Richard John Worrall
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 6154142 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Richard John Worrall |
| NOMBRES | Richard John |
| APELLIDO | Worrall |
| FIRMA | WORRALL R J |
| AFILIACIONES | Manchester Metropolitan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9050-8008 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 2 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2006 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Enough to be Seen to be Onside but Hardly Substantial?’
This article considers the operations of RAF Bomber Command in support of Operation Husky. Earmarked to play a considerable supporting role, the piece goes on to examine how valid operational difficulties, rather than the usual supposed notion of Sir Arthur Harris’ aversion to bombing Italy, would conspire to blunt its full participation. In attempting to get around these obstacles, Sir Arthur Tedder proposed a number of solutions, ranging from a…
The termination of the long immunity from air raids’
Arthur Harris infamously pursued the Battle of Berlin in winter 1943/1944 in the face of an increasingly sceptical Air Staff and a disinterested prime minister. The irony was that originally the C-in-C Bomber Command was lukewarm about bombing Berlin. Instead, it was Churchill who continually pressed for attacking the German Capital under Operation Tannenberg, which went ahead in mid-January 1943, for wider political considerations, especially An…
Crossing the Red Line?’
On 21/22 January 1944, RAF Bomber Command conducted an area-bombing attack on the city of Magdeburg. The outcome was hardly pleasing, marked by high losses and inaccurate bombing. However, most notable was the rancorous aftermath, in which a full-blown row would erupt between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command Headquarters. This stemmed from the Air Staff perceiving that Sir Arthur Harris had ‘crossed a red line’ in his non-cooperation with thei…
The strategic limitations of a Middle East client state by the mid-1950s
This article looks at how Libya – a British client state under the Anglo-Libyan treaty – refused to allow Britain the use of forces and bases in that country for operations against Egypt during the summer and autumn of 1956. The subsequent restrictions over the use of Libya was shown over the movement of the 10th Armoured Division for ‘training exercises’ on the Cyrenaican–Egyptian border during early August and later manifested in a written requ…
Coping with a Coup d'Etat’
The Iraqi revolution greatly undermined a British Middle Eastern strategy which, from 1954, had increasingly centred on Iraq. At one stroke, the ability of Britain to rely on Iraq's support in the pursuit of wider regional goals through the Baghdad pact had become uncertain. To British policymakers, it seemed that Nasser had successfully taken yet another step to achieving the expulsion of British influence from the entire region. Yet British ass…
The strategic limitations of a Middle East client state by the mid-1950s
This article looks at how Libya – a British client state under the Anglo-Libyan treaty – refused to allow Britain the use of forces and bases in that country for operations against Egypt during the summer and autumn of 1956. The subsequent restrictions over the use of Libya was shown over the movement of the 10th Armoured Division for ‘training exercises’ on the Cyrenaican–Egyptian border during early August and later manifested in a written requ…
Coping with a Coup d'Etat’
The Iraqi revolution greatly undermined a British Middle Eastern strategy which, from 1954, had increasingly centred on Iraq. At one stroke, the ability of Britain to rely on Iraq's support in the pursuit of wider regional goals through the Baghdad pact had become uncertain. To British policymakers, it seemed that Nasser had successfully taken yet another step to achieving the expulsion of British influence from the entire region. Yet British ass…
Coping with a Coup d'Etat’
The Iraqi revolution greatly undermined a British Middle Eastern strategy which, from 1954, had increasingly centred on Iraq. At one stroke, the ability of Britain to rely on Iraq's support in the pursuit of wider regional goals through the Baghdad pact had become uncertain. To British policymakers, it seemed that Nasser had successfully taken yet another step to achieving the expulsion of British influence from the entire region. Yet British ass…
The strategic limitations of a Middle East client state by the mid-1950s
This article looks at how Libya – a British client state under the Anglo-Libyan treaty – refused to allow Britain the use of forces and bases in that country for operations against Egypt during the summer and autumn of 1956. The subsequent restrictions over the use of Libya was shown over the movement of the 10th Armoured Division for ‘training exercises’ on the Cyrenaican–Egyptian border during early August and later manifested in a written requ…
Crossing the Red Line?’
On 21/22 January 1944, RAF Bomber Command conducted an area-bombing attack on the city of Magdeburg. The outcome was hardly pleasing, marked by high losses and inaccurate bombing. However, most notable was the rancorous aftermath, in which a full-blown row would erupt between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command Headquarters. This stemmed from the Air Staff perceiving that Sir Arthur Harris had ‘crossed a red line’ in his non-cooperation with thei…
The termination of the long immunity from air raids’
Arthur Harris infamously pursued the Battle of Berlin in winter 1943/1944 in the face of an increasingly sceptical Air Staff and a disinterested prime minister. The irony was that originally the C-in-C Bomber Command was lukewarm about bombing Berlin. Instead, it was Churchill who continually pressed for attacking the German Capital under Operation Tannenberg, which went ahead in mid-January 1943, for wider political considerations, especially An…
Enough to be Seen to be Onside but Hardly Substantial?’
This article considers the operations of RAF Bomber Command in support of Operation Husky. Earmarked to play a considerable supporting role, the piece goes on to examine how valid operational difficulties, rather than the usual supposed notion of Sir Arthur Harris’ aversion to bombing Italy, would conspire to blunt its full participation. In attempting to get around these obstacles, Sir Arthur Tedder proposed a number of solutions, ranging from a…
Law (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Economics (4 obras) · History (4 obras) · History (4 obras) · Archaeological Research and Protection (3 obras) · Engineering (3 obras) · Management (3 obras) · Operations research (3 obras)