Elizabeth Ventham
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 6558994 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Elizabeth Ventham |
| NOMBRES | Elizabeth |
| APELLIDO | Ventham |
| FIRMA | VENTHAM E |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Salzburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8759-5339 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Marko Jurjako
Beyond the Pendulum
You Only Get Out What You Put In
This paper argues in favour of a desire-based account of normativity. In addition, it demonstrates that the view is particularly well-placed to answer ‘bootstrapping’ objections. Such objections have previously been taken to be a problem not just for desire-based accounts, but for a variety of other subjective accounts of practical normativity. I will begin by explaining desire-based accounts of normativity, and then by explicating two different …
Beyond the Social Value of Privacy
Privacy is something that is important to us at least in part because of other people. It can be valuable to help us to regulate our different social relationships, and show different sides of ourselves to our lovers, mentors, friends’ children, etc. In this paper, I argue that this is a good but incomplete account of the value of privacy. Privacy is also important in a non-social way, that doesn’t make primary reference to other people but that …
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction
One of the reasons why empathy is a topic of enduring interest is the role it can play in understanding others. Empathy can help us to predict each other’s future actions and explain past ones; to
Empathising in online spaces
This paper aims to better understand and account for potential difficulties in empathising with each other in online spaces. I argue that two important differences between online and in-person communication are both to do with what information comes across in equivalent interactions. Firstly, there are ways in which less information comes across in online interactions (both consciously and unconsciously). Secondly, agents have greater control ove…
The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories
Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does th…
Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action
Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person…
Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure and De Re Desires
This article has two main aims. First, it will defend an ‘attitudinal’ account of pleasure, that is, an account of what it is that makes an experience pleasurable for a subject that explains it in terms of a certain kind of de re desire that the subject has towards that experience. Second, in doing so, the article aims to further our understanding of unconscious desires, and of what the subjects of such desires can be. The article begins by intro…
Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure and De Re Desires
This article has two main aims. First, it will defend an ‘attitudinal’ account of pleasure, that is, an account of what it is that makes an experience pleasurable for a subject that explains it in terms of a certain kind of de re desire that the subject has towards that experience. Second, in doing so, the article aims to further our understanding of unconscious desires, and of what the subjects of such desires can be. The article begins by intro…
Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure and De Re Desires
This article has two main aims. First, it will defend an ‘attitudinal’ account of pleasure, that is, an account of what it is that makes an experience pleasurable for a subject that explains it in terms of a certain kind of de re desire that the subject has towards that experience. Second, in doing so, the article aims to further our understanding of unconscious desires, and of what the subjects of such desires can be. The article begins by intro…
The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories
Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does th…
Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action
Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person…
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction
One of the reasons why empathy is a topic of enduring interest is the role it can play in understanding others. Empathy can help us to predict each other’s future actions and explain past ones; to
Empathising in online spaces
This paper aims to better understand and account for potential difficulties in empathising with each other in online spaces. I argue that two important differences between online and in-person communication are both to do with what information comes across in equivalent interactions. Firstly, there are ways in which less information comes across in online interactions (both consciously and unconsciously). Secondly, agents have greater control ove…
You Only Get Out What You Put In
This paper argues in favour of a desire-based account of normativity. In addition, it demonstrates that the view is particularly well-placed to answer ‘bootstrapping’ objections. Such objections have previously been taken to be a problem not just for desire-based accounts, but for a variety of other subjective accounts of practical normativity. I will begin by explaining desire-based accounts of normativity, and then by explicating two different …
Beyond the Social Value of Privacy
Privacy is something that is important to us at least in part because of other people. It can be valuable to help us to regulate our different social relationships, and show different sides of ourselves to our lovers, mentors, friends’ children, etc. In this paper, I argue that this is a good but incomplete account of the value of privacy. Privacy is also important in a non-social way, that doesn’t make primary reference to other people but that …
Marko Jurjako
Beyond the Pendulum
Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Normative (3 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras)