objects beyond possible experience (“rational ignorance”). On the prevailing approach (popularized by Strawson’s Bounds of Sense), the conditions on immediate, experiential cognition explain why rational cognition cannot extend beyond it. Yet I argue that the prevailing approach risks surrendering reason to heteronomy, shackling reason to external constraints that …
How metaphysics feigns what isn’t there
Kant accuses the traditional metaphysician of not only transgressing the bounds of possible experience, but also misjudging her favoured real entities to be given in experience – resulting in the error of subreption. Unfortunately, Kant’s general diagnosis of how and why subreptions arise is far from obvious. I argue that progress can be made by first reconstructing the neglected pioneering diagnosis offered by Christian Wolff. On Wolff’s view, s…
From Wild Despair to Kantian Hope
A common view among latter-day Kantians is that hope is needed to defeat the threat of moral demotivation. I argue against this view by drawing on Kant’s neglected account of despair. On this account, despair is an affect in response to hopelessness. A certain kind of despair—wild despair—can be intensely motivating. Wild moral despair (as I call it) can even help to sustain moral motivation. Yet this presents a challenge: since wild moral despai…
Miracles, Metaphysics, and Method in Wolff and Kant
Kant’s critical procedure aims to determine the conditions and boundaries of reason’s use in synthetic a priori cognition through an antecedent critique of reason. The prevailing view maintains that his arch-dogmatic predecessor, Christian Wolff, fell short of the critical procedure because he overlooked the possibility of synthetic truth altogether. I first argue that Wolff in fact accepts synthetic truths. On his miracle account of synthetic tr…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 obras) · Historical Philosophy and Science (2 obras) · Optimism, Hope, and Well-being (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras)