James Kinkaid
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5996001 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | James Kinkaid |
| NOMBRES | James |
| APELLIDO | Kinkaid |
| FIRMA | KINKAID J |
| AFILIACIONES | Bilkent University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4834-7647 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
A ‘Drainage Hole’ in Being
Both classical phenomenology and contemporary first-person realism accord a special metaphysical status to perspectives. Yet ‘inegalitarian’ forms of first-person realism are, I argue, vulnerable to Sartre’s response to the problem of other minds in Being and Nothingness. After discussing the special status Sartre accords to the first-person perspective (‘ipseity’) and signaling its affinities with first-person realism, I argue that Sartre’s desc…
Heidegger and the Concept Horse
Filippo Casati’s Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being is exactly the kind of work in the history of philosophy that gets me out of bed in the morning.1 This is for two reasons. First, Casati do
Idealism and transparency in Sartre’s ontological proof
The Introduction to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (B&N) contains a condensed, cryptic argument – the ‘ontological proof’ – that is meant to establish a position ‘beyond realism and idealism’. Despite its role in establishing the fundamental ontological distinction of B&N – the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself – the ontological proof has received very little scholarly attention. My goal is to fill this lacuna. I begin by c…
Nietzsche as Metaphysician
Nietzsche as Metaphysician is a sequel of sorts to Justin Remhof’s Nietzsche’s Constructivism (Routledge, 2018). In the earlier book Remhof argues that Nietzsche is a constructivist about material objects: he holds that all objects constitutively depend on human practices. In other work Remhof has argued that Nietzsche is a panpsychist (“Nietzsche as Panpsychist,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32.5 [2024]: 1074–96) and explored th…
Is Sartre an Eleatic Monist
It has long been recognized that Sartre’s description of “being-in-itself” in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness (B&N) is reminiscent of Eleatic monism, the view traditionally attributed to Parmenides on which there is only one mind-independent entity, which is undifferentiated and atemporal. I reconstruct two arguments from premises Sartre endorses in B&N for Eleatic monism. These arguments are interesting not only because they give new l…
Husserl and the marks of the mental
Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox
Husserl endorses ideal verificationism , the claim that there is a necessary correlation between truth and the ideal possibility of experience. This puts him in the company of semantic anti‐realists like Dummett, Tennant, and Wright who endorse the knowability thesis that all truths are knowable. Unfortunately, there is a simple, seductive, and troubling argument due to Alonzo Church and Frederic Fitch that the knowability thesis collapses into t…
Hermeneutics in Heidegger’s Science of Being
Heidegger calls his early philosophy a “science of being.” Being and Time combines phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical, and existential themes in a way that is not obviously coherent. Commentators have worried in particular that Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology is incompatible with his “scientific” aspirations. I outline three interpretations on which Heidegger cannot adopt Husserl’s “scientific” conception of ph…
Phenomenology and the stratification of reality
Phenomenologists have no taste for desert landscapes. The early phenomenologists—Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Roman Ingarden—adopt stratified views of reality on which spiritual objects like artifacts and persons are distinct from their underlying matter. Call this view “pluralism.” After describing Scheler, Ingarden, and Husserl's pluralism about goods, literary artworks, and images, respectively, I reconstruct a phenomenological case for pl…
Sin obras prominentes en esta página.
Phenomenology and the stratification of reality
Phenomenologists have no taste for desert landscapes. The early phenomenologists—Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Roman Ingarden—adopt stratified views of reality on which spiritual objects like artifacts and persons are distinct from their underlying matter. Call this view “pluralism.” After describing Scheler, Ingarden, and Husserl's pluralism about goods, literary artworks, and images, respectively, I reconstruct a phenomenological case for pl…
Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox
Husserl endorses ideal verificationism , the claim that there is a necessary correlation between truth and the ideal possibility of experience. This puts him in the company of semantic anti‐realists like Dummett, Tennant, and Wright who endorse the knowability thesis that all truths are knowable. Unfortunately, there is a simple, seductive, and troubling argument due to Alonzo Church and Frederic Fitch that the knowability thesis collapses into t…
Hermeneutics in Heidegger’s Science of Being
Heidegger calls his early philosophy a “science of being.” Being and Time combines phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical, and existential themes in a way that is not obviously coherent. Commentators have worried in particular that Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology is incompatible with his “scientific” aspirations. I outline three interpretations on which Heidegger cannot adopt Husserl’s “scientific” conception of ph…
Is Sartre an Eleatic Monist
It has long been recognized that Sartre’s description of “being-in-itself” in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness (B&N) is reminiscent of Eleatic monism, the view traditionally attributed to Parmenides on which there is only one mind-independent entity, which is undifferentiated and atemporal. I reconstruct two arguments from premises Sartre endorses in B&N for Eleatic monism. These arguments are interesting not only because they give new l…
Husserl and the marks of the mental
A ‘Drainage Hole’ in Being
Both classical phenomenology and contemporary first-person realism accord a special metaphysical status to perspectives. Yet ‘inegalitarian’ forms of first-person realism are, I argue, vulnerable to Sartre’s response to the problem of other minds in Being and Nothingness. After discussing the special status Sartre accords to the first-person perspective (‘ipseity’) and signaling its affinities with first-person realism, I argue that Sartre’s desc…
Heidegger and the Concept Horse
Filippo Casati’s Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being is exactly the kind of work in the history of philosophy that gets me out of bed in the morning.1 This is for two reasons. First, Casati do
Idealism and transparency in Sartre’s ontological proof
The Introduction to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (B&N) contains a condensed, cryptic argument – the ‘ontological proof’ – that is meant to establish a position ‘beyond realism and idealism’. Despite its role in establishing the fundamental ontological distinction of B&N – the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself – the ontological proof has received very little scholarly attention. My goal is to fill this lacuna. I begin by c…
Nietzsche as Metaphysician
Nietzsche as Metaphysician is a sequel of sorts to Justin Remhof’s Nietzsche’s Constructivism (Routledge, 2018). In the earlier book Remhof argues that Nietzsche is a constructivist about material objects: he holds that all objects constitutively depend on human practices. In other work Remhof has argued that Nietzsche is a panpsychist (“Nietzsche as Panpsychist,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32.5 [2024]: 1074–96) and explored th…
Epistemology (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (7 obras) · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism (5 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Realism (3 obras) · Existentialism (2 obras) · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity (2 obras) · Ontology (2 obras)