Adam Piovarchy
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5997306 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Adam Piovarchy |
| NOMBRES | Adam |
| APELLIDO | Piovarchy |
| FIRMA | PIOVARCHY A |
| AFILIACIONES | The University of Notre Dame Australia |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5169-2030 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
On the Importance of Slack
This article is on the concept of “slack”: the absence of binding constraints on behavior. Slack comes in many forms, including as time, money, space, others’ goodwill, and support networks. It enables you to weather sudden shocks and avoid crises, or to pursue opportunities and take on risks. It gives you room to fail. Slack is often good for individuals and can create positive externalities for groups. It is not already accounted for in existin…
A Modest Defense of Somewhat Selective Outrage
Many people think there is something objectionable about “selective outrage.” After investigating how to best characterise what selective outrage is and what these objections target, this paper argues that selective outrage can actually have important positive effects. Because we often have limited resources with which to enforce norms, it can be collectively prudent to prioritise enforcing norms that are well-established or collectively recognis…
Epistemic Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame
This paper considers the possibility that ‘epistemic hypocrisy’ could be relevant to our blaming practices. It argues that agents who culpably violate an epistemic norm can lack the standing to blame other agents who culpably violate similar norms. After disentangling our criticism of epistemic hypocrites from various other fitting responses, and the different ways some norms can bear on the legitimacy of our blame, I argue that a commitment acco…
Hypocritical Blame as Dishonest Signalling
This paper proposes a new theory of the nature of hypocritical blame and why it is objectionable, arguing that hypocritical blame is a form of dishonest signaling. Blaming provides very important benefits: through its ability to signal our commitments to norms and unwillingness to tolerate norm violations, it greatly contributes to valuable norm-following. Hypocritical blamers, however, are insufficiently committed to the norms or values they bla…
The Utilitarian's Guide to Dreams
Unpleasant dreams occur much more frequently than many people realise. If one is a hedonistic utilitarian – or, at least, one thinks that dreams have positive or negative moral value in virtue of their experiential quality – then one has considerable reason to try to make such dreams more positive. Given it is possible to improve the quality of our dreams, we ought to be promoting and implementing currently available interventions that improve ou…
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore Unwelcome Epistemic Company
The problem of unwelcome epistemic company refers to the problem of encountering agreement with your beliefs from an unwelcome source, such as someone who is known to form unreliable beliefs or have values you reject. Blanchard (2023) and Levy (2023) argue that when we encounter unwelcome agreement, we may have reason to reduce our confidence in our matching beliefs. I argue that unwelcome epistemic company rarely provides reasons to reduce our c…
Does being a ‘bad feminist’ make me a hypocrite? Politics, commitments and moral consistency
A ‘bad feminist’ is someone who endorses feminist ideals and values but finds themselves falling short of them. Since bad feminists exhibit an inconsistency between what they say and what they do, this can generate worries about hypocrisy. This article investigates whether and when members of political movements with certain ideals ought to worry they are being hypocritical. It first provides a diagnosis of why worries about hypocrisy seem common…
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
This paper introduces three new concepts: epistemic health, epistemic immunity, and epistemic inoculation. Epistemic health is a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals. It is constituted by many different factors (e.g. possessing true beliefs, being disposed to make reliable inferences), is improved or degraded by many different things (e.g. research funding, …
Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame
Philosophers have argued that subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments are morally responsible for their actions. This paper argues that though the obedient subjects in Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments are blameworthy, since most of us would have acted in the same manner they did, it is inappropriate for most of us to blame them. On Todd’s ([2019]. “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.” Noûs 5…
Attributionist Group Agent Responsibility
A number of philosophers have recently argued that group agents can be morally responsible for their actions in virtue of having a certain kind of structured decision-making procedure which is responsive to reasons. However, accounts of group agent blameworthiness face some objections. One is that group agents cannot be responsible for wrongdoing because they are unable to experience certain kinds of emotional responses. Another is that group age…
Vice epistemology, norm-maintenance and epistemic evasiveness
Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, u…
Situationism, capacities and culpability
Responsibility for testimonial injustice
What do We Want from a Theory of Epistemic Blame
This paper identifies a number of questions that any plausible theory of epistemic blame ought to answer. What is epistemic blame? When is someone an appropriate target of epistemic blame? And what justifies engaging in epistemic blame? I argue that a number of problems arise when we try to answer these questions by using existing conceptions of moral blame. I then consider and reject Brown’s [2020 Brown, Jessica 2020. What Is Epistemic Blame? No…
Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority
This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. By identifying problems with thinking of hypocritical blame as inappropriate and examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame as a status that grants agents a normative power. Using Darwall's account of second‐personal obligations, I argue that hypocrites lack the standing to blame becaus…
A Second-Personal Solution to the Paradox of Moral Complaint
Smilansky (2006) notes that wrongdoers seem to lack any entitlement to complain about being treated in the ways that they have treated others. However, it also seems impermissible to treat agents in certain ways, and this impermissibility would give wrongdoers who are themselves wronged grounds for complaint. This article solves this apparent paradox by arguing that what is at issue is not the right simply to make complaints, but the right to hav…
A Second-Personal Solution to the Paradox of Moral Complaint
