Johanna Thoma
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5969347 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Johanna Thoma |
| NOMBRES | Johanna |
| APELLIDO | Thoma |
| FIRMA | THOMÄ J |
| AFILIACIONES | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1364-4521 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 41 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Some Mistakes Are Irreducibly Diachronic
The idea that people make mistakes in how they pursue their own best interests, and that we can identify and correct for these mistakes has been central to much recent work in behavioural economics, and the ‘nudge’ approach to public policy grounded in it. The focus in this literature has been on individual choices that are mistaken. Agreeing with, and building on the criticism that this literature has been too quick to identify individual choice…
The precision fallacy
The standard theory of choice in economics involves modelling human agents as if they had precise attitudes when in fact they are often fuzzy. For the normative purposes of welfare economics, it might be thought that the imposition of a precise framework is nevertheless well justified: If we think the standard theory is normatively correct, and therefore that agents ought to be in this sense precise, then doesn't it follow that their true welfare…
Cost‐Effectiveness Analysis of Risky Health Interventions
Cost‐effectiveness analysis for health interventions is traditionally conducted in a risk‐neutral way, insensitive to risk attitudes in the population, which are potentially non‐neutral. While the standard outcome metric of quality‐adjusted life years (QALYs) aims to be deferential to people's valuations of health states, cost‐effectiveness analysis of risky interventions using the QALY metric is not similarly deferential to people's risk attitud…
Reply to Hausman
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and “Debiased” Welfare Analysis
Behavioral welfare economics usually aims at mere means paternalism, helping agents better pursue their own goals. This paper discusses one initially promising way to inform policies addressed at agents who violate expected utility theory (EUT), namely what I call “CPT debiasing.” I argue that this approach is problematic even if we grant the normative authority of EUT, the descriptive adequacy of CPT (cumulative prospect theory), and the general…
Social Science, Policy and Democracy
Can social science provide policy-guidance without undermining some basic democratic values? It would clearly be devastating if the answer was “no”: Most people are deeply committed both to democracy, as well as to the idea that policy decisions should be informed by the best available science, including the best available social science. Accordingly, the many philosophers who have worried about potential tensions between science and democracy ha…
Taking Risks on Behalf of Another
A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf o…
Time for Caution
Time for CautionI
Folk Psychology and the Interpretation of Decision Theory
Most philosophical decision theorists and philosophers of the social sciences believe that decision theory is and should be in the business of providing folk psychological explanations of choice behaviour, and that it can only do so if we understand the preferences, utilities and probabilities that feature in decision-theoretic models as ascriptions of mental states not reducible to choice. The behavioural interpretation of preference and related…
In defence of revealed preference theory
This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as…
Judgementalism about normative decision theory
Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they …
On the Hidden Thought Experiments of Economic Theory
Most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. They take the form of more informal bits of reasoning that precede the presentation of the formal, mathematical models these papers are known for. These thought experiments differ from the formal models in various ways. In particular, they do not invoke the same idealized assumptions about the rationality, knowledge, and preferences of agents. The presence of thought experiments in…
The Epistemic Division of Labor Revisited
Some scientists are happy to follow in the footsteps of others; some like to explore novel approaches. It is tempting to think that herein lies an epistemic division of labor conducive to overall scientific progress: the latter point the way to fruitful areas of research, and the former more fully explore those areas. Weisberg and Muldoon’s model, however, suggests that it would be best if all scientists explored novel approaches. I argue that th…
The Epistemic Division of Labor Revisited
Some scientists are happy to follow in the footsteps of others; some like to explore novel approaches. It is tempting to think that herein lies an epistemic division of labor conducive to overall scientific progress: the latter point the way to fruitful areas of research, and the former more fully explore those areas. Weisberg and Muldoon’s model, however, suggests that it would be best if all scientists explored novel approaches. I argue that th…
Social Science, Policy and Democracy
Can social science provide policy-guidance without undermining some basic democratic values? It would clearly be devastating if the answer was “no”: Most people are deeply committed both to democracy, as well as to the idea that policy decisions should be informed by the best available science, including the best available social science. Accordingly, the many philosophers who have worried about potential tensions between science and democracy ha…
Time for Caution
Time for CautionI
Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and “Debiased” Welfare Analysis
Behavioral welfare economics usually aims at mere means paternalism, helping agents better pursue their own goals. This paper discusses one initially promising way to inform policies addressed at agents who violate expected utility theory (EUT), namely what I call “CPT debiasing.” I argue that this approach is problematic even if we grant the normative authority of EUT, the descriptive adequacy of CPT (cumulative prospect theory), and the general…
Taking Risks on Behalf of Another
A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf o…
Judgementalism about normative decision theory
Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they …
On the Hidden Thought Experiments of Economic Theory
Most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. They take the form of more informal bits of reasoning that precede the presentation of the formal, mathematical models these papers are known for. These thought experiments differ from the formal models in various ways. In particular, they do not invoke the same idealized assumptions about the rationality, knowledge, and preferences of agents. The presence of thought experiments in…
The Epistemic Division of Labor Revisited
Some scientists are happy to follow in the footsteps of others; some like to explore novel approaches. It is tempting to think that herein lies an epistemic division of labor conducive to overall scientific progress: the latter point the way to fruitful areas of research, and the former more fully explore those areas. Weisberg and Muldoon’s model, however, suggests that it would be best if all scientists explored novel approaches. I argue that th…
On the Hidden Thought Experiments of Economic Theory
Most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. They take the form of more informal bits of reasoning that precede the presentation of the formal, mathematical models these papers are known for. These thought experiments differ from the formal models in various ways. In particular, they do not invoke the same idealized assumptions about the rationality, knowledge, and preferences of agents. The presence of thought experiments in…
Folk Psychology and the Interpretation of Decision Theory
Most philosophical decision theorists and philosophers of the social sciences believe that decision theory is and should be in the business of providing folk psychological explanations of choice behaviour, and that it can only do so if we understand the preferences, utilities and probabilities that feature in decision-theoretic models as ascriptions of mental states not reducible to choice. The behavioural interpretation of preference and related…
In defence of revealed preference theory
This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as…
Judgementalism about normative decision theory
Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they …
Time for Caution
Time for CautionI
Taking Risks on Behalf of Another
A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf o…
Reply to Hausman
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and “Debiased” Welfare Analysis
Behavioral welfare economics usually aims at mere means paternalism, helping agents better pursue their own goals. This paper discusses one initially promising way to inform policies addressed at agents who violate expected utility theory (EUT), namely what I call “CPT debiasing.” I argue that this approach is problematic even if we grant the normative authority of EUT, the descriptive adequacy of CPT (cumulative prospect theory), and the general…
Social Science, Policy and Democracy
Can social science provide policy-guidance without undermining some basic democratic values? It would clearly be devastating if the answer was “no”: Most people are deeply committed both to democracy, as well as to the idea that policy decisions should be informed by the best available science, including the best available social science. Accordingly, the many philosophers who have worried about potential tensions between science and democracy ha…
Cost‐Effectiveness Analysis of Risky Health Interventions
Cost‐effectiveness analysis for health interventions is traditionally conducted in a risk‐neutral way, insensitive to risk attitudes in the population, which are potentially non‐neutral. While the standard outcome metric of quality‐adjusted life years (QALYs) aims to be deferential to people's valuations of health states, cost‐effectiveness analysis of risky interventions using the QALY metric is not similarly deferential to people's risk attitud…
Some Mistakes Are Irreducibly Diachronic
The idea that people make mistakes in how they pursue their own best interests, and that we can identify and correct for these mistakes has been central to much recent work in behavioural economics, and the ‘nudge’ approach to public policy grounded in it. The focus in this literature has been on individual choices that are mistaken. Agreeing with, and building on the criticism that this literature has been too quick to identify individual choice…
The precision fallacy
The standard theory of choice in economics involves modelling human agents as if they had precise attitudes when in fact they are often fuzzy. For the normative purposes of welfare economics, it might be thought that the imposition of a precise framework is nevertheless well justified: If we think the standard theory is normatively correct, and therefore that agents ought to be in this sense precise, then doesn't it follow that their true welfare…
Economics (9 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · Positive economics (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 obras) · Economic Theory and Institutions (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras)