Thomas J Miceli
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 698038 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Thomas J Miceli |
| NOMBRES | Thomas J |
| APELLIDO | Miceli |
| FIRMA | MICELI T J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Connecticut |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6289-9280 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 25 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 43 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1989 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Reformulating Detection in the Economic Model of Crime
This paper examines how strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and foreign ownership influence the choice of commodity taxation principle. We show that the destination and origin principles create different CSR incentives: under the destination principle, increased foreign ownership raises CSR in the domestic firm but lowers it in the foreign firm, with the opposite pattern under the origin principle. Departing from Haufer et al. (2005),…
The broken-windows theory of crime
Counting offenders’ gains? Economic and moral considerations in the determination of criminality
Crime as exchange
An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws
Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria
Packaging deals in the entertainment industry
Creation of a television or movie project requires the bundling of inputs – writers, actors, directors – into a coherent package that can be produced and distributed. Traditionally this bundling was done by studios, which then negotiated compensation deals with input suppliers via their agents. However, large talent agencies have increasingly engaged in the practice of “packaging,” which involves creating vehicles for their clients and selling th…
Toward an Economic Theory of Religious Belief and the Emergence of Law
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders are a pervasive feature of punishment schemes in various contexts, but economic theory has had a hard time rationalizing the practice. This paper reviews the literature on escalating penalties, and then develops a theory based on uncertainty on the part of enforcers about offenders' gains from committing socially undesirable acts. The analysis derives the conditions under which escalating penalties are bo…
An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control
Modern‐day piracy on the high seas poses a serious threat to international shipping. This paper develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. Implementation of optimal enforcement policies is complicated by the need for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Free riding and other problem…
Political Legitimacy and Technology Adoption
A fundamental question of economic and technological history is why some civilizations adopted new and important technologies and others did not. In this paper, we construct a simple political-economy model that suggests that rulers may not accept a productivity-enhancing technology when it negatively affects an agent's ability to provide the ruler legitimacy. However, when other sources of legitimacy emerge, the ruler will accept the technology …
Crime and Punishment in Ottoman Times
Ruling for more than six centuries over lands that spanned three continents, the Ottomans developed a system of law enforcement that initially relied on fines collected by local agents. In the sixteenth century, much of the revenue from these fines went to the local officials in charge of identifying suspects and punishing criminals. To prevent corruption, the personnel responsible for adjudicating criminals were not also responsible for punishin…
Free riders, holdouts, and public use
Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment
Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this article we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. Although the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth-century O…
Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation
While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and…
The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems
The Mistaken Improver Problem
Voluntary Environmental Agreements
Organization and Distributional Equality in a Network of Communes
A distinctive feature of the Shaker organization of communes was to divide each commune into economically independent subdivisions called "Families." Although the sharing of wealth and egalitarian distribution of output were integral aspects of Shaker religious practice, the organization of their communes based on the Family system led to inequalities among Families. The data from the 1850, 1860, and 1870 US Census enumeration schedules show that…
The Decision to Regionalize in the Provision of Education
A Public Choice Analysis of the Evolution of Tort Law
In contrast to the article by W. Harris, it is contended that in the area of product liability a rule of strict liability is not necessarily less efficient than a negligence rule and an analogy between product liability cases and lotteries is not appropriate
Habitability Laws for Rental Housing
Court decisions in the 1970s dramatically changed the distribution of legal rights in the landlord-tenant relationship in seeking to improve the welfare of tenants, thought to be at a disadvantage in their search for housing. Both landlords and tenants contribute to the quality of services but the fact that the rights of ownership and use are separated prevents both parties from fully internalising the benefits of their efforts. The paper develop…
Free riders and distortionary zoning by local communities
Reputation in land development markets
The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems
Crime and Punishment in Ottoman Times
Ruling for more than six centuries over lands that spanned three continents, the Ottomans developed a system of law enforcement that initially relied on fines collected by local agents. In the sixteenth century, much of the revenue from these fines went to the local officials in charge of identifying suspects and punishing criminals. To prevent corruption, the personnel responsible for adjudicating criminals were not also responsible for punishin…
Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment
Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this article we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. Although the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth-century O…
The Decision to Regionalize in the Provision of Education
An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control
Modern‐day piracy on the high seas poses a serious threat to international shipping. This paper develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. Implementation of optimal enforcement policies is complicated by the need for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Free riding and other problem…
Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation
While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and…
Free riders and distortionary zoning by local communities
Free riders, holdouts, and public use
Organization and Distributional Equality in a Network of Communes
A distinctive feature of the Shaker organization of communes was to divide each commune into economically independent subdivisions called "Families." Although the sharing of wealth and egalitarian distribution of output were integral aspects of Shaker religious practice, the organization of their communes based on the Family system led to inequalities among Families. The data from the 1850, 1860, and 1870 US Census enumeration schedules show that…
Reputation in land development markets
Reputation in land development markets
Free riders and distortionary zoning by local communities
Habitability Laws for Rental Housing
Court decisions in the 1970s dramatically changed the distribution of legal rights in the landlord-tenant relationship in seeking to improve the welfare of tenants, thought to be at a disadvantage in their search for housing. Both landlords and tenants contribute to the quality of services but the fact that the rights of ownership and use are separated prevents both parties from fully internalising the benefits of their efforts. The paper develop…
The Decision to Regionalize in the Provision of Education
A Public Choice Analysis of the Evolution of Tort Law
In contrast to the article by W. Harris, it is contended that in the area of product liability a rule of strict liability is not necessarily less efficient than a negligence rule and an analogy between product liability cases and lotteries is not appropriate
Organization and Distributional Equality in a Network of Communes
A distinctive feature of the Shaker organization of communes was to divide each commune into economically independent subdivisions called "Families." Although the sharing of wealth and egalitarian distribution of output were integral aspects of Shaker religious practice, the organization of their communes based on the Family system led to inequalities among Families. The data from the 1850, 1860, and 1870 US Census enumeration schedules show that…
Voluntary Environmental Agreements
The Mistaken Improver Problem
The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems
Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation
While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and…
Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment
Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this article we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. Although the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth-century O…
Free riders, holdouts, and public use
Political Legitimacy and Technology Adoption
A fundamental question of economic and technological history is why some civilizations adopted new and important technologies and others did not. In this paper, we construct a simple political-economy model that suggests that rulers may not accept a productivity-enhancing technology when it negatively affects an agent's ability to provide the ruler legitimacy. However, when other sources of legitimacy emerge, the ruler will accept the technology …
Crime and Punishment in Ottoman Times
Ruling for more than six centuries over lands that spanned three continents, the Ottomans developed a system of law enforcement that initially relied on fines collected by local agents. In the sixteenth century, much of the revenue from these fines went to the local officials in charge of identifying suspects and punishing criminals. To prevent corruption, the personnel responsible for adjudicating criminals were not also responsible for punishin…
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders are a pervasive feature of punishment schemes in various contexts, but economic theory has had a hard time rationalizing the practice. This paper reviews the literature on escalating penalties, and then develops a theory based on uncertainty on the part of enforcers about offenders' gains from committing socially undesirable acts. The analysis derives the conditions under which escalating penalties are bo…
An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control
Modern‐day piracy on the high seas poses a serious threat to international shipping. This paper develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. Implementation of optimal enforcement policies is complicated by the need for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Free riding and other problem…
Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand
Toward an Economic Theory of Religious Belief and the Emergence of Law
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Packaging deals in the entertainment industry
Creation of a television or movie project requires the bundling of inputs – writers, actors, directors – into a coherent package that can be produced and distributed. Traditionally this bundling was done by studios, which then negotiated compensation deals with input suppliers via their agents. However, large talent agencies have increasingly engaged in the practice of “packaging,” which involves creating vehicles for their clients and selling th…
Crime as exchange
An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws
Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria
Counting offenders’ gains? Economic and moral considerations in the determination of criminality
The broken-windows theory of crime
Reformulating Detection in the Economic Model of Crime
This paper examines how strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and foreign ownership influence the choice of commodity taxation principle. We show that the destination and origin principles create different CSR incentives: under the destination principle, increased foreign ownership raises CSR in the domestic firm but lowers it in the foreign firm, with the opposite pattern under the origin principle. Departing from Haufer et al. (2005),…
Economics (23 obras) · Law (15 obras) · Political science (15 obras) · Business (12 obras) · Computer Science (10 obras) · Law and economics (10 obras) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (8 obras) · Microeconomics (8 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 obras) · Law (7 obras)