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Peter A Zaleski

Datos Biográficos

ID715265
NOMBREPeter A Zaleski
NOMBRESPeter A
APELLIDOZaleski
FIRMAZALESKI P A
AFILIACIONESVillanova University
ORCID0000-0002-6703-6011
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS8
TOTAL DE CITAS47
TOTAL COMO AUTOR8
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1992
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN1999
ÍNDICE H4
  • Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life

    Open Access•Alfredo G Esposto, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1999•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 10

  • Group size and the free-rider hypothesis

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 9

  • The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Social Economy•1995•Citada por: 11•Referencias: 17

    This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation…

  • The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation

    Open Access•Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 7

    The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fel…

  • Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994•Citada por: 9

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 158-167

  • Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech et al.•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, R. Hoge, Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 197-206

  • Antitrust, the market, and the State

    Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Forum for Social Economics•1993•Referencias: 1

    (1993). Antitrust, the market, and the State: The Contributions of Walter Adams. Edited by James W. Brock and Kenneth G. Elzinga. Forum for Social Economics: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 76-77

  • Determinants of Contributions to Religious Organizations

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1992•Citada por: 15

    A model of contributions to one's religious congregation suggests that since the operations of the congregation rely upon voluntary contributions from members, congregation members will contribute less as congregation size increases. This type of behavior, known as free riding is supported by the empirical results. Furthermore, income, race, congregation expenses and denomination are key determinants of contributions

  • Determinants of Contributions to Religious Organizations

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1992•Citada por: 15

    A model of contributions to one's religious congregation suggests that since the operations of the congregation rely upon voluntary contributions from members, congregation members will contribute less as congregation size increases. This type of behavior, known as free riding is supported by the empirical results. Furthermore, income, race, congregation expenses and denomination are key determinants of contributions

  • The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Social Economy•1995•Citada por: 11•Referencias: 17

    This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation…

  • Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994•Citada por: 9

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 158-167

  • Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life

    Open Access•Alfredo G Esposto, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1999•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 10

  • The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation

    Open Access•Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 7

    The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fel…

  • Group size and the free-rider hypothesis

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 9

  • Determinants of Contributions to Religious Organizations

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1992•Citada por: 15

    A model of contributions to one's religious congregation suggests that since the operations of the congregation rely upon voluntary contributions from members, congregation members will contribute less as congregation size increases. This type of behavior, known as free riding is supported by the empirical results. Furthermore, income, race, congregation expenses and denomination are key determinants of contributions

  • Antitrust, the market, and the State

    Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Forum for Social Economics•1993•Referencias: 1

    (1993). Antitrust, the market, and the State: The Contributions of Walter Adams. Edited by James W. Brock and Kenneth G. Elzinga. Forum for Social Economics: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 76-77

  • Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994•Citada por: 9

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 158-167

  • Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech et al.•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, R. Hoge, Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 197-206

  • The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Social Economy•1995•Citada por: 11•Referencias: 17

    This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation…

  • The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation

    Open Access•Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 7

    The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fel…

  • Group size and the free-rider hypothesis

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 9

  • Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life

    Open Access•Alfredo G Esposto, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1999•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 10

Economics (7 obras) · Religion and Society Interactions (6 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Religion, Society, and Development (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology (4 obras) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras)

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