Roger Koppl
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 704844 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Roger Koppl |
| NOMBRES | Roger |
| APELLIDO | Koppl |
| FIRMA | KOPPL R |
| AFILIACIONES | Fairleigh Dickinson University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4807-2770 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 47 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1991 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Bespoke science
Many governments formed ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic because they offered the government greater control over policy advice than standing agencies. The difference between ad hoc and standing advisory bodies has been little noted in the literature. High-uncertainty crises demanding expertise and requiring action from the national government increase the value of policy discretion, raising the value of controlling …
On Democracy and Capitalism
Gerhard Wegner has shown that capitalism and democracy may not be mutually supporting, and political liberty may not lead to economic liberty. Personal and economic liberty once established may fall away more easily than scholars such as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) maintain. I bolster Wegner’s nuanced view with evidence of the early effects of the Industrial Revolution on worker wealth and welfare. Workers …
Public health and expert failure
The Cacophony within Law and Macroeconomics
The emerging field of law and macroeconomics is dominated by Keynesianism, which is used to defend interventionism. Law fluctuates with economic fluctuations. I defend an alternative approach that resists fluctuations in the law and supports the rule of law. This approach emerges from old-fashioned monetary theory as exemplified by the work of F. A. Hayek and Leland Yeager. I show how the tools of complexity economics may be used to build on the …
The Rule of Experts
The division of labor creates a division of knowledge, which creates expertise and the problem of experts. The rule of experts exists when experts have an epistemic monopoly and choose for others. Generally, experts may have power that threatens individual autonomy. Competition tends to dissipate the power of experts, although the details of market structure matter. Even well-meaning experts may fail because they have bounded rationality. Epistem…
Entangled Political Economy
The term the "Entangled political economy" was first coined by economist Richard E. Wagner of George Mason University who challenged the "additive" political economy paradigm with his "entangled political economy," which sees public and private entities as equal and entwined players in exchange relations. This volume examines entangled political economy from several distinct but complementary points of view. The history of entangled political eco…
An economic perspective on “Unanalyzed evidence in law‐enforcement agencies”
A Battle of Forensic Experts is not a Race to the Bottom
We apply concepts from the small, but growing literature on the economics of experts to forensic science. An economic theory of experts must build on the assumption that experts are no more or less influenced by incentives than actors in other areas of human action. We suggest changes in the organization of forensic science that will improve error prevention, detection, and correction. In particular, a right of forensic expertise for the defense …
The Preaching Must Never Stop
The Social Construction of Expertise
Austrian economics and entrepreneurial studies
Carabelli & de Vecchi on Keynes and Hayek
Carabelli & De Vecchi dispute competing interpretations of Keynes and Hayek, including ours. They mistakenly impute to us the view that Keynes was inconsistent. They deny that Keynes had a subjectivist theory of expectations by noting his rationalist philosophy. We agree that Keynes had a rationalist philosophy, but deny that this implies an objectivist theory of economic expectations. We persist in viewing Keynes as a subjectivist regarding expe…
Rational-choice hermeneutics
Custom and Rules
This comment is part of a symposium on Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom in the Economy (1998
Confidence in Keynes and Hayek
We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the ec…
Mises and Schutz on Ideal Types
Ludwig von Mises's fundamental epistemological ideas regarding 'conception' and 'understanding' prevented him from constructing a theory of economic expectations. Building on different philosophical foundations, his student Alfred Schutz discovered the importance of 'anonymity' in economic analysis and was thus able to make a fundamental contribution to the theory of economic expectations. This difference between Mises and Schutz is of interest f…
The Varieties of Subjectivism
Research Article| June 01 1997 The Varieties of Subjectivism: Keynes and Hayek on Expectations William N. Butos; William N. Butos 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Roger G. Koppl Roger G. Koppl 2 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1997) 29 (2): 327–359. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-29-2-327 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissi…
Big Players and Herding in Asset Markets
Hayekian expectations
Retrospectives
John Maynard Keynes argued that when the conditions for rational action are not present, people are driven by "animal spirits." This article briefly considers Keynes' argument, and the history of the term
The Varieties of Subjectivism
Research Article| June 01 1997 The Varieties of Subjectivism: Keynes and Hayek on Expectations William N. Butos; William N. Butos 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Roger G. Koppl Roger G. Koppl 2 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1997) 29 (2): 327–359. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-29-2-327 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissi…
Public health and expert failure
Rational-choice hermeneutics
Big Players and Herding in Asset Markets
Hayekian expectations
A Battle of Forensic Experts is not a Race to the Bottom
We apply concepts from the small, but growing literature on the economics of experts to forensic science. An economic theory of experts must build on the assumption that experts are no more or less influenced by incentives than actors in other areas of human action. We suggest changes in the organization of forensic science that will improve error prevention, detection, and correction. In particular, a right of forensic expertise for the defense …
Retrospectives
John Maynard Keynes argued that when the conditions for rational action are not present, people are driven by "animal spirits." This article briefly considers Keynes' argument, and the history of the term
Bespoke science