Smilansky (2006) notes that wrongdoers seem to lack any entitlement to complain about being treated in the ways that they have treated others. However, it also seems impermissible to treat agents in certain ways, and this impermissibility would give wrongdoers who are themselves wronged grounds for complaint. This article solves this apparent paradox by arguing that what is at issue is not the right simply to make complaints, but the right to hav…
Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority
This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. By identifying problems with thinking of hypocritical blame as inappropriate and examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame as a status that grants agents a normative power. Using Darwall's account of second‐personal obligations, I argue that hypocrites lack the standing to blame becaus…
A Second-Personal Solution to the Paradox of Moral Complaint
Smilansky (2006) notes that wrongdoers seem to lack any entitlement to complain about being treated in the ways that they have treated others. However, it also seems impermissible to treat agents in certain ways, and this impermissibility would give wrongdoers who are themselves wronged grounds for complaint. This article solves this apparent paradox by arguing that what is at issue is not the right simply to make complaints, but the right to hav…
Responsibility for testimonial injustice
What do We Want from a Theory of Epistemic Blame
This paper identifies a number of questions that any plausible theory of epistemic blame ought to answer. What is epistemic blame? When is someone an appropriate target of epistemic blame? And what justifies engaging in epistemic blame? I argue that a number of problems arise when we try to answer these questions by using existing conceptions of moral blame. I then consider and reject Brown’s [2020 Brown, Jessica 2020. What Is Epistemic Blame? No…
Situationism, capacities and culpability
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore Unwelcome Epistemic Company
The problem of unwelcome epistemic company refers to the problem of encountering agreement with your beliefs from an unwelcome source, such as someone who is known to form unreliable beliefs or have values you reject. Blanchard (2023) and Levy (2023) argue that when we encounter unwelcome agreement, we may have reason to reduce our confidence in our matching beliefs. I argue that unwelcome epistemic company rarely provides reasons to reduce our c…
Does being a ‘bad feminist’ make me a hypocrite? Politics, commitments and moral consistency
A ‘bad feminist’ is someone who endorses feminist ideals and values but finds themselves falling short of them. Since bad feminists exhibit an inconsistency between what they say and what they do, this can generate worries about hypocrisy. This article investigates whether and when members of political movements with certain ideals ought to worry they are being hypocritical. It first provides a diagnosis of why worries about hypocrisy seem common…
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
This paper introduces three new concepts: epistemic health, epistemic immunity, and epistemic inoculation. Epistemic health is a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals. It is constituted by many different factors (e.g. possessing true beliefs, being disposed to make reliable inferences), is improved or degraded by many different things (e.g. research funding, …
Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame
Philosophers have argued that subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments are morally responsible for their actions. This paper argues that though the obedient subjects in Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments are blameworthy, since most of us would have acted in the same manner they did, it is inappropriate for most of us to blame them. On Todd’s ([2019]. “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.” Noûs 5…
Attributionist Group Agent Responsibility
A number of philosophers have recently argued that group agents can be morally responsible for their actions in virtue of having a certain kind of structured decision-making procedure which is responsive to reasons. However, accounts of group agent blameworthiness face some objections. One is that group agents cannot be responsible for wrongdoing because they are unable to experience certain kinds of emotional responses. Another is that group age…
Vice epistemology, norm-maintenance and epistemic evasiveness
Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, u…
The Utilitarian's Guide to Dreams
Unpleasant dreams occur much more frequently than many people realise. If one is a hedonistic utilitarian – or, at least, one thinks that dreams have positive or negative moral value in virtue of their experiential quality – then one has considerable reason to try to make such dreams more positive. Given it is possible to improve the quality of our dreams, we ought to be promoting and implementing currently available interventions that improve ou…
A Modest Defense of Somewhat Selective Outrage
Many people think there is something objectionable about “selective outrage.” After investigating how to best characterise what selective outrage is and what these objections target, this paper argues that selective outrage can actually have important positive effects. Because we often have limited resources with which to enforce norms, it can be collectively prudent to prioritise enforcing norms that are well-established or collectively recognis…
Epistemic Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame
This paper considers the possibility that ‘epistemic hypocrisy’ could be relevant to our blaming practices. It argues that agents who culpably violate an epistemic norm can lack the standing to blame other agents who culpably violate similar norms. After disentangling our criticism of epistemic hypocrites from various other fitting responses, and the different ways some norms can bear on the legitimacy of our blame, I argue that a commitment acco…
Hypocritical Blame as Dishonest Signalling
This paper proposes a new theory of the nature of hypocritical blame and why it is objectionable, arguing that hypocritical blame is a form of dishonest signaling. Blaming provides very important benefits: through its ability to signal our commitments to norms and unwillingness to tolerate norm violations, it greatly contributes to valuable norm-following. Hypocritical blamers, however, are insufficiently committed to the norms or values they bla…
On the Importance of Slack
This article is on the concept of “slack”: the absence of binding constraints on behavior. Slack comes in many forms, including as time, money, space, others’ goodwill, and support networks. It enables you to weather sudden shocks and avoid crises, or to pursue opportunities and take on risks. It gives you room to fail. Slack is often good for individuals and can create positive externalities for groups. It is not already accounted for in existin…
Psychology (13 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Epistemology (10 obras) · Sociology (10 obras) · Social Psychology (9 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Free Will and Agency (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (7 obras)