Eduardo Rivera‐López
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5912331 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Eduardo Rivera‐López |
| NOMBRES | Eduardo |
| APELLIDO | Rivera‐López |
| FIRMA | LÓPEZ E R |
| AFILIACIONES | Universidad Torcuato Di Tella |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0071-8189 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1995 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Self-Defense Against Conditional Threats
Euthanasia, consensual homicide, and refusal of treatment
Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life‐saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthana…
What is the Role of Partial Compliance in Moral Theory
Nonideal Ethics
Our world is far from ideal: people kill, steal, and harm others; governments initiate unjust wars; material resources are sometimes scarce or unjustly distributed; and millions of people suffer extreme deprivation from social or natural causes. Any adequate moral theory should be sensitive to these unfortunate facts. Given these actual deficiencies, it seems obvious that the best, or most appropriate, actions, rules, and institutions in this non…
The limited (but relevant) role of the doctrine of the double effect in the Just War Theory
My focus in this paper is the use of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) in the context of Just War Theory. Different versions of DDE have different degrees of plausibility. Two distinctions are crucial. First, I distinguish between epistemically idealized and non-idealized scenarios. Second, I distinguish between versions of DDE that make a ceteris paribus comparison between intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either mak…
How to Reject Resultant Moral Luck Alone
Probabilities in Tragic Choices
In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to…
Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions
Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditio…
Use and Misuse of Examples in Normative Ethics
Kommunitaristische Paradoxe
Two basic kinds of communitarians are discriminated. ‘Weak communitarians’ reject only the liberal metaethical theses that I call ‘universalism’ and ‘neutralism’, but endorse liberal norms and institutions at the normative level. ‘Strong communitarians’ condemn liberalism at both levels: they reject not only universalism and neutralism, but also substantive liberal norms defending communitarian values (family, tradition, solidarity, etc.). This a…
The limited (but relevant) role of the doctrine of the double effect in the Just War Theory
My focus in this paper is the use of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) in the context of Just War Theory. Different versions of DDE have different degrees of plausibility. Two distinctions are crucial. First, I distinguish between epistemically idealized and non-idealized scenarios. Second, I distinguish between versions of DDE that make a ceteris paribus comparison between intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either mak…
Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions
Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditio…
Kommunitaristische Paradoxe
Two basic kinds of communitarians are discriminated. ‘Weak communitarians’ reject only the liberal metaethical theses that I call ‘universalism’ and ‘neutralism’, but endorse liberal norms and institutions at the normative level. ‘Strong communitarians’ condemn liberalism at both levels: they reject not only universalism and neutralism, but also substantive liberal norms defending communitarian values (family, tradition, solidarity, etc.). This a…
Use and Misuse of Examples in Normative Ethics
Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions
Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditio…
Probabilities in Tragic Choices
In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to…
How to Reject Resultant Moral Luck Alone
Nonideal Ethics
Our world is far from ideal: people kill, steal, and harm others; governments initiate unjust wars; material resources are sometimes scarce or unjustly distributed; and millions of people suffer extreme deprivation from social or natural causes. Any adequate moral theory should be sensitive to these unfortunate facts. Given these actual deficiencies, it seems obvious that the best, or most appropriate, actions, rules, and institutions in this non…
The limited (but relevant) role of the doctrine of the double effect in the Just War Theory
My focus in this paper is the use of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) in the context of Just War Theory. Different versions of DDE have different degrees of plausibility. Two distinctions are crucial. First, I distinguish between epistemically idealized and non-idealized scenarios. Second, I distinguish between versions of DDE that make a ceteris paribus comparison between intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either mak…
What is the Role of Partial Compliance in Moral Theory
Euthanasia, consensual homicide, and refusal of treatment
Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life‐saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthana…
Self-Defense Against Conditional Threats
Law (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · War, Ethics, and Justification (5 obras) · Economics (4 obras)