John Garen
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 715326 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | John Garen |
| NOMBRES | John |
| APELLIDO | Garen |
| FIRMA | GAREN J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Kentucky |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4641-8811 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 37 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1985 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Enhancing economic freedom via school choice and competition
An aspect of economic freedom that varies across U.S. states is K-12 educational freedom. Some states allow a degree of choice for families in selecting schools outside public schools for their children. However, the enabling laws for such programs are often quite restrictive and limited to few children. Can this limited degree of competition and choice have a noticeable effect on an entire state's overall K-12 performance? I find strikingly larg…
Do more open economies have bigger governments? Another look
Do Health Insurance and Pension Costs Reduce the Job Opportunities of Older Workers
Using a 1991 nationwide survey of employers and 1979, 1983, 1988, and 1993 data from the Employee Benefits Supplement of the Current Population Survey, the authors examine the effects of fringe benefit provision on the decision to hire older workers. They find that higher health insurance costs, in the presence of prohibitions against age discrimination and discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits, adversely affected older workers' empl…
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
The empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base hypotheses regarding its determinants. In contrast, this paper analyzes a simple principal-agent model to determine how well it explains variations in CEO incentive pay and salaries. Many findings are consistent with the basic intuition of principle-agent models that compensation is structured to trade off incentives with insura…
Job-Match Quality as an Error Component and the Wage-Tenure Profile
John E. Garen, Job-Match Quality as an Error Component and the Wage-Tenure Profile: A Comparison and Test of Alternative Estimators, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 245-252
Job-Match Quality as an Error Component and the Wage-Tenure Profiler A Comparison and Test of Alternative Estimators
The job-matching hypothesis implies that the disturbance of the standard-wage equation is correlated with one of the regressors, tenure, causing an overestimation of the effect of tenure on wages. This hypothesis is tested and consistent estimates of wage-equation parameters obtained using the methods of Hausman (1978). The approach treats job-match quality as a component of the disturbance term, and an error-components estimator is compared to a…
Compensating Wage Differentials and the Endogeneity of Job Riskiness
Those with greater earnings capacity are likely to choose safer jobs, assuming safety is a normal good. Those who e xperience greater returns to job may choose riskier jobs. This paper estimates wage premia for risk of fatality and injury, allowing unobs ervables to affect earnings capacity and the returns to risk. As the endogeneity of job risk causes bias in OLS estimation, the model is e stimated with simultaneous equations and modified select…
Worker Heterogeneity, Job Screening, and Firm Size
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
The empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base hypotheses regarding its determinants. In contrast, this paper analyzes a simple principal-agent model to determine how well it explains variations in CEO incentive pay and salaries. Many findings are consistent with the basic intuition of principle-agent models that compensation is structured to trade off incentives with insura…
Worker Heterogeneity, Job Screening, and Firm Size
Do Health Insurance and Pension Costs Reduce the Job Opportunities of Older Workers
Using a 1991 nationwide survey of employers and 1979, 1983, 1988, and 1993 data from the Employee Benefits Supplement of the Current Population Survey, the authors examine the effects of fringe benefit provision on the decision to hire older workers. They find that higher health insurance costs, in the presence of prohibitions against age discrimination and discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits, adversely affected older workers' empl…
Do more open economies have bigger governments? Another look
Worker Heterogeneity, Job Screening, and Firm Size
Compensating Wage Differentials and the Endogeneity of Job Riskiness
Those with greater earnings capacity are likely to choose safer jobs, assuming safety is a normal good. Those who e xperience greater returns to job may choose riskier jobs. This paper estimates wage premia for risk of fatality and injury, allowing unobs ervables to affect earnings capacity and the returns to risk. As the endogeneity of job risk causes bias in OLS estimation, the model is e stimated with simultaneous equations and modified select…
Job-Match Quality as an Error Component and the Wage-Tenure Profile
John E. Garen, Job-Match Quality as an Error Component and the Wage-Tenure Profile: A Comparison and Test of Alternative Estimators, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 245-252
Job-Match Quality as an Error Component and the Wage-Tenure Profiler A Comparison and Test of Alternative Estimators
The job-matching hypothesis implies that the disturbance of the standard-wage equation is correlated with one of the regressors, tenure, causing an overestimation of the effect of tenure on wages. This hypothesis is tested and consistent estimates of wage-equation parameters obtained using the methods of Hausman (1978). The approach treats job-match quality as a component of the disturbance term, and an error-components estimator is compared to a…
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
The empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base hypotheses regarding its determinants. In contrast, this paper analyzes a simple principal-agent model to determine how well it explains variations in CEO incentive pay and salaries. Many findings are consistent with the basic intuition of principle-agent models that compensation is structured to trade off incentives with insura…
Do Health Insurance and Pension Costs Reduce the Job Opportunities of Older Workers
Using a 1991 nationwide survey of employers and 1979, 1983, 1988, and 1993 data from the Employee Benefits Supplement of the Current Population Survey, the authors examine the effects of fringe benefit provision on the decision to hire older workers. They find that higher health insurance costs, in the presence of prohibitions against age discrimination and discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits, adversely affected older workers' empl…
Do more open economies have bigger governments? Another look
Enhancing economic freedom via school choice and competition
An aspect of economic freedom that varies across U.S. states is K-12 educational freedom. Some states allow a degree of choice for families in selecting schools outside public schools for their children. However, the enabling laws for such programs are often quite restrictive and limited to few children. Can this limited degree of competition and choice have a noticeable effect on an entire state's overall K-12 performance? I find strikingly larg…
Economics (8 obras) · Labour economics (5 obras) · Econometrics (4 obras) · Wage (3 obras) · Business (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Demographic economics (2 obras) · Employment and Welfare Studies (2 obras) · Estimator (2 obras) · Finance (2 obras)