Jakob Thrane Mainz
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 6686418 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jakob Thrane Mainz |
| NOMBRES | Jakob Thrane |
| APELLIDO | Mainz |
| FIRMA | MAINZ J T |
| AFILIACIONES | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7766-6439 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Medical AI
I discuss an influential argument put forward by Hatherley in the Journal of Medical Ethics . Drawing on influential philosophical accounts of interpersonal trust, Hatherley claims that medical artificial intelligence is capable of being reliable, but not trustworthy. Furthermore, Hatherley argues that trust generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. For instance, when a patient trusts a clinician, it generates certain moral obligation…
The privacy dependency thesis and self-defense
If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act may undermine other people’s ability to conceal information about them. Such dependencies are called privacy dependencies in the literature. Some say that privacy dependencies generate moral duties to avoid sharing information about oneself. If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing information to prevent them from doing so. In this …
Artificial intelligence and the secret ballot
Algorithmic decision-making
The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a d…
The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making
To Believe, or Not to Believe – That is Not the (Only) Question
The Patient preference predictor and the objection from higher-order preferences
Recently, Jardas et al have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas et al . I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as power…
Why Busing Voters to the Polling Station is Paying People to Vote
In this paper, we argue that the widespread practice in the United States of busing voters to the polling station on Election Day is an instance of paying people to vote. We defend a definition of what it means to pay people to vote, and on this definition, busing voters to the polling station is an instance of paying people to vote. Paying people to vote is illegal according to United States federal election law. However, the United States court…
The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies
Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that …
If you polluted, you’re included
In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referenda. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who po…
Inferences and the Right to Privacy
Why some defenders of positive duties serve a bad theoretical cocktail
In the literature on global justice, there has been a lengthy debate about what the world’s rich owe to the world’s poor. Some have argued that rich individuals have positive duties of beneficence to help the poor, while others have argued that rich individuals only have negative duties not to harm them. A common objection to the former view is that once it is accepted that positive duties exist, fulfilling these duties will be overdemanding sinc…
Privacy Rights, and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End
An Indirect Argument for the Access Theory of Privacy
But anyone can mix their labor
Francis Cheneval has recently argued that people have property rights over personal data about themselves. Until now, the discussion on data ownership has primarily been a discussion among legal theorists and economists. Cheneval contribution to the discussion is a very welcome input from academic philosophy. Cheneval attempts to reach his conclusion through two distinct strategies. One strategy is to reach the conclusion through a Lockean inspir…
Too Much Info
Too Much Info
Why some defenders of positive duties serve a bad theoretical cocktail
In the literature on global justice, there has been a lengthy debate about what the world’s rich owe to the world’s poor. Some have argued that rich individuals have positive duties of beneficence to help the poor, while others have argued that rich individuals only have negative duties not to harm them. A common objection to the former view is that once it is accepted that positive duties exist, fulfilling these duties will be overdemanding sinc…
An Indirect Argument for the Access Theory of Privacy
But anyone can mix their labor
Francis Cheneval has recently argued that people have property rights over personal data about themselves. Until now, the discussion on data ownership has primarily been a discussion among legal theorists and economists. Cheneval contribution to the discussion is a very welcome input from academic philosophy. Cheneval attempts to reach his conclusion through two distinct strategies. One strategy is to reach the conclusion through a Lockean inspir…
Too Much Info
Why some defenders of positive duties serve a bad theoretical cocktail
In the literature on global justice, there has been a lengthy debate about what the world’s rich owe to the world’s poor. Some have argued that rich individuals have positive duties of beneficence to help the poor, while others have argued that rich individuals only have negative duties not to harm them. A common objection to the former view is that once it is accepted that positive duties exist, fulfilling these duties will be overdemanding sinc…
Privacy Rights, and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End
An Indirect Argument for the Access Theory of Privacy
Inferences and the Right to Privacy
The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making
To Believe, or Not to Believe – That is Not the (Only) Question
The Patient preference predictor and the objection from higher-order preferences
Recently, Jardas et al have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas et al . I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as power…
Why Busing Voters to the Polling Station is Paying People to Vote
In this paper, we argue that the widespread practice in the United States of busing voters to the polling station on Election Day is an instance of paying people to vote. We defend a definition of what it means to pay people to vote, and on this definition, busing voters to the polling station is an instance of paying people to vote. Paying people to vote is illegal according to United States federal election law. However, the United States court…
The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies
Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that …
If you polluted, you’re included
In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referenda. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who po…
Medical AI
I discuss an influential argument put forward by Hatherley in the Journal of Medical Ethics . Drawing on influential philosophical accounts of interpersonal trust, Hatherley claims that medical artificial intelligence is capable of being reliable, but not trustworthy. Furthermore, Hatherley argues that trust generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. For instance, when a patient trusts a clinician, it generates certain moral obligation…
The privacy dependency thesis and self-defense
If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act may undermine other people’s ability to conceal information about them. Such dependencies are called privacy dependencies in the literature. Some say that privacy dependencies generate moral duties to avoid sharing information about oneself. If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing information to prevent them from doing so. In this …
Artificial intelligence and the secret ballot
Algorithmic decision-making
The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a d…
Computer Science (12 obras) · Political science (11 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Law and economics (9 obras) · Sociology (8 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Internet privacy (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Privacy, Security, and Data Protection (6 obras)