Many governments formed ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic because they offered the government greater control over policy advice than standing agencies. The difference between ad hoc and standing advisory bodies has been little noted in the literature. High-uncertainty crises demanding expertise and requiring action from the national government increase the value of policy discretion, raising the value of controlling …
An economic perspective on “Unanalyzed evidence in law‐enforcement agencies”
The Preaching Must Never Stop
Carabelli & de Vecchi on Keynes and Hayek
Carabelli & De Vecchi dispute competing interpretations of Keynes and Hayek, including ours. They mistakenly impute to us the view that Keynes was inconsistent. They deny that Keynes had a subjectivist theory of expectations by noting his rationalist philosophy. We agree that Keynes had a rationalist philosophy, but deny that this implies an objectivist theory of economic expectations. We persist in viewing Keynes as a subjectivist regarding expe…
Mises and Schutz on Ideal Types
Ludwig von Mises's fundamental epistemological ideas regarding 'conception' and 'understanding' prevented him from constructing a theory of economic expectations. Building on different philosophical foundations, his student Alfred Schutz discovered the importance of 'anonymity' in economic analysis and was thus able to make a fundamental contribution to the theory of economic expectations. This difference between Mises and Schutz is of interest f…
Retrospectives
John Maynard Keynes argued that when the conditions for rational action are not present, people are driven by "animal spirits." This article briefly considers Keynes' argument, and the history of the term
Hayekian expectations
Big Players and Herding in Asset Markets
Mises and Schutz on Ideal Types
Ludwig von Mises's fundamental epistemological ideas regarding 'conception' and 'understanding' prevented him from constructing a theory of economic expectations. Building on different philosophical foundations, his student Alfred Schutz discovered the importance of 'anonymity' in economic analysis and was thus able to make a fundamental contribution to the theory of economic expectations. This difference between Mises and Schutz is of interest f…
The Varieties of Subjectivism
Research Article| June 01 1997 The Varieties of Subjectivism: Keynes and Hayek on Expectations William N. Butos; William N. Butos 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Roger G. Koppl Roger G. Koppl 2 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1997) 29 (2): 327–359. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-29-2-327 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissi…
Confidence in Keynes and Hayek
We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the ec…
Custom and Rules
This comment is part of a symposium on Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom in the Economy (1998
Austrian economics and entrepreneurial studies
Carabelli & de Vecchi on Keynes and Hayek
Carabelli & De Vecchi dispute competing interpretations of Keynes and Hayek, including ours. They mistakenly impute to us the view that Keynes was inconsistent. They deny that Keynes had a subjectivist theory of expectations by noting his rationalist philosophy. We agree that Keynes had a rationalist philosophy, but deny that this implies an objectivist theory of economic expectations. We persist in viewing Keynes as a subjectivist regarding expe…
Rational-choice hermeneutics
An economic perspective on “Unanalyzed evidence in law‐enforcement agencies”
A Battle of Forensic Experts is not a Race to the Bottom
We apply concepts from the small, but growing literature on the economics of experts to forensic science. An economic theory of experts must build on the assumption that experts are no more or less influenced by incentives than actors in other areas of human action. We suggest changes in the organization of forensic science that will improve error prevention, detection, and correction. In particular, a right of forensic expertise for the defense …
The Preaching Must Never Stop
The Social Construction of Expertise
Entangled Political Economy
The term the "Entangled political economy" was first coined by economist Richard E. Wagner of George Mason University who challenged the "additive" political economy paradigm with his "entangled political economy," which sees public and private entities as equal and entwined players in exchange relations. This volume examines entangled political economy from several distinct but complementary points of view. The history of entangled political eco…
The Rule of Experts
The division of labor creates a division of knowledge, which creates expertise and the problem of experts. The rule of experts exists when experts have an epistemic monopoly and choose for others. Generally, experts may have power that threatens individual autonomy. Competition tends to dissipate the power of experts, although the details of market structure matter. Even well-meaning experts may fail because they have bounded rationality. Epistem…
The Cacophony within Law and Macroeconomics
The emerging field of law and macroeconomics is dominated by Keynesianism, which is used to defend interventionism. Law fluctuates with economic fluctuations. I defend an alternative approach that resists fluctuations in the law and supports the rule of law. This approach emerges from old-fashioned monetary theory as exemplified by the work of F. A. Hayek and Leland Yeager. I show how the tools of complexity economics may be used to build on the …
Public health and expert failure
On Democracy and Capitalism
Gerhard Wegner has shown that capitalism and democracy may not be mutually supporting, and political liberty may not lead to economic liberty. Personal and economic liberty once established may fall away more easily than scholars such as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) maintain. I bolster Wegner’s nuanced view with evidence of the early effects of the Industrial Revolution on worker wealth and welfare. Workers …
Bespoke science
Many governments formed ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic because they offered the government greater control over policy advice than standing agencies. The difference between ad hoc and standing advisory bodies has been little noted in the literature. High-uncertainty crises demanding expertise and requiring action from the national government increase the value of policy discretion, raising the value of controlling …
Economics (18 obras) · Law (12 obras) · Political science (12 obras) · Economic Theory and Institutions (11 obras) · Sociology (8 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Positive economics (7 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Economic theories and models (5 obras